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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE

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THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN INDIA'S THIRD PLAN*

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The key decisions in Indian planning concern the area of direct governmental operations. How large will investment in the public sector be in the Third Plan? How will it be allocated? What major new lines of policy will government adopt? When the Planning Commission gives some indication, however preliminary, of the answers here, the "tone" for the development effort for 1961-66 will have been set.

Inevitably, government deprecates any "pause for consolidation" in its march forward to economic expansion. The investment program must continue to expand; given the goal of a "democratic and socialist society," the role of government must also expand. Within these broad and understandable requirements however, there is considerable scope for major differences in the specific decisions as to how much, where, and what. This brief note is written far from New Delhi and remote from the various pressures and considerations which bear directly upon the official answers. Nonetheless, it points up some past experiences in India which are directly relevant to these momentous decisions.

I. How Large the Public Sector, 1961-66?Plans

In the First Plan, development outlays in the public sector were eventually scheduled aggregate to Rs. 2,378 crores; the investment component of these outlays was about Rs. 1,850 crores (see Table 1). For 1956-61 both these magnitudes were given explicitly: Rs. 4,800 crores and 3,800 crores respectively. An aggregate investment program in the public and private sectors of the order of Rs. 3,500-3,600 crores was considered possible for 1951-56; for the Second Plan years, this was taken at Rs. 6,200 crores. The ratio of public to total investment increased from an estimated 50 percent in the pre-planning years (1950/51) to 52 percent over the First Plan and 61 percent over the Second.

* The gist of section I of this paper has appeared in the Tenth Annual Number of The Economic Weekly, Vol. XI, Nos. 4-6, pp. 179-202.

Table 1. Characteristics of Monetized Savings and Investment
(Rs. Crores)*

	Pre-Plan (1950/51)Actual	First Plan		Second Plan	
		Plan	Actual	Plan	Projection
<u>Net Domestic Investment</u>					
Total	380	3,550	3,100	6,200	6,000
Public Sector	190	1,850	1,500	3,800	3,300
Ratio	(50%)	(52%)	(48.5%)	(61.3%)	(55%)
<u>Net Imports</u>					
Total	-39 ^a	800	125 ^b	1,100	2,100
Public Sector	-18.5	700	250	1,000	2,000
<u>Domestic Savings</u>					
Total	420	2,750	2,975	5,100	3,900
Used in Public Sector ^c	210	1,150	1,250	2,800	1,300
Ratio					
Average	(50%)	(42%)	(42%)	(55%)	(33%)
Marginal	---	(17%)	(23%)	(73.5%)	(5.4%)

* All data but those projected are from official sources.

a India was a net investor abroad on both public and private account in 1950/51.

b On private account there was net investment abroad over the First Plan years. (Both groups of figures exaggerate transactions on private account due to errors and omission.)

c Note: This is not saved by public sector, it is saved, or borrowed, etc., by government from domestic sources.

The striking characteristic of this large increase in the Second Plan was its dependence upon borrowing, domestic and foreign, as distinct from surpluses on current account of regular governmental operations and of various public enterprises. Indeed, given the fact that noninvestment development outlay is actually a current account item, revenue surpluses from the various government activities were to provide but 5 percent of all public investment; 63 percent was to be borrowed domestically (but half of this through "deficit financing"), 21 percent was "to be raised externally" through loans and grants, while the uncovered gap (11 percent) might be covered by additional measures (unspecified) to raise resources domestically.

Relevant here are facts as to the basic savings-investment habits and patterns of the Indian economy. A nation of entrepreneurs--and most of India's work force is self-employed--has a high propensity to invest directly any surpluses arising in the individual enterprise. Self-financing is of great importance in large enterprise--and in small. Most Indian enterprise thus tends to have this direct-investment attribute. It is true that banks, insurance companies,

stock exchanges, cooperative societies, and the like, do facilitate the flow of private savings from individuals into public investment, and perhaps into a few of the larger industrial enterprises. In 1950/51, this transfer to government may have involved about one-fourth of total monetized savings; the transfer to big enterprise about half this amount.¹ Before the Plans, at any rate, no less than 50 percent, and at times as much as 60 percent of all investment was made directly by the private saver. With respect to the private sector alone, as much as 75 percent may have been directly invested.

While the First Plan did not really involve any significant interference with the traditional savings pattern, the Second Plan envisaged a marked break with past performance. Thus the planned expansion of the public sector implied that no less than 73 percent of the anticipated growth in (monetized) savings during 1956-61 was to become available to the public sector (see Table 1).²

Finally, the First Plan tended to retain the same general pattern of allocation within the public sector as prevailed in recent pre-Plan years. The Second Plan called for significant reductions in agriculture and for significant increases (all on a relative basis) in modern industry, mining and power. Thus, it was the Second Plan which was to bring the marked changes in the scale of investment effort, in the methods for financing it, in its allocation between public and private sectors and indeed among major industrial categories.

Performance

According to the Planning Commission, public investment during the First Plan accounted for 48.5 percent of the total of Rs. 3,100 crores actually achieved. Actually, the scale and investment pattern for this Plan were in line with performance in 1950/51. The public sector had expected to invest some 50 percent of total investment; it planned to mobilize for its purposes about 40 - 45 percent of all domestic savings--all consistent with traditional savings flows.

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1. See for example the rough estimates presented by the Government of India, Planning Commission, First Five Year Plan, New Delhi, 1952, pp. 107-108.
 2. This observation, as indeed the present paper, is addressed to the distribution of any volume of savings between public and private investment. We are not specifically concerned here with the more familiar question of the distribution of additional income between savings and consumption--the marginal propensities to save and to consume. In the First Plan, the saving propensity was assumed at 20 percent; it actually worked out to be significantly higher, perhaps 30 percent. The Second Plan was less explicit on this point, but it can be calculated that a marginal ratio of about 30 percent was implicit in the estimates. On the basis of the savings figures of Table 1 and rough projections of national income, it is conceivable that this ratio be attained. (These calculated propensities are approximate, since only rough adjustments were made for price changes over the period. Also, they apply only to monetized transactions.)

Detailed records for the Second Plan years are not yet available. However, such information as there is suggests the persistence over the first two years of a ratio of public investment closer to 50 percent, as in preceding periods, than any approximation to the 61 percent specified in the Plan. Public investment in two years did not reach 30 percent of the five year target of Rs. 3,800 crores, while the economy as a whole was investing at about as high a rate as had been anticipated.

Actually, governmental operations did not yield a surplus during those first two years after taking account of the noninvestment outlays called for in the Plan. Loans and small savings fell well below the target levels: only 27 percent of the five year goals was achieved. Indeed, it was external assistance and deficit financing which provided the resources for 85 percent of the actual public investment in those two years. The private sector preferred to invest directly rather than through government. Without a much more extensive and aggressive system of taxation and other fiscal and monetary controls, and perhaps a broad extension of pricing and distribution power to government, the Second Plan's expectations for change in savings patterns were simply unrealistic. At any rate, this has been patently evident in the actual record to date.

Second Plan Outlook

Government is now making greater efforts to step up its investment performance--with a consequent slowing down in the private sector (and with a smaller expansion in national product during 1956-61 than might have been, as we will indicate below). It is conceivable that actual investment in the public sector over the Second Plan (without adjustment for the lower domestic purchasing power of the rupee accompanying price increases) can reach Rs. 3,300 crores, corresponding to development outlays of some Rs. 4,200 crores. However, a public sector of Rs. 3,200 crores (still an impressive 100 percent and more above the First Plan level) is more probable. For the economy as a whole, net investment might well be of the order of Rs. 6,000 crores--a result consistent with some overperformance in the private sector (12 percent) accompanying underperformance in the public (15 percent).

There would then be a 55 percent ratio for public investment, the financial resources for which were supplied in very important measure from external sources. The net import surplus may well reach Rs. 2,000 crores over the Plan years, when account is taken of the use of some Rs. 600 crores of India's foreign balances. This means that government will have used only Rs. 1,300 crores of domestic monetized savings over the Second Plan years, less than half the level anticipated in the Plan.³ This projection appears in

3. It is possible to reconcile this estimate of Rs. 1,300 crores with official published data after allowance is made for noninvestment outlays, for depreciation items, etc. In this connection, it is important to recognize that government "borrowing" of Rs. 1,200 crores through deficit financing does not represent an equivalent tapping of domestic savings. Rs. 600 crores of "domestic" expenditure by government made possible the net imports financed by reductions in foreign exchange reserves. At most, therefore, only half of the deficit financing can be considered as domestic savings.

Table 1 alongside of comparable data from plans and performance in earlier periods.

Over the years 1956-61, a total of Rs. 3,900 crores of investment in monetized form will have been made as a result of domestic savings. This last, as Table 1 implies, also assumes that there will occur a net inflow on private investment account of Rs. 100 crores; thus Rs. 2,100 crores out of the total investment will have been financed abroad. Government would then have mobilized and used 33-1/3 percent of the nation's savings, a significantly lower ratio than prevailed in the First Plan years. In incremental terms, domestic monetized savings will have increased Rs. 925 crores above the 1951-56 total, and of these government was able to attract only Rs. 50 crores in one way or another--a marginal ratio equal to but 5.4 percent as against the 73.5 percent implicit in the original Second Plan formulation. Even this performance, it may be added, was influenced favorably by special factors. Thus it is questionable that such large reliance can in the future be placed on short-term borrowing through the Reserve Bank.

Third Plan Alternatives

What now about the scale of public effort in the Third Plan? Let us assume that the total investment target becomes Rs. 9,000 crores (see Table 2)--an amount which, given probable performance during 1956-61, may not be much out of line with the Rs. 9,900 crores projected in the Second Plan⁴. Forward motion for the public sector might mean raising the planned ratio for the public sector from its 61 percent in the Second Plan to 66-2/3 percent in the Third, we'll say. Suppose now that India and the rest of the world arranged to finance as much as Rs. 3,000 crores of this (net) total from abroad, with some Rs. 300 crores of this amount from private sources. Under this set of assumptions, public authorities would have to attract 55 percent of total monetized domestic savings, as against 33 percent calculated above in the Second Plan projection. In marginal terms, 95 percent of each additional crore of domestic monetized savings would have to go to the public sector!

Let us assume now that rather than the 66-2/3 percent ratio, the public sector were to content itself with the 55 percent figure here projected for the Second Plan period. The public sector would account for Rs. 5,000 crores from the Rs. 9,000 crores total (Alternative II). Net financing from abroad would still have to be Rs. 2,500 crores to keep the public saving ratio at the 42 percent level actually achieved in the First Plan. If government only maintains its Second Plan performance in mobilizing domestic savings, net imports from abroad would have to total about Rs. 3,500 crores. In either event, there would still have to be a significant expansion above actual 1956-61 levels in the increment of total monetized savings which the public sector is able to use.

4. Government of India, Planning Commission, Second Five Year Plan, New Delhi, 1956, p. 11.

Table 2. Savings-Investment Calculations: The Third Plan 1961-66
(Rs. Crores)

	<u>Alternative I</u>	<u>Alternative II</u>	<u>Pant Projection*</u>
<u>Net Domestic Investment</u>			
Total	9,000	9,000	10,000
Public Sector	6,000	5,000	6,700
Ratio	(66.7%)	(55%)	(66.7%)
<u>Net Imports</u>			
Total	3,000	2,500	1,250
Public Sector	2,700	2,250	1,000
<u>Domestic Savings</u>			
Total	6,000	6,500	8,750
Used in Public Sector	3,300	2,750	5,700
Ratio			
Average	(55%)	(42%)	(65%)
Marginal	(95.2%)	(55.8%)	(90.8%)

- * The Statesman, Delhi, February 5, 1959 gave most of these data in its description of a working paper submitted to India's National Development Council. This paper was prepared by Pitambar Pant, Head of the Planning Commission, Perspective Planning Division.

The larger the public sector, the smaller the dependence upon financing from abroad, the greater the need for intensification of governmental efforts to alter past patterns of the flow of domestic savings into investment. In this regard, the third set of figures shown in Table 2 is interesting, since they are working estimates very recently prepared by an official group in India.⁵ Quite apart from the implications these have for the scale of total savings, they mean that government would have to quadruple and more the absolute level of its use of domestic resources as compared with our projection for the Second Plan. Over ninety percent of this large increment in monetized savings would have to become available to the public sector. This will clearly involve major new ventures in India's economic life.

5. I have only added the assumption that there would be foreign investment in the private sector also. The figure of Rs. 250 crores is simply an estimate. No mention of it is made in the account cited. Without such investment, domestic savings would need to average closer to 45 percent for these years, as against 40 percent if there were such private investment from abroad. This propensity for alternatives I and II in Table 2 might be about 25 to 30 percent as in the past.

Indeed, as plans for investment in the public sector during 1961-66 expand beyond Rs. 5,000 crores, there will have to be a new approach to taxation, especially in the rural sectors, as well as systems of prices and marketings which can step up government surpluses. A country in which government itself intends to make more than 50 percent of all investment will encounter certain incongruities in retaining in the private sector responsibility for 90 percent of total output. In any case, this private sector will have to anticipate increasingly more limits upon its freedom of action--and government must determine these and administer them effectively.

II. Sectoral Allocation of Public Investment

How government allocates the investment resources in the public sector influences not only the contribution this investment will make to future product, but also, interestingly enough, the ability of the public sector to mobilize domestic private savings, and indeed to stimulate domestic private investment. In other words, the problem of allocation of public investment in India is an integral part of our earlier problem of attracting private savings into public investment as well as a key element in creating income flows. Two major considerations are relevant here: First, the degree of interdependence between public and private investment in different sectors and second the degree of mobility of investible resources in different parts of the economy. Both these permit some elaboration, although in the present state of knowledge of savings-investment behavior in India, even the occasional insights provided by past data are hypotheses more than facts.

Interdependence between public and private investment

Whatever the scale of public investment in India's mixed enterprise economy today, income flows originate predominantly in the private sector. In order to expand the output flows, the relationship among the component parts of public investment--how much in agriculture as against transportation for example--will generally be less relevant than will be either the public-private balance within each sector or the relationship among components of total investment, public and private. Thus, the erection of large multi-purpose dams will provide more irrigation only if the necessary facilities for carrying the water to the fields already exist or are to be constructed along with the dam. Expanded transport facilities (public or private) will contribute additional agricultural, mineral, or industrial product only if transport has been a bottleneck, or is anticipated to become one by prospective investors, who are mostly in the private sector in these directly productive fields in India.

In addition to these essentially technical interdependences, the motivational problem is also relevant: What prompts the private entrepreneur to greater investment? It is usual--and generally appropriate--to assume that the creation of external economies will open new vistas to the businessman and induce private, complementary investment. In India today, and without doubt in other more or less comparable countries, this role of public investment can be exaggerated. For the existing social overhead facilities are themselves generally underutilized. Government's most important tasks may thus lie in the creation both of a general atmosphere conducive to future progress and, more

immediately, of sufficient purchasing power to expand current demand. The very scale of the public investment effort may thus be important to the private investor. For example, one explanation for the presently depressed position of such basic Indian industries in the private sector as cement and textiles is simply the shortage of both current and perhaps even--at least in the view of the private businessman--in prospective demand. This also provides some explanation of the current easiness in the supply of private savings. These may be moving into public investment because of some pessimism about economic prospects for the private sector. The gradual paring down of India's total investment effort over the Second Plan years, and particularly that of government itself, does contribute to reduced drive on the part of the private entrepreneur.

This is a result which is not related to any direct public competition in areas of productive activity; it can arise even when government confines itself essentially to the more traditional overhead sectors. When there is important competition with private enterprise--as there must be in many cases (fertilizer and steel in India, for example)--it becomes even more essential that the totality of public operations be large enough to assure adequate levels of over-all demand. In these circumstances however, there may also emerge some ideological biases on the part of private enterprise which can deter productive investment and expansion of output. Altogether, these technical and economic relationships (even apart from the ideological) have a basic bearing upon the "best" allocation of public investment in a mixed enterprise economy. If the goal is a large volume of investment, private as well as public, and a large resultant flow of additional income, government must have a deliberate, informed concern about the implications of public investment allocations upon private investment.

Nonmonetization and immobile investment resources

In many economically underdeveloped countries, a very large part of national output simply does not go to market. It is utilized near where it is produced, and frequently by the producer's family. In India in recent years, perhaps 40 to 50 percent of all rural product was utilized in this way. Inevitably, a large part of the savings which arise in the non-market-oriented sector is itself nonmonetized. Thus, National Sample Survey results for 1950/51 indicate that some 25 percent of gross investment in India was essentially in this category. (These comprehensive statistical results have been corroborated by occasional survey materials for later years.)

However, official savings and investment estimates (and hence those in the earlier section of this paper) simply omit this large volume of transactions from explicit consideration.⁶ Plan statements also suggest a gradual diminution of these nonmonetized transactions as the economy progresses. However, no attempt has been made to measure this change, nor to devise programs for using these resources while they exist.

6. "... nonmonetized investment has not been included in the calculations of capital inputs... there is considerable investment of this kind... [and] this has deliberately to be fostered." Second Five Year Plan, op. cit. p. 11.

This category of savings takes the form of goods produced and initially added to inventories. These may then be used in various ways--for greater-than-anticipated consumption at a later time, for disposition through the regular market and for direct use (generally as payment in kind) for capital creation. What are (or what at the time of production were considered to be) surpluses above needs for consumption may later be applied to expanded consumption, or to investment, either in a mobile or a very immobile form. The important point is that developments--subsequent to some allocation of these "surplus" products to savings--may direct them to a range of alternative uses which are very different from an economic viewpoint. Presumably, the producer's economic outlook, including his reaction to governmental policies and programs, will be of great importance in determining to just which use these surpluses will be allocated.

The general tendency for savings to be invested where they are generated is thus strongly bulwarked by these varied possibilities which pertain to an important part of rural savings. Year to year variations in the absolute and relative size of the nonmonetized savings component may show increases as well as declines--and these at the expense of consumption or of savings through local banks, small savings schemes, etc., which are part of the monetized flow in the economy. Government must therefore not only be interested in private investment performance; it must also devise methods by which nonmonetized investment can be observed--and indeed, its patterns influenced. It is true that statistics for such savings and investment are not readily at hand. But this applies to most of the private rural investment in a country like India. Government plans do make references to some figures for the monetized component of direct rural savings-investment. This component is neither analytically nor statistically separable from the nonmonetized flow. There is need for better measurement and for tools which can influence the flow (and perhaps the form) of these investments. For this, government's investment responsibilities will therefore require some kind of direct involvement at local levels--perhaps through community development organizations.

Public control over investment allocation

The varied interrelationships between public and private investment in a mixed economy, and the nature of the savings-investment flows, especially on the part of entrepreneurs in agriculture and the small-scale sectors generally, thus give great power to India's private sector in over-all investment decisions. For the action taken in this sector has fundamental influence both on the size of the flow of real savings to public investment and on the government's ability to determine the pattern of investment in the economy as a whole. Recent experience in India may illustrate how important can be these limitations upon government investment activity.

It will be remembered that total investment during the First Plan was officially projected at some Rs. 3,550 crores. On the average this was almost 85 percent above comparable actual investment in 1950/51. For the Second Plan, the total of Rs. 6,200 crores was to achieve an average some 75 percent above that planned for 1951-56. For public investment alone, the expansion was even more pronounced. Table 3 indicates some allocations of this

Table 3. Percentage Investment in Basic Sectors
(total for each column = 100)

	1950-51		1951-56		1956-	
	Public Sector (Actual)	Total Economy (Actual)	Public Sector (Plan)	Total Economy (Actual)	Public Sector (Plan) 1956-61	Total Economy (Actual) 1956-58
Agriculture, irrigation and community development:	32	32	33	33	21	29
Modern industry (and mining):	5	19	6	18	19	25
Transportation and communication:	24	14	29	17	35	16
Remaining Sectors	39	35	32	32	25	30

investment. The data are on a percentage basis, and include estimates for non-monetized as well as monetized investment.⁷

Relationships among these important sectors over the First Plan years show only minor deviations from those of the pre-Plan year. (This provides additional testimony for the earlier observation that this Plan did not place great strains upon the total economy.) Thus, private activity in agriculture maintained the over-all importance which government gave this sector. The predominant role of the private sector in capital formation in modern industry was not impaired--at least on a relative basis--by the small part which the government took directly in this sector. Only in transport and communication, where government has long been the dominant investor, has stepped-up public investment changed significantly the relative importance of this sector in total investment. For the Second Plan, the shifts in investment emphasis were to be much more marked, as Plan allocations in Table 3 make clear. However--on the basis of such evidence as the first two years of actual experience provides--the over-all investment pattern bids fair to change much less significantly than the Plan indicated. Indeed, if one examines the rough calculations given in the Plan for the investment level and pattern officially anticipated for

7. Investment statistics by sectors are not officially available, not even for the public sector. However, there is considerable working material which provides a reasonable basis for the estimates. See for example my *East and West in India's Development*, National Planning Association, Washington, D. C., April 1959, pp. 18-19, 28.

the private sector during 1956-61, one would rule out any expectation that an investment pattern like that in Table 3 could emerge for the total economy in those years.⁸ Private investment--its volume and allocation--simply does not correspond with Plan estimates. For better or worse, the anticipated results do not emerge.

The percentages of Table 3 actually understate the role which the private sector seems to have played in the total investment picture of the past few years. We have noted earlier the important shortcomings in planned public investment arising from the difficulty of harnessing private savings. Study of public and private investment within key sectors--actual as against planned--reveals some shift toward restoring a technical balance between the two. Thus, government finds itself able to invest less, and the private sector more than the Plan anticipates. Both these operate in the direction of retaining technologically necessary relationships.

But it is clear that such "corrective" tendencies cannot be relied upon to solve all problems. The public investment program today, even after the adjustments forced by private action, is not bringing rapid over-all growth. The program in the agricultural sector is not achieving essential targets of output. There still remain major imbalances between new public and private capital formation. In short, traditional savings and investment patterns may be deeply rooted, but in the soil of an economy which has not been growing. Government in India needs to be aware of the intricacies of private savings and investment behavior--not because government wants to adhere to these patterns, but because it must devise and implement programs for altering them. In a mixed economy the possibility exists for optimum over-all development achievement only if public and private investment activities are treated as two parts of one investment program.

III. The Role of Government, 1961-66

In a mixed enterprise economy which is expanding, growth in government's investment role must be thought of in two dimensions. The first is extensive and focuses on scale: the absolute expansion of investment by public authorities and its growth relative to total investment. The second is intensive: the shifts of the allocation of public investment, to such sectors and through the use of such methods, as to assure a maximum income flow as well as maximum total investment over the period of development. Public authorities like to make decisions to increase the scale of investment, and particularly so in a society which wants to place community above individual interest. Intensive steps are intrinsically difficult as well as generally unattractive. They place a great premium upon knowledge about the flows of savings, the behavior of investment, and the factors of production. In contrast to a dramatic increase in the ratio of public investment, there is something anticlimactic in making private investment more effective, and especially for a newly independent nation. It is not surprising therefore, to see more action in the direction of simple growth in the scale of public activity.

8. The Second Five Year Plan, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57; it is clear that the volume of private investment anticipated for agriculture and small-scale industry, for example, could not outweigh that in the public sector.

The experience of India, however, suggests that effective progress in scale soon runs into the same problems as are encountered in intensification. In order to attract significantly more than 40 or 50 percent of private domestic savings to the public sector, in order to cut deeply into the tendency for savers to invest directly, programs to mobilize domestic resources for investment by government must be built upon an intimate knowledge of savings and investment behavior in the society. Government needs to extend in many ways its influence upon economic activity as a whole. Apart from a larger role in marketing (and pricing) and a larger area of direct productive activity by the government itself, central authorities will need to concern themselves intimately with operations in the small scale sector, whether or not these are monetized. This clearly involves incurring the costs of intensification. There is every reason therefore to seek the gains from close cooperation with the private sector. Only then, through an effort in which government, by participating closely with private enterprise in rural programs, however financed, provides new vistas for big industry, can the government sector fill the growing demands which an expanding development effort places upon it.

ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS
IN AN UNDERDEVELOPED AREA: A CASE STUDY OF
AFRICAN ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR IN THE RHODESIAS

William J. Barber
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Few economists nowadays would claim that the classical postulate of the rational economic man can adequately explain all human conduct. Qualifications to the classical concept--particularly as applied to individual behavior--are generally acknowledged in current analysis. Nevertheless, the assumption of economic rationality has not been entirely discredited. Predictions built on this premise still yield reasonably satisfactory results when the behavior of large numbers is examined; at least, with qualifications, this is the case in Western societies. Considerable uncertainty has been voiced, however, about the relevance of these assumptions in underdeveloped economies where traditional forms of social and economic organization contrast markedly with the Western pattern.

The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, to analyze the response of an indigenous people to fresh opportunities for economic advance; and secondly to consider the extent to which the observed patterns of economic behavior can be explained by the usual assumptions of economic rationality. The African populations of Southern and Northern Rhodesia have been selected for study. While the Rhodesian economic environment is not in all respects typical of the underdeveloped world, it nevertheless has a distinct merit as a laboratory specimen. The case of these two territories exhibits in bold relief one of the familiar features of underdeveloped societies: the co-existence of an advanced type of Westernized money economy with a backward indigenous economic organization in which techniques are primitive and real incomes are low. Moreover, the money economy in both Rhodesias has expanded rapidly, especially since World War II. This, in turn, has swollen the demand for African labor. Employers, however, have generally been disappointed with the response of indigenous workers to the extension of job opportunities. Rates of labor turnover have remained high and productivity low. To many employers (who, in this European settler area, are virtually all white), the African worker is an enigma whose ways are mysterious and unpredictable. He has come to be regarded as lacking in economic ambitions and as unwilling to exert himself to raise his standard of living. On this basis, the case is often made that wage improvements would be self-defeating for, it is argued, they would merely enable African workers to reach a target income in a shorter period and would lead to reductions in the quantity of labor time offered. The supply function of African labor, it is often held, is indeed backward-sloping.

I. The Environment of the Indigenous Economy and Its Influence on African Behavior

In the early days of Western penetration into the African interior, the case for indifference of the indigenous peoples to new economic opportunities could be given strong support. The African was not immediately attracted to the novel assortment of imported goods which the European brought with him. Accustomed as he had been to an isolated society in which the structure of tastes was modest, he did not readily break from his traditional patterns. Initially, the positive inducements of wage employment, in the form of a cash income and the collection of goods which it could command, were seldom sufficient to draw forth labor in volume. The governments of these territories were obliged to introduce indirect forms of coercion, such as head and hut taxes which could only be paid in cash, in order to provide a sizeable African labor force for the nascent money economy. Now, after more than a half a century of contact with higher Western material standards, it can no longer be argued that the African is ignorant of the advantages of a money income; nor is it reasonable to assume that the African's tastes have remained unaltered. What then can account for the continued instability of the African as a worker in the money economy?

An insight into this problem can be gained by examining the structure of the economic organization devised by the indigenous peoples. Before the coming of the European, it was generally the case in the Rhodesias that the economic life of the African peoples was based on self-contained agricultural and pastoral systems. The quality of the land was poor and its fertility was soon exhausted. The abundance of land, however, made some compensation for this deficiency by permitting a form of shifting cultivation (known as the chitemene system) to evolve. The details of the chitemene practice were adjusted to the natural conditions.¹ But only one notable exception to the common theme of chitemene occurs in the Rhodesias. The Lozi peoples of Barotseland in Northern Rhodesia, possessing a physical environment with fertile flood plains and rich fishing grounds, have differentiated themselves from the normal pattern. With these advantages, the Lozi have used settled cultivation to achieve living standards above the average and have retained a remarkable degree of political autonomy despite European settlement.²

1. Within Northern Rhodesia alone, twenty-one variations of this agricultural practice have been distinguished by classifying the length of the period of cultivation, acreages involved, and the variety of crops grown. See C. G. Trapnell and J. N. Clotheir, The Soils, Vegetation and Agricultural Systems of North-Western Rhodesia, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1937; and The Soils, Vegetation and Agriculture of North-Eastern Rhodesia, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1943.
2. The unique character of Lozi life has been well described in Professor Max Gluckman's studies; e.g. "Economy of the Central Barotse Plain", Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Paper No. 7, 1941; "Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property", Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Paper No. 10, 1943.

The common property of the widespread practices of *chitemene* was the abandonment of exhausted lands and the substitution of fresh areas which were brought into cultivation by clearing bush, burning it, and allowing the ash to fertilize the soil. In most areas, this process had to be repeated at least every two to three years. The destructiveness of this technique has been much criticized. But shifting cultivation, as Lord Hailey observed, is "less a device of barbarism than a concession to the character of the soil."³ As a general rule, the level of output which could be obtained from the traditional agricultural system was seldom much above the consumption requirements of the population. Nor was there much incentive to expand production beyond this point. Specialization of production for exchange, as opposed to purely subsistence output, was rarely a real possibility; and, given the hazards of the climate and the prevalence of pests, stockpiling of food surpluses was rarely feasible.

Within the economic unit of the closed community, an important division of labor and specialization occurred. Normally, this was along well established lines with a demarcation of function according to sex. The adult males in the community were responsible for the construction of shelters and for the clearing and preparation of new lands. Most of the routine tasks in peasant agriculture, on the other hand, were the lot of women, upon whom the burdens of sowing and cultivating were placed. The techniques with which these tasks were performed were crude by Western standards and had not advanced beyond the technology of the hoe before European intervention.

Under the traditional system, standards of real income, of necessity, were low. There was little net saving, apart from that required to accommodate increases in the population, for the channels into which investment (in real terms) could be directed were limited. An extension of the land area through additional clearing was one of the few possibilities. Even so, limitations imposed by the available techniques and by reliance on the family as the unit of production restricted the effort which could profitably be directed into land clearance. The most popular alternative form of real accumulation--common in the areas free from trypanosomiasis--was the increase in cattle herds. Although rarely prized for the contribution to the real income stream which they might yield, cattle were convenient as a store of value.⁴ Within the confines of the restricted system, it was indeed rational to store wealth in this fashion--at least as rational as the hoarding of gold in some stages in Western economic history. Cattle represented a highly liquid asset and one which bore interest without effort on the part of the owner. Moreover, cattle served the social function of conspicuous display and the size of herds, not their economic quality by Western standards, became the badge of rank and the mark of prestige.

3. Hailey, *An African Survey*, Second edition, O. U. P., 1945, p. 879.

4. The persistence of this view of cattle, even among peoples well advanced in contact with the money economy, has been noted by E. Colson, "The Role of Cattle Among the Plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District", *Rhodes-Livingstone Journal*, Vol. XI, pp. 12-46.

Judged by Western standards of economic performance, these indigenous economies were highly inefficient. Within them was a considerable volume of concealed unemployment. This applied particularly to male labor which, apart from its periodic employment in keeping the productive capital of the agricultural economy intact, made little contribution to output. The temporary absence of adult males could thus be tolerated without any short-term sacrifice in real product.

The unique form of specialization developed in the *chitemene* system is important to an understanding of the contacts of the indigenous peoples with the money economy. The type of labor for which the money economy creates a demand is generally restricted to one component of the family productive unit--the adult male. Because his essential contribution to the productive process does not occupy him fully, the effects of his withdrawal upon the output of the agricultural community will depend on the length of his absence, the natural fertility of the soil, and the customary practices of his tribal group. But despite local variations in details, adult manpower can hardly be spared for more than two to three years without a serious setback in output. By the same token, the adult male can absent himself from the indigenous economy for a considerable period without reducing agricultural output.

It would be erroneous to describe this situation as one of "disguised unemployment", in the usual sense of the term. The marginal product of the adult male is not zero or negative, even though the short-term effects of his absence are negligible. Over the longer-term, the indispensability of his contribution to total production will be felt, for the *chitemene* system depends for its longer term viability upon his efforts. At the same time, the real income of the indigenous family may be increased if adult males accept temporary employment in the money economy. As long as the male workers spend enough time in the indigenous economy to maintain the fertility of the soil, the indigenous family can sustain its conventional level of output and can supplement its real income through the cash earnings of its absent member. This arrangement implies movement between the two economies on the part of the African male. To the wage employer, the transient character of the labor force made available on these terms may not be desirable. But he is compensated for this inconvenience by his ability to obtain labor at a lower wage than would be the case if the laborer and his family, not just the laborer himself, were dependent upon money wages for their livelihood.

II. Recent Economic Behavior of the African in the Rhodesias: an Hypothesis and an Empirical Exploration

Within the dualistic economic structure of the Rhodesias, the indigenous peoples may live in two economic worlds: one is that of the indigenous economy, rooted in traditional types of production and largely geared to meeting the subsistence requirements of the family; the other is the European's money economy in which Africans may participate to some extent, although their access is far from perfect. Two avenues are available to Africans seeking higher real income through contact with the money economy: the sale of labor and the sale of

agricultural products.⁵ Only the former, however, is universally open. For many Africans, the production of marketable surpluses is not a genuine alternative. Even though the African might be prepared to extend himself more fully in agriculture and thereby produce surpluses for market, he may be denied this opportunity. Extensive crop sales presuppose the availability of transport and communication facilities. In much of the Rhodesias' Native areas, these pre-conditions of agricultural marketing do not exist. In large measure, this situation is a by-product of the racial segregation applied to land owning in the Rhodesias. The land enjoying the greatest proximity to urban population centers (as well as the best agricultural land) is reserved for white settlers.⁶

How might the African be expected to behave in these circumstances if he were to act as a maximizer of his family's real income? If wage earning is the only means for acquiring money which is open to him, he can only afford a permanent commitment to wage employment if the real wage paid by his employer more than offsets the loss in real income which his family would suffer through his prolonged absence from indigenous agriculture. Historically, the real wage paid to African workers in the money economy has been well below this level--indeed it has generally been sufficient only to support the worker himself, plus permitting a small supplement to the real income of his family. A higher wage was unnecessary in order to obtain a large, although migratory, wage labor force. As long as the real wage in the money economy remains at the conventional level, movement between the two economies may well be a rational way to maximize real income of the indigenous family.

When the real wage from employment in the money economy is low, some Africans may get higher real incomes for their families by remaining at home, working harder in agriculture, and producing a marketable surplus. Participation in the money economy in this manner might be the preferred way to increase real income. For much of the African population, however, this choice may not be effectively open.

If the preceding argument is correct, the recent contrast of the African with the money economy could be expected to fall into quite different patterns in different parts of the Rhodesias. In those areas favored for the production and

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5. Potentially, a third means of acquiring cash--self employment as entrepreneurs in the money economy--might also be available to Africans. A few Africans have established themselves as independent tradesmen, but their number is insignificant in relation to the total population. In the social environment of the Rhodesias, the opportunities open to the African entrepreneur are limited.
 6. In Southern Rhodesia, less than forty percent of the total area of the colony is available to African farmers. Proportionately, land allocations are more favorable to Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Over ninety percent of the total land area is classified as Native Reserves or Native Trust Land. Nearly two-thirds of this area, however, is still heavily infested by tsetse-fly, making habitation unattractive.

sale of agricultural surpluses, one would expect that the efforts of the African male might be directed more into the production of marketable surpluses and less into wage earning. Conversely, in the areas less favored for the agricultural marketing, a heavier concentration on wage earning in the money economy might be anticipated.

Of the two territories, Northern Rhodesia presents the simpler case for investigating whether or not these relationships are borne out in fact. The districts in which agricultural production for market is possible are limited to a small proportion of the total African area of the territory, primarily to the land adjacent to the line of rail. (See map.) Maize is the major cash crop and its marketing is controlled by a government-sponsored control board. Effectively, this means that marketing opportunities are concentrated primarily in the Southern and, to a lesser extent, Central Provinces. In the isolated Eastern Province, some African-grown maize is sold for local consumption and in recent years groundnuts have been produced for sale under government encouragement. In agricultural production, as in almost every other respect, Barotseland stands out as unique in Central Africa. Although its opportunities for market production are limited by the lack of communications, its more favorable natural endowment and higher real income standards place it in a separate economic classification.⁷

The differing contributions of the various provinces to the wage labor force is brought out in estimates shown in Table 1 which have been prepared for selected years since 1941 by the Provincial Administration and the Department of Labour.

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7. The concentration of cash-crop production is well reflected in the official estimates, by province, of African holdings of agricultural implements. The provinces which have been able to sell crops virtually monopolize the holdings of implements. The number of plows in use in the most favored area (the Southern Province) increased nearly five-fold between 1947 and 1954. What is more striking is that the Southern Province has consistently claimed roughly seventy percent of the total number of plows in the entire territory. The other province adjacent to the line of rail, the Central Province, is less well suited to profitable agricultural production. The accumulation of agricultural equipment there has proceeded at roughly the same rate, but the aggregates involved are much smaller. The late introduction of the possibilities of commercial agriculture into the Eastern Province is revealed in the same data. While the aggregate accumulation of agricultural implements there is still small, the rate of increase in the years since market outlets were established has been rapid. Barotseland and the Central Province stand roughly on par with one another in holdings of implements. In the remaining provinces, both the accumulation of agricultural capital and sales of cash crops are negligible. See Annual Reports on African Affairs, Northern Rhodesia, 1947-1954.

RHODESIAN PROVINCES AND AFRICAN LANDS




Table 1. Estimates of the Percentage of Male Taxpayers at Work for Wages from the Various Provinces of Northern Rhodesia*

	Central Province	Eastern Province	Southern Province	Barotse Province	Western Province	Northern Province	North West Province
1941	49	62	33	44	35	40	
1944	55	71	39	48	36	43	
1947	52	55	33	45	43 (a)	43 (a)	
1948	57	66	33	42	43	43	
1949	52	64	36	46	43	49	
1950	52	57	38	41	47	52	
1951	59	58	40	34	54	49	36 (b)
1952	63	53	41	37	46	59	36
1953	63	55	36	36	53 (a)	55 (a)	41
1954	60	58	38	38	55	59	45

* Sources: Calculated from Northern Rhodesian Reports on African Affairs and Labour Department Annual Reports. For 1941 and 1944, data on the Kaonde-Lunda Province have been consolidated with that for the Western Province. The former was officially merged with the latter in 1947.

- a. Two districts from the Northern Province were shifted to the jurisdiction of the Western Province in 1947; the same two districts were transferred back to the Northern Province in 1953.
- b. North West Province was created from outlying areas of the Western Province in 1951.

From these data, it would appear that in the areas in which agricultural production for market can be carried on successfully, the absence of male labor for wage employment is relatively lower than in the provinces in which agricultural production is a less profitable alternative. Clearly this is the case in the Southern Province. It is at the leader cash crop production and at or near the bottom of the scale in the relative number of wage earners it supplies. Its only rival in the latter respect is Barotseland where agricultural production is attractive, if not for a cash market. The Eastern Province, where opportunities for sale of cash crops are of recent origin, has generally exported labor in volume. But the proportion of wage earners has tended to decline since market opportunities, though still limited, have appeared. In the Northern and Western Provinces, almost no entry into the money economy through the sale of agricultural products is possible, both because of the extreme poverty of the soil and the absence of communications. These provinces, in recent years, have been near the top of the scale of suppliers of male labor. The insulation

of these peripheral areas from the influences of the money economy is indicated by relatively low rates of absenteeism in the earlier years--low rates which are apparent even as late as 1954 in the remote North West Province. The Central Province might at first inspection appear a departure from the pattern. Much of the province has the advantage of proximity to the rail line. But apart from the few localities in which cash crop production is undertaken, the soil conditions of its African areas are unusually poor.⁸ Thus, for the province as a whole, the high rate of absenteeism is not inconsistent with localized production for market.

The Southern Rhodesian case is both more complex and the more interesting. Lines of demarcation between the provinces selling agricultural products and those in which cash sales are negligible cannot be as clearly drawn as in Northern Rhodesia. In favorable seasons, each province acquires some money income through agricultural marketing. But an additional complicating feature is the variation in the types of product offered in the various provinces. From 1948 to 1954 sales returns through the government marketing organization are available for the five principal food crops; maize, munga, rupoko, groundnuts, and kaffir corn. With the exception of maize (which has been marketed through official or quasi-official channels since 1931), earlier estimates of the provincial contributions to sales are not reliable.

For the seven-year period 1948-1954, the approximate distribution of the money values of the five principal cash crops has been calculated as shown in Table 2.

Because of seasonal variations which have unevenly affected the agricultural production of the various provinces, a more accurate general picture of the position of each can be obtained by aggregating the sales of the main cash crops over the seven-year period. The contribution of each province to the total marketed value from 1948 to 1954 appears in Table 3. The striking features in this allocation of money income from the sale of cash crops are the predominant position of North Mashonaland and the negligible contribution from Matabeleland.

In Southern Rhodesia, money income may also be acquired by African agriculturalists through the sale of livestock, primarily of cattle. To the African community, as has been noted above, this method of obtaining cash is different in character from the sale of surplus foodstuffs. In large measure, cattle are still regarded in the traditional sense; i. e. as a store of value and not as a source of income. Voluntary sales of cattle occur in the years of bad harvests when disinvestment is made to acquire the minimum current requirements of cash; the extent to which this view persists is borne out by the fact that cattle sales have always increased heavily in years of poor crops.⁹ This

8. See Report of the Land Commission, Northern Rhodesia, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1947, p. 18.

9. This conclusion is apparent from a comparison of the variations in cattle sales with the sales of cash crops as estimated in the Reports of Chief Native Commissioner, Southern Rhodesia. The inverse relationship between these two magnitudes has continued even though, in recent years, the government has made some sales of cattle mandatory through its program of compulsory de-stocking.

Table 2. Percentage of the Annual Aggregate Money Value of the Five Principal Cash Crops Attributable to each Province of Southern Rhodesia, 1948-1954*

	<u>North Mashonaland</u>	<u>South Mashonaland</u>	<u>Mid- lands</u>	<u>Manica- land</u>	<u>Matabele- land</u>
1948	49	17	18	10	6
1949	28	15	38	12	7
1950	53	12	20	12	3
1951	46	21	18	12	2
1952	53	16	21	9	1
1953	46	16	16	17	5
1954	56	14	16	11	4

*Notes and sources: These results have been derived by calculating the average value per ton for maize, munga, kaffir corn, rupoko, and groundnuts for each year. Aggregate values by province have then been calculated from the returns, by province, of quantities sold as shown in the Annual Reports of Production and Marketing Branch, Department of Native Affairs, 1948-54.

The data do not permit detailed adjustment to allow for differences in prices paid owing to quality variations. Averaging the values of marketed production, therefore, implicitly assumes that the quality of produce is reasonably uniform throughout the territory. Percentages shown have been rounded.

Table 3. Percentage of the Aggregate Value of the Five Principal Cash Crops Attributable to Each Province Over the Seven Year Period 1948-1954*

North Mashonaland	49
South Mashonaland	15
Midlands	19
Manicaland	12
Matabeleland	4

*Sources: As shown in Table 2; percentages have been rounded.

association would indicate that the African farmer generally prefers to sell crops rather than cattle as a regular source of income.

Confusions in marketing procedure make impossible a precise calculation of inter-provincial distribution of income acquired through sales of cattle. The relative position of the provinces, however, is probably reasonably represented by the estimates of the Department of Native Agriculture of the average number of cattle held per resident family in each of the provinces. In 1954, for example, this can be established as follows:

North Mashonaland	- 3.3 cattle per family
South Mashonaland	- 4.2 cattle per family
Midlands	- 4.85 cattle per family
Manicaland	- 2.9 cattle per family
Matabeleland	- 7.5 cattle per family ¹⁰

To the extent that this pattern of distribution of cattle holdings corresponds to the sales of cattle by province, it would be expected that Matabeleland would be the major seller, followed by the Midlands and South Mashonaland. Cattle sales would be lowest in North Mashonaland and Manicaland.

This pattern suggests that some adjustments are appropriate in the initial estimate of the provincial allocation of money income from agricultural production. When cash receipts from cattle sales are taken into consideration, it appears that the provincial distribution of income based on crop sales understates the proportionate shares of Matabeleland, South Mashonaland, and the Midlands. Similarly, the relative shares of North Mashonaland and Manicaland are probably somewhat overstated.

With these amendments, comparison can now be drawn between the provincial distribution of money income and the distribution of population. Two independent calculations of the percentage of the total African population legally resident in the various provinces are shown in Table 4.

North Mashonaland, with a quarter of the total population, is, by any reckoning, the richest of the group. Even when its commanding position in crop sales is adjusted downward, its leadership in total income is not challenged. At the other end of the scale, Matabeleland is still relatively the poorest with one-fifth of the *de-jure* population. Its poor showing in crop sales is partially offset by its leading position in cattle sales. But its regular share of total agricultural income is probably still considerably lower than its share of the population. Of the three provinces in the middle position with respect to crop sales, the considerations introduced by the sale of cattle indicate that Manicaland is probably relatively poorer than the other two. With 15 percent of population, it earns roughly 12 percent of cash-crop income; but its relative total income figure is actually less because of its minor contribution to cattle sales. South Mashonaland with 17.5 percent of the population and the Midlands with 22.5 percent claimed 15 and 19 percent respectively of the income from crop sales. In

10. Calculated from data contained in the Report of the Director of Native Agriculture, Southern Rhodesia, 1954, especially Charts VIII and VIII-A, pp. 38-40; (published as part of the Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, 1954).

Table 4. Percentage Distribution of the African Population of Southern Rhodesia by Provinces of Legal Residence*

	1948 Sample Census	1950 Native Affairs Estimates
North Mashonaland	25	26
South Mashonaland	17.5	17
Midlands	22.5	21
Manicaland	15	15
Matabeleland	20	21

*Notes and Sources: All Africans indigenous to the colony are regarded as legally resident in one of the Native Provinces, even though they may be absent much of the time in the European areas. Data are calculated from the Report of the Demographic Sample Survey of the African Population of Southern Rhodesia, 1948 and estimates of the Native Affairs Department, as reported in the Official Yearbook of Southern Rhodesia, 1952.

each case, the share of total agricultural income is probably larger as both have relatively higher proportions of the income from cattle sales.

It is now necessary to compare this outline of the provincial distribution of agricultural income with the contribution of each province to total wage employment. If the hypothesis is to be sustained for Southern Rhodesia, Matabeleland should have the highest proportion of absentees to its male population and North Mashonaland the lowest. The other three provinces should lie in an intermediate position with Manicaland showing a somewhat higher proportion of absentees than South Mashonaland and the Midlands.

The sample survey of Southern Rhodesia's African population in 1948 provides a guide to the extent of male absenteeism from the various provinces. An approximate measure of the volume of absenteeism can be devised by subtracting the number of adult males actually present from the number regarded as legally resident; this calculation, in other words, represents the difference the de jure and the de facto returns on the adult male population. Absenteeism from the native provinces can then be expressed as a percentage of the total number of adult males (de-jure).¹¹

11. This approach is deficient in that it cannot indicate the length of absenteeism from each of the districts. Instead the census figures show only the number of absentees at the time of the census. The results derived from the 1948 study are supported, however, by the findings of a more limited sample survey taken in 1953. The coverage of the later survey was only partial. But for the administrative districts (sub-units of provinces) for which data are comparable in the two samples, analysis reveals a remarkable stability in the relative degree of absenteeism between the two periods. See Preliminary Report of the Second Demographic Survey of the Indigenous African Population, 1953.

Table 5. Percentage of Absenteeism of Adult Males for the Various Provinces of Southern Rhodesia, 1948*

North Mashonaland	55
South Mashonaland	41
Midlands	48
Manicaland	51
Matabeleland	60

*Sources: Calculated from the 1948 Sample Census, Southern Rhodesia.

With one exception, these results conform to the pattern expected from the analysis of agricultural income distribution by provinces. Matabeleland has the lowest agricultural income and, for its population, is the highest contributor to wage employment. It would also be expected that Manicaland would have a higher ratio of male absentees than South Mashonaland or the Midlands. This is also confirmed in the above ratios of absenteeism. But from the agricultural income calculations, it should follow that North Mashonaland would have the lowest ratio of male absentees if the general hypothesis is to hold. In fact, it is a surprisingly high contributor to wage employment, being second only to the poorest province in its ratio of male absentees.

What can account for this deviation of North Mashonaland from the norm? In the search for an explanation, several considerations are relevant. This province is adjacent to the heaviest concentrations of European settlement in the territory. With its geographical situation, agricultural marketing is less hampered by poor communications than is the case in the more remote African areas. Moreover, it is favored by more abundant rainfall than any of the other provinces.¹² The available historical data indicate that the leadership of this province in agricultural sales has been a persistent phenomenon and is not limited to the period under examination.¹³

In part, the more advanced degree of exposure to the influences of the money economy may account for the unique position of North Mashonaland. This may have led to more radical changes in tastes than in the more isolated areas, and, in consequence, additional inducements to the acquisition of money income

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12. The Department of Native Agriculture adopts four classifications for rainfall in the reserves: good, variable, medium, and low. The area of North Mashonaland classified in the first category is proportionately much higher than in Matabeleland, Midlands, or South Mashonaland. Manicaland is more favored than the latter three provinces, but less so than North Mashonaland. See Annual Report of the Director of Native Agriculture, 1954, Chart VIII, pp. 38-40.
 13. As comprehensive data are not available for all crops before 1948, this conclusion is based on the marketing of maize exclusively. See Reports of the Maize Control Board, Southern Rhodesia, 1931-1948.

may have been present. This could account for the increased production of agricultural crops for market, or for the higher ratio of male absenteeism. Some other explanation must be sought when both occur simultaneously. The answer may lie in the manner in which population pressure on the land is felt in this province. This cannot be subjected to precise quantitative measurement. Several factors, however, point to the conclusion that population pressure in North Mashonaland, despite its agricultural prosperity, is more acute than in the other provinces of Southern Rhodesia. A sample census of African agriculture in 1949 indicated that North Mashonaland was almost at the bottom of the scale of provinces in average acreage per resident family.¹⁴ A similar relative position for North Mashonaland is brought out in the Native Agriculture Department's annual estimates of the amount of usable acreage per family of five resident in each of the provinces.¹⁵

Perhaps the extent to which the African feels the pressure for land is reflected more forcefully in calculations of the number of dependents, not just male wage earners, absent from the native areas. The position of North Mashonaland in this respect is unequivocal. In the results of the 1948 census of population, it stands out as the only Southern Rhodesian province in which the number of adult males absent from the native area is exceeded by the number of absentee women and children.¹⁶ This provides a rough index of the degree of permanence of absenteeism; the larger the number of African dependents resident in the European area, the more permanent the settlement in wage employment is likely to be. But is the detachment of entire families from the indigenous economy, which has apparently been underway in North Mashonaland, the preferred economic option of the indigenous peoples or has this choice been forced upon them by circumstances within indigenous agriculture? A conclusive answer to this question cannot be given. It may be the case that population has grown to the point at which additional labor, with existing techniques, cannot be accommodated on the restricted agricultural area without a reduction in per capita product. Money income from the sale of surpluses may be relatively high for families established on the land; at the same time, part of the population may be unable to find room on the land. Should this be the case, a high rate of exodus into wage employment and a high volume of agricultural sales may occur simultaneously. At least this phenomenon is not observable in provinces in which there is no prima facie evidence of population pressure.

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14. Report of the Sample Census of African Agriculture of Southern Rhodesia, 1948-49, Central African Statistical Office, Salisbury, 1951, Table IV, p. 9. It should be noted that the average acreage per cultivator shown in these calculations is based on the de facto agricultural population in each province.
 15. Calculated from data shown in the Annual Report of the Director of Native Agriculture, 1954, Chart VIII.
 16. Calculated from the 1948 Demographic Sample Survey.

III. Conclusions on African Economic Behavior and Its Significance

From the foregoing considerations, it would appear that the general hypothesis with respect to the African's contact with the money economy can generally be sustained in an inter-provincial comparison of African economic behavior. Where access to markets has permitted the sale of agricultural surpluses, the African has apparently intensified his efforts as a farmer, produced more, and sold a surplus for cash. These areas have tended to offer a lower proportion of their adult males for wage employment, as compared with provinces in which the acquisition of cash from agricultural sales is less feasible. But there is an important qualification to this pattern. It has emerged where population pressure on the land has been heavy.

In taking up the options which are open to him as the money economy expands, the African has appeared to demonstrate a rationality in his economic behavior. It is, however, a rationality which can only be understood within the context of the dualistic economic structure within which he lives. If he is a wage earner, he is well advised--as long as the real wage obtainable from employment in the money economy remains at its traditional level--to keep a "foot in two camps" by moving between the money and the indigenous economies. He dare not risk a sacrifice in the output of the subsistence agricultural community which would follow from his continuous absence. This situation recommends perpetuation of the migratory system--an arrangement which is both rational and economic, even though it may not appear so to the European employer or to an outside observer who expects rational economic behavior to take the same form in both the underdeveloped and Western economies.

The form of rational economic behavior adopted by the African may have important implications for the longer term process of economic development in the Rhodesias. If an African labor force is to be stabilized in wage employment and its productivity there increased, it may be necessary for the employer in the money economy to break from the traditional low wage pattern of the past. The price which he must expect to pay for a stable labor force is a real wage sufficient to support an entire indigenous family at a standard which would make it attractive to grow roots in the money economy. The employer in the money economy may hesitate to pay this price; but under one set of circumstances he may be obliged to. If expansion in the money economy increases the demand for indigenous labor sufficiently, it is possible that its manpower requirements can only be satisfied by drawing more labor from the indigenous economy than can be spared without reducing the conventional level of per capita agricultural output. Sharply increased real wages would then be required to over-compensate the indigenous population for the loss in subsistence output.

Considerable adjustment in the cost structure of the money economy--adjustments which may interrupt the course of economic expansion--may thus occur mid-stream in the development process. But, as the case of one of the native provinces investigated has suggested, the longer-term process of economic development may take quite a different turn. It is also possible that population pressure may so intensify that the natural growth in numbers can no longer be absorbed on the land without reduction in per capita product. Should this occur, the African might be denied the option of dividing his time between the money and the indigenous economies. Instead he may be forced to accept whatever wage terms were offered in the money economy. Expansion in the money economy might thus be sustained without readjustments required by increased labor costs. Economic development in this sense, however, would not mean advancement in per capita real income for the indigenous peoples.

ANALYSIS OF THE LAND USE AND LAND TAXATION POLICIES
OF NON-COMMUNIST UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

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1. The property tax was extensively used and proved to be very productive in the United States and Japan during their periods of transition from an agricultural to an industrial economic base. This similarity of tax policy during a period of rapid introduction of industrial processes was the case although population density and other conditions related to land use were very different in the two countries.¹

Despite the demonstrated productivity of the land tax as a source of government revenues in underdeveloped and non-communist areas and its proven compatibility with industrial progress, the tax is not extensively used by the democratic low-per-capita income countries.²

2. Since the days when the property tax provided the major revenue source in agricultural United States and Japan, the world has been blanketed by communist-type propaganda. An important aspect of this propaganda is the promise of land to the peasant when communists control the government. This

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1. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, and Richard W. Lindholm, Public Finance and Fiscal Policy, New York, 1950, pp. 407-410. Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880, Stanford, California, 1955, and "The Land Tax in the Tokugawa Period," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XVIII, pp. 3-19.
 2. "In many underdeveloped countries, taxes on land, agricultural produce, or agricultural incomes take a smaller share of farm income and represent a smaller proportion of the government revenue than they did before the Second World War." United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Progress in Land Reform, New York, 1954, p. 267. In Bolivia "the land taxes (because of low rates) on rural property make it easy to hold large tracts idle for prestige or speculative purposes." United Nations, Technical Assistance Administration, Taxes and Fiscal Policy in Underdeveloped Countries, New York, 1953, p. 47. In Turkey the portion of the tax revenues arising from land taxes decreased from 7 percent to 2 percent between 1938 and 1949. United Nations unpublished materials, taken from Comparative Economic Organization by Arthur Burns, New York, 1955, p. 697. Also see H. Wald, ed., Agricultural Taxation and Economic Development, Cambridge, 1954.

prospect seems to appeal to a fundamental desire of peasants everywhere.³ This attitude can perhaps be traced to folktales telling of the idyllic life of the landowner.⁴

3. The governments of underdeveloped areas in the free world feel that they must counter the communist appeal by also offering the peasant land. However, the non-communist countries cannot just take ("expropriate") the lands, as can the communists. Therefore, non-communist countries establish a procedure to compensate landlords. The scheme usually involves the issuance of bonds.⁵

4. The government of an underdeveloped nation carrying out a land reform (breaking up land holdings into small ownership units) has no practical way of retiring and meeting interest payments on the bonds issued to former landlords except to collect annual payments from the multitude of new peasant proprietors.⁶ To the new peasant landlord these payments are very similar to the former rent payments. In fact they may be more difficult to meet, for the government, in case of peasant adversity, is likely to be less understanding than was the landlord. Also, many governments are likely to be rather ineffective in providing technical and financial assistance to improve production and marketing techniques.⁷ The net result is very likely to be high cost agricultural production,

3. "The overwhelming majority of the peasants, i.e., all except the rich ones who retain the tail of feudalism, positively demand 'land to the tillers.'" Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, a political report made "On Coalition Government," Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, New York, 1956, Vol. 4, 1941-1945, p. 292. See also Naum Jasny, The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR, Stanford, California, 1949, pp. 5-6; and James G. Maddox, Land Reform in Mexico, New York, 1950, p. 1.

4. Alvin Johnson, "The Communist Farmer," Social Research, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 228.

5. Sometimes payment is made partly in cash and partly as investment in industry, as in Taiwan. Also on occasion the bonds are payable in kind rather than in money. For an analysis and description of many programs, see Kenneth H. Parsons, Raymond J. Penn, and Philip M. Raup, eds., Land Tenure, Madison, Wisconsin, 1956.

6. This at least has appeared to be the situation. Maybe this is not so. For an analysis of this possibility, see Martin Bronfenbrenner, "The Appeal of Confiscation in Economic Development," this journal, Vol. III, pp. 201-219. See also footnote 14.

7. See Lowry Nelson, Land Reform in Italy, Washington, 1956, p. 29.

continued grinding peasant poverty, and disorganization of the agricultural sector.⁸

5. Before the days of the communist programs and propaganda, money lenders, landlords, speculators, and other groups, small in total numbers but strong economically, had to rely on their own political power to prevent the government from using agricultural land as an important base of taxation. Communist propaganda has greatly improved the political position of these groups. Today they can very effectively raise the communist bogey when land taxation is considered. They raise their voices along with the communist agitators to point out that land taxation will make the lot of the poor tiller and new landowner even more difficult.⁹ The effect is to place the masses in the rural areas of non-communist countries on the side of the speculators, middlemen, and landowners. The result is to make the governments of non-communist underdeveloped areas very hesitant to use their land taxation powers.¹⁰

8. The basic point of land reform, and often neglected, is that it should be aimed at inefficiency. Sometimes this inefficiency is a part of bigness, frequently it is not. For example, the United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1955, p. 48, states "Production increments of sugar cane attained by Peru in the last few years have mainly been derived from better unit yields, thanks to the adoption of modern cultivation techniques... The degree of efficiency in processing and the higher yields allow Peruvian sugar to compete on the world market without state protection." See also report of U. N. Economic Commission for Latin America, 1959, New York Times, May 19, 1959.

9. It is reported that in India land taxation is not used to assist in land reform because it is believed "...the burden would be passed on by the absentee landholder to the cultivating tenant." United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Progress in Land Reform Second Report, New York, 1956, p. 115.

10. "Land revenue contributes only about 8 percent of total tax revenues of India.

"Doubtless India's land taxes could be raised somewhat especially on lands improved by the government through irrigation and so on. This the states are doing to some extent. It is expected that, with land reform, the contribution of land and agriculture can be increased." Government of India, Planning Commission, The New India, New York, 1958, pp. 138-139.

"Private landowners pay no tax on their property in land, and the income tax is not progressive. The new control of Iraq's water and land will thus serve to increase the incomes of a class which now contributes little to development and which is opposed to social progress." Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle-East, Garden City, England, 1957, p. 135.

"The land tax which was an important source of revenue in the countries of the Middle East and Latin America has lost its revenue significance in all these countries. Contributions from this source do not exceed one-tenth of total tax receipts in most of them." Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. IX, No. 1, p. 3.

6. The initiation of land reform seriously limits the fiscal choices of non-communist governments of underdeveloped countries. The action largely eliminates the possibility of their use of the property tax as a major revenue source in the near future.¹¹ This makes it difficult for these governments to collect the funds required for normal operations, and, of course, next to impossible to finance expansion of productivity with tax revenues. This squeeze is very likely to result in deficit government finance, which will develop inflationary pressures and reduce the effectiveness of the taxes being utilized.¹²

7. Deficit finance and inflation, which are made very nearly inevitable by land reform, reduce the value of the bonds and money payments received by the former landlords. If the inflation is very rapid, as it tends to be, compensated land reform approaches very close to land expropriation. To attempt to reduce the deterioration of the purchasing power of money unit contracts by increasing the payments of the new peasant proprietors will develop new political difficulties arising from the "money illusion" and will not directly improve the government's fiscal situation nor the rate of economic development. To make the sales contract in terms of rice, as was done in Taiwan, or in terms of some other produce, introduces additional rigidities in land usage that are highly undesirable.

8. More than likely the most undesirable aspect of non-communist underdeveloped nations' adopting land reform is that the resulting landowner-ship fragmentation will make the adoption of modern agricultural production methods more difficult to organize and finance, and perhaps uneconomical. The communists avoid this serious deficiency of fragmentation by initiating the second step of their program of reorganizing the agricultural sector. This is, of course, the large state-controlled and managed collective farms or communes, where the former peasants become laborers. The best procedure open to the non-communist nation wishing to benefit from "big-scale farming with machinery" while enjoying land reform, is to organize cooperatives. This method of organizing agricultural production is difficult and has not proved to be particularly attractive or efficient.¹³

11. "It cannot, however, be denied that the present systems of agricultural taxation offer wide scope for improvement. . . Taxation of land on the basis of capital value and in the form of a property tax in rem may have other advantages which deserve thorough examination by governments in the region." United Nations, Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, "Taxation and Development of Agriculture in Under-developed Countries, with Special Reference to Asia and the Far East," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. IX, pp. 9-10.

12. Latin America, for example, has suffered from "chronic inflation" and it has also been true that property taxes, and direct internal taxes generally, have provided minimal revenues. United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1955, New York, 1956, pp. 131-151.

13. See Alta Ullah, The Co-operative Movement in the Punjab, London, 1937; Sir Alan Pim, Colonial Agricultural Production, London, 1946, pp. 10-11; Charles P. Kindleberger, Economic Development, New York, 1958, p. 231.

9. Land reform through partial confiscation of privately-owned land weakens citizen faith in government protection of contract rights;¹⁴ fragments agricultural production units; eliminates the principal, and maybe the most desirable, government revenue possibility;¹⁵ makes deficit government finance inevitable; and very nearly necessitates the initiation of extensive direct government economic controls. In each instance, the direct impact and private and government reaction is unfavorable to rapid economic development of a non-communist nation.

The "land reform" approach to land management and land use in non-communist underdeveloped countries causes a destruction of institutional relationships, of political power balances, and of production bases which seem to be necessary for a rapid economic development along democratic lines. This danger is sufficiently imminent and important to warrant careful consideration by free world economic strategists.

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14. "The outright expropriation of large landowners in favour of their tenants also gives the beneficiaries a breathing-space and easement which may yield higher output. But the disadvantages are likely to be even greater... In particular the disregard of property rights is likely to weaken confidence throughout the economy at large, and to discourage capital formation..." Peter T. Bauer and Basil S. Hamey, *The Economics of Under-Developed Countries*, Chicago, 1957, pp. 212-213.
15. "The present administrative machinery for land revenue assessment in many countries should be able to cope with land value assessments with only slight adjustments. Taxation of land on the basis of capital value can also facilitate the assessment and administration of death duties and levies on wealth or net worth taxation which are receiving increased attention on the part of the governments in Asia and the Far East." United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, Vol. IX, No. 1, p. 10. See also Haskel B. Wald, *Taxation of Agricultural Land in Under-Developed Economies*, Cambridge, 1959, p. 184.

TWO DETERMINANTS OF COMMUNITY REACTION TO INDUSTRIALIZATION IN RURAL MEXICO*

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A key-informant structured survey of the 24 villages surrounding a five-year old industrial center in the Mexican control plateau indicates that two factors, population size (over 1000) and distance from the factory center (less than five miles), determines most of the variance of a seven item Guttman scale of economic contact. Low economic contact is confined to individual worker relations; high contact includes selling in the market place of the factory center and the gains (new roads, etc.) made by the village as a whole. But further analysis shows that population size correlates highly with institutional level, as measured by a 14 item Guttman scale, the crucial cutting point of which occurs between the items reflecting traditional contact (railroad, school) and those indexing modern contact with the national system (a doctor, telephones, radios, and a secondary school). Similarly, distance has a sociological substratum. Absolute distance does not correlate. Only when the units are converted to functional miles based on the condition of the roads, and thus relating to the actual opportunity for contact, is there a relation. In short, institutional level operates to put villages as a whole into contact with the industrial center, but if they are close enough, individuals can make contact on their own. In combination the determinants correctly predict the economic contact of all but two of the villages.

I

In 1950 the Mexican government began establishing an 'industrial city' in one of the poorest states of the Central Plateau. Besides its immediate object of expanding the basic industries of the nation, the new center of 6000 people was supposed to stimulate the economy of the surrounding rural region. The managers of the several factories expected to draw some of their labor supply from the neighboring villages, and they assumed that local business would be stimulated by the purchases made by the new population. Additionally, the factories made various contributions, such as new roads and water wells, to particular villages. Apparently the factory officials had no clear idea of the factors that might determine the differential economic contact among the villages even though they had noticed variation among them. Since they lacked knowledge of the effects of such a new enterprise, but were inclined toward an optimistic view of the result, it is probable that they expected a general development of the regional economy and social life. Briefly put, their view was optimistically undifferentiated. Such was the background of one of the key research questions: the specification of the important determinants of variation in the economic contact between the industrial center and the surrounding rural villages.

* The research on which this paper is based was supported by the Doherty Foundation and PHS Grant #MF-7818-C.

The study on which this paper is based used several converging research stages for ascertaining the kinds and degrees and the determinants of contact, but the present results are based on only one of these, a key informant survey of the 24 villages in the immediate zone of contact.¹ The most distant village was 16 miles by dirt road from the industrial city, and the mean distances of all the villages was seven miles. In each of these communities, at least one village leader was interviewed regarding the characteristics of his village and its contact with the industrial city. Independently, the interviewer made various observations and measurements.

The data of these schedules supplied seven items which formed a Guttman scale² of economic contact with the factory center. (Table 1). Moving from low to high contact, these items were: the village was located in the zone of influence³; two percent or more of the village population working in the industrial city; some girls or women working there as house servants; some former residents of the village now living in the industrial town; some villagers go there in order to sell goods; the community had received some contribution from the factories; the key informant thought that a majority of the villagers would like to live in the industrial city; and, last, the community had made some request of the factories and the request had been refused. In other words, the first contact with the center was on an individual basis, as labor for the factories or in private houses. Later the community established commercial relations and made requests of the factories. At the last point in the scale, those villages with the most contact became bold enough to make requests that went beyond the contribution policies of the city officials. It turned out that five of the 24 villages had practically no contact with the factory center, in that they did not even have two percent of their population working in the town. At the other end of the scale, four villages had all the other items and had even come to the point of being refused by the officials. In terms of the cutting point used to define low and high contact, half of the villages had no contact other than the two or more percent of the population working in the city. The other 12, beginning with those having some female house servants working there, will be considered to have high contact.

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1. The other three stages were: general assessment of the urban contribution to the region, based mainly on interviews with economic planners and managerial personnel; an intensive study of four selected villages, including an individual household survey of fifty percent of their combined populations; a brief participant-observation study of the industrial city itself.
 2. Coefficient of reproducibility is .93.
 3. In contrast to attitude scales, where each step coincides with a given item, even if it be negative, this type of scale typically begins with a 'not measured by any item in the scale' category. Consequently, the seven items produce an eight step scale.

Table 1. Scale of Economic Contact of Twenty-four Rural Mexican Villages with an Industrial Center

<u>Scale Step #</u>	<u>Item Content</u>	<u>Proportion of 24 Villages Having Characteristic</u>	<u>Scale Error</u>
1	Located in zone of influence	100	-
2	Informant's estimate of number of people working in industrial center is two percent or more of 1950 population	80	0
3	Village supplies house servants for industrial center	50	3
4	Some former villagers now live in center	46	2
5	Vendors from village sell in industrial city's market	41	2
6	Village has received aid from industrial city	33	2
7	Informant believes a majority of villagers would like to live in industrial center	20	2
8	One or more petitions for aid has been refused by industrial center	16	1

Examination of the scale items suggests that the underlying dimension is limited to a kind of economic exploitation. Certainly more than one informant referred to the factory center as a 'mine', perhaps implying that this was the modern version of the mines that had been worked out. Stated negatively, the scale does not tap consumption. The villagers do shop in the industrial center, as well as attend movies and ball games there, but these items did not scale. Similarly, other types of contact, like religious, familial and certain perception items did not scale, and appeared not to form any other basic variable.

II

Turning now to the factors which determine whether the village, taken as a unit, will have high or low contact with this newly established center, the answer turns out to be initially simple and subsequently complicated. The two key determinants are population size, and distance from the factory town. If the village has over 1000 people it will have high contact. If it is within five

miles of the center it will also have high contact. Using both of these factors in combination, it is possible to predict correctly the economic contact of all but two of the villages.

However, the above statements are not quite correct. The five miles are functional miles, defined on the basis of the type of road surface and the relative speed that can be made on such roads. The cutting point of 1000 people also reflects a functional concept, which seems to be the point at which the village attains a level of institutional resources beyond that of the traditional villages. So qualified, the data are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Economic Contact by Size of Village and Functional Distance from Industrial City

<u>Population Size</u>	<u>Distance</u>	<u>Economic Contact</u>	
		<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>
Large (1000 or more)		6	0
Small (1000 or less)			
	Near (5 miles or less)	4	0
	Far (5 miles or more)	2	12

It should be noted that these 24 villages comprise the universe of autonomous communities lying within a region which was defined by external criteria as the 'immediate zone of contact.'⁴ Thus, the only relevant criterion of significance is the practical one, and we believe that this is met even when the factors are used singly, since in both cases it is possible to predict all the villages with low contact and half of those with high contact. When the two factors are combined, as in the above table, then it is possible to predict correctly not only the villages with low contact, but ten of the twelve with high economic contact.⁵ Consideration of the two exceptions reveals sufficient reason for their deviant status.⁶

4. Several knowledgeable informants in the industrial center indicated on a map the villages that lay at the edges of local contact. These villages were then connected by lines, and all villages within these boundaries were studied. A number of ranches, having no free labor supply or other reason for contact, were omitted.
5. The improvement in prediction of contact that results from knowing both size and distance as measured by lambda is .64. See Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruckal, 'Measures of Association for Cross Classifications,' Journal of the American Statistical Association, 49, pp. 740-742.
6. One village had a special contract with one factory involving a well drilled on its land to serve as an emergency water supply. The other was unusual in its organization, especially the fact that it was the only village of the 24 where the villagers owned their land privately and outright.

The phrases functional distance and functional size have already signaled the presence of more complexity than is suggested by their minimal ecological meaning. It is possible to show that these determinants reflect a complex of variables that are more specifically sociological. These wider referents seem to be the individual transportation capability of the villagers with respect to the factory center, and the community's participation in the national ideology and system of communication.

The meaning of functional size can be specified much more accurately by way of a 14 item Guttman scale⁷ of what we shall call "institutional level." (Table 3). Moving from least to most institutionalized, the items are: village has a name and is autonomous; it has an official position of some kind; presence of at least one organization; presence of a church; a school; a school that functions; access to a railroad; electricity; a railroad station; four or more grades in the school; a public square; a doctor; at least one telephone; 40 percent or more have radios; a secondary school. There were many other items that were interchangeable with these (see Table 3), but the sequence clearly indicates the levels of institutionalization, beginning with the communities that were no more than neighborhoods with little or no formal structure, through the middle-level communities with the traditional contact with the outside world embodied in the railroad and the village school, to the communities that have direct access to the national communication level by way of the doctor, telephone, radios, and a secondary school.

The real meaning of the cutting point of 1000 people now becomes clear: only one of the six villages with more than 1000 people did not fall into one of the highest four steps in the scale, which are the items reflecting participation in the contemporary national system. Even this one exception was only one step below. At the other end of the scale are nine communities that may be called isolated villages.

The particular operational definition of functional distance used here took into consideration the condition of the most direct road between each village and the factory town. Paved roads gave the standard mile. Gravel roads were considered functionally twice as far, and dirt roads or foot paths three times as distant. These factors corresponded roughly to the actual amount of time required to travel them, since poorer roads cut down speed directly or indirectly. This definition does not take into consideration the differential bus service or the period of time during which a route was impassable during the rainy season, although there is undoubtedly a high correlation. Also, it reflects a point in time after which bicycles came into general use and the roads were somewhat improved. Although it is probable that the five mile cutting point applied to the initial period of contact when most of the workers walked to work, it will probably not apply some years hence, after roads and transportation have greatly improved.

The fact that distance measured in absolute units did not correlate with economic contact is important to the understanding of this variable. It is only when distance is converted to an indirect measure of difficulty of access that it

7. Coefficient of reproducibility is .98. The formation of this scale is greatly indebted to the work of H. Aurbach, 'A Guttman Scale for Measuring Isolation,' *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 142-144.

Table 3. Scale of Institutional Levels Among Twenty-four Rural Mexican Villages

Scale Step #	Item Content*	Proportion of 24 Villages Having Characteristic	Scale Error
1	Named and autonomous locality group	100	-
2	One or more governmentally designated official More than one street	92	0 0
3	One or more organizations in village	88	1
4	A church	84	3
5	A school building A government organization An ejido Mass said in the village more than annually	80	0 0 3 1
6	A functional school	76	0
7	Has access to a railroad or informant voluntarily includes railroad in list of village needs	63	0
8	Access to electric power Informant estimates that a majority have electricity Six or more streets	46	1 2 3
9	Railroad station Four or more bus or train trips daily	41	1 4
10	School has four or more grades	37	1
11	Village has a public square Village market patronized by people in other villages	29	0 2
12	Doctor Priest resides in village Ten or more streets School has six or more grades Six or more stores Two or more television sets in village Public monument	20	0 0 0 0 1 1 1
13	Has one or more telephones	16	0
14	Forty percent or more have radios Settlement area one square mile or more	12	0
15	Secondary school Twenty or more stores	8	0 0

*First item was used in present scale. Others are interchangeable.

begins to figure as an explanatory variable. Essentially it specifies the condition under which small communities make contact with the industrial center, that is, when the individual can make contact with the factories without institutional help.

A consideration of the particular cases elucidates the interaction of the size and distance factors. Four of the six highly institutionalized villages already had good highway and bus connection with the industrial center, even though they were more than five functional miles away. What happened to the other two? Within a year an arrangement had been made between them and the factories for the purchase of bicycles on an installment basis. This sufficed for getting the men to work over the muddy roads, but immediately the villages began agitation for improvement of the roads. At the time of the study these roads were near the point of realization as a result of an agreement between the factory, the villages and the state. In short, the institutional resources of the village were brought to bear on the problem of the individual workers.

The situation is different in the villages that do not have such resources. Contact here is a matter of individual effort and interest. But since the scale of economic contact specifies more than individual contact in order to qualify as "high", it may be wondered how four small communities ever fell into that category. Individual consideration of these cases suggests that all of them received help from a larger community. Two are satellites of a large village and benefited by its resources. The other two received special aid from the industrial center itself, in return for rights in land which these communities yielded to the industrial city. So, in an indirect way, even functional distance depends upon the operation of highly institutionalized communities.

In summary, these findings seem to have at least two major implications. Since the basic measurements are easily made and the two determinants in combination seem to account for so much of the variance in economic contact, these results should have a certain practical utility for economic planners. At the very least, they point to the possibility of a more differentiated view of the effects of economic development. But more than this, the results give more substance to the view that the "receiving" end of economic development is important in the total process.

They suggest that the village reacts to industrialization as an organized system, operating as an independent element in the total process.⁸

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8. It has been suggested that these results can be interpreted in terms of the Zipf-Steward formula for intercity migration. Zipf's formula is $P_1 P_2 / D = m$ where P_1 and P_2 are the populations of any two communities, D the shortest transportation distance between them, and m the intercity migration. It should be added that Zipf and others have interpreted D and m in wider terms, so that it is not stretching their thought to use our functionally derived distance, or equate m with our scale of economic contact. When the populations of the 24 villages are successively inserted in the formula along with the population of the industrial center and divided by the number of functional miles, the results $m_1, m_2 \dots m_{24}$ tend to correlate with the degree of economic contact as measured by our scale. Thus:

		Contact Measured by Economic Contact Scale	
		High	Low
Potential Contact	High	9	3
According to Zipf			
Formula	Low	2	10

Although there are five deviant cases, the imprecisions in our population data might account for some of these. Some of the relevant sources are: George K. Zipf, "The $P_1 P_2 / D$ Hypothesis: On the Intercity Movement of Persons, *American Sociological Review*, 11, pp. 677-686; John Q. Stewart, "Demographic Gravitation: Evidence and Applications," *Sociometry*, 11, pp. 31-58; Stuart C. Dodd, "The Intercity Hypothesis," *American Sociological Review*, 15, pp. 245-256; T. R. Anderson, "Intermetropolitan Migration: A Comparison of the Hypotheses of Zipf and Stouffer," *American Sociological Review*, 20, pp. 287-291.

LABOR MIGRATION AS A POSITIVE FACTOR IN THE CONTINUITY OF TONGA TRIBAL SOCIETY*

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It is often taken for granted that when people migrate to towns they become "detrribalized" or "urbanized", in the sense that sooner or later they break off all ties with the countryside. It is further assumed that this process leads to a rejection of traditional values and the adoption of new ones, specific to urban life. This article examines these contentions as they relate to the Tonga of Nyasaland in Central Africa, many of whose men have been away from home for many years. It suggests that, however long they have lived in the towns, they continue to take an active interest in what goes on at home because sooner or later they intend to return. They may learn to lead a new and different life in town and they may enter new associations there, but at the same time they take care to maintain their position in their society of origin and they exert on that society a conservative influence. It may be that the Tonga are unique, and that others behave in the way commonly alleged, but it will be suggested that statistics which purport to show increasing "urbanization" show only that greater numbers stay in the towns for longer, which is not at all the same as saying that they become permanent urban dwellers.

I. The Pattern of Labor Migration

The Tonga¹ live on the western shores of the northern half of Lake Nyasa, at a distance of about 1,000 miles from the main employment centers in the Rhodesias and of about 1,500 to 2,000 miles from those in the Union of South Africa. They live in small scattered homesteads which I have called "hamlets". The overwhelming majority of Tonga wage earners find work in those three countries; very few are employed in Nyasaland. Tongaland is still undeveloped and very little cash is generated locally. Compared with other

* This paper was first presented at the International African Institute Seminar, held at Makerere College in January, 1959. A synopsis of this paper will be published, together with the other papers read at this Seminar, by the International African Institute in a forthcoming symposium. I am grateful to the International African Institute for their permission to publish this paper in its original form in this journal. I gratefully acknowledge Dr. Walter Elkan's helpful comments.

1. I lived among the Tonga for thirty months between 1952 and 1955 as a research officer of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Lusaka. A fuller account of the results of this fieldwork will be found in my forthcoming monograph: The Politics of Kinship.

tribal areas the Tonga are relatively prosperous; this prosperity is largely due to their export of labor. Their staple diet is cassava, the cultivation of which does not require much labor. Subsistence cultivation is almost entirely in the hands of the women and does not seem to be adversely affected by the exodus of male labor. There is no shortage of land.

Formally Tonga society is matrilineal: descent and office follow to the matriline and ideally a person should reside matrilocally but wives should live virilocally. In fact, however, there are many deviations from these rules and patrilineal kin play an important role in a person's life. Indeed, there are no clear foci of social and political relationships and there is ample scope for political manipulation and usurpation of offices and titles.

Absent labor migrants are an important category of Tonga. At any one time between 60 and 75%² of the adult males are absent while working abroad (viz. outside Tongaland). The great majority of these leave their families behind. Indeed, even the most casual visitor to Tongaland cannot fail to notice the marked preponderance of women. In another respect too the absence of such a large proportion of the Tonga is conspicuous: there are few situations or discussions in which the affairs of temporarily emigrated kinsmen, or the subject of labor migration itself, do not crop up. It may be a wife who complains about her husband's absence; or a man waiting for a kinsman to return from abroad so that he can have his turn of working abroad; or a court hearing a case of a deserted or adulterous grass-widow. Every mail brings thousands of letters, postal orders and parcels from kinsmen abroad to the three post offices in the area.

In this paper I will show that these absent villagers generally maintain a stake in the social and political structure of Tongaland; that they have a vested interest in its continued functioning and try to play their social and political role despite their absence. Tonga working abroad thus belong to two contrasted and distinguishable (but not rigidly separated) economic and social environments. On the one hand there is their tribal area with the villages where they come from, where they are likely to retire and where their status is largely determined by birth. On the other hand there are the urban areas where they work (often for the best part of their adult lives) and where their status does not depend on their birth (apart from the fact that they are black). I shall refer to these two environments respectively as the village, home, rural area or the country, and as town, urban or industrial area. In the second category I also include those areas (e.g. farming areas) which are not really urban but share with the latter the characteristics of a cash economy.

Tonga who seek employment abroad are quite explicit about their objections to taking their families with them. These objections may refer to urban life in general (as it is experienced by Africans in Rhodesian and South African towns) or to life in particular urban areas. The reasons they give for their

2. This estimate is based upon my own village census figures and estimates by government officials.

objections are corroborated by the literature on urban conditions for Africans.³ As I shall describe later, it is largely for the same reasons that Tonga want to retire in the village after a life-time in the towns. I shall therefore continue to use the term "labor migrants" because, through necessity, and hence by intention, most Tonga who go abroad retire to their village in Tongaland. My view is that those who manage to settle in the towns permanently and have given up the intention to return to the village, are the exception rather than the rule. This view cannot easily be supported by figures from either the rural or the urban end.

The Administration counts a Tonga taxpayer as "lost" when they have not heard from him for more than seven years. It is, however, by no means exceptional for a migrant to stay away longer than seven years before he visits the rural area again. In any case a man may return to Tongaland without his presence being recorded by the Administration. The rural kinsmen of a migrant also tend to talk about him as "lost" (*mchiona*, plur. *achiona*) if he has been away for a number of years without a visit to the village. But here again, "lost" is not as final as it sounds. I have met several elderly men in Tongaland who had gone abroad as young bachelors, stayed away without a break and returned, after thirty years or so, as grandfathers bringing with them some of their children or grandchildren who had never been to Tongaland before and whose mothers might be non-Tonga. One may assume that especially those Tonga who have done well in the towns are likely to retire there. On the other hand, I have concrete evidence (apart from their own stories) of several Tonga who have now retired in Tongaland, who had spent a lifetime in the towns where they reached positions of distinction while still maintaining contact with the village. One would need life histories of men who have reached such a stage in their lives (or who are now dead) that one can assume that they are not likely to move from the urban to the rural area or *vice versa*, depending on where they are found. Considering the number of men who are away at any one time and the long average duration of a man's absence abroad, in the relatively short time that I lived with the Tonga I could not gather sufficient systematic numerical data at the rural end.

The data on urbanization could be reliably obtained only through the usual anthropological method of intensive study rather than through surveys which tend to lay too much emphasis on such quantitative data as the number of years spent

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3. See for instance A. Dalglish, Chairman, Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Advancement of Africans in Industry, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1948, p. 36; Ellen Hellman, "Urban areas", *Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa*, O. U. P., 1949, pp. 246, 268 et passim; *The African Factory Worker*, O. U. P., 1950, pp. 10, 11, 15; *The African Native Market in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, H. M. S. O., London 1954, pp. 9-10; H. W. Woodruff, *The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Overseas Economic Surveys, H. M. S. O., London, 1955, pp. 43-144; G. E. Stent, "Migrancy and Urbanization in the Union of South Africa," *Africa*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, pp. 161-183.

by Africans in towns, or, alternatively, their attitudes towards urbanization.⁴ From my experience with Tonga labor migrants, it seems to me that the number of years spent in the towns by a person is not a reliable index of that person's "urbanization". I understand by this term a condition in which the African has given up his continued dependence on the economic and social system of his tribe, and has become, as an individual and no longer through membership of his tribe, a citizen of the larger state which now contains his tribe. It is relatively unimportant whether an African has lived for one, ten or twenty years, with or without intervals in his tribal area, in the specialized and industrialized economy of the towns if he relies for his ultimate security on his tribal society, after his limited security of urban employment has come to an end.

In the light of my Tonga evidence it might perhaps be more fruitful if in urban surveys one tried to discover a correlation between length of residence on the one hand and distance from tribal area and the nature of a man's employment (whether skilled or not or whether well paid) on the other hand. I have found a definite reluctance among the Tonga to come home frequently because the journey to their place of employment is generally long and expensive; moreover Tonga tend to have the rather better paid jobs and they are afraid that if they go on holiday too often or too long at a time they may lose their jobs.

I remarked before that the Tonga retire to the village from necessity rather than from choice. The Tonga living in the towns are all "urbanized" in the sense that they come under the urban authorities and live in an industrial, urban, cash economy and so forth.⁵ But their integration into the industrial, urban economy, particularly as regards social security, is only partial for reasons which are beyond their control. It seems to me that this aspect of economic integration is or should be the crucial element in any discussion of "urbanization". Since the majority of the Tonga working abroad maintain social and economic links with their village, they remain "migrants" and do not become "urbanized". Consequently when Tonga migrants eventually retire to their village, they do not fall back upon the security of a tribal social system which happens to have continued during their absence; the migrants themselves, during their absence, have been actively and consciously contributing to its continuance because they know that they may have to rely on it when they are no longer usefully employed in their urban habitat. In other words, the decision of Tonga urban workers to maintain a position in their tribal society is therefore not so much a matter of choice but rather it is inherent in the social and economic system of the urban areas in which they live and work. And such variations between individual Tonga as the length of their stay abroad, the

4. Cf. Stent, *op. cit.* p. 173; J. C. Mitchell, "Note on the Urbanization of Africans in the Copperbelt", *Human Problems* No. 12, pp. 20-27; J. C. Mitchell, "Urbanization, Detribalization and Stabilization in Southern Africa: A Problem of Definition and Measurement" in D. Forde, ed., *Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara*, UNESCO Tensions and Technology Series, pp. 693-711.

5. Cf. also M. Gluckman, "Seven Year Research Plan of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute", *Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Journal*, No. 4, December 1945, pp. 1-32.

amount of money sent home, and, in general, the frequency and intensity of their contacts with the rural area,⁶ are differences of degree and do not alter the fundamental fact that the majority of the Tonga working abroad look to the economic and social system of their tribal area for their ultimate security.

Labor migration is often assumed to have bad effects. The word "detrribalization" does more than neutrally state a fact; it has strong pejorative overtones. Indeed, detrribalization and labor migration are generally considered to be inevitably associated. But while it is true, for instance, that among the Tonga divorce is frequent and that, in fact, many marriages are somewhat ill-defined legally, one does not know whether this is a new trend and if so, whether it is a result of labor migration.⁷ Whether labor migration alone is responsible for so-called "illegitimate" births and whether it has a "disastrous effect" on family life is a moot point if one considers the problem within the framework of Tonga (and not European) values, and if one remembers that every Tonga still has a father who is both his pater and his genitor. Unfortunately, writers on "detrribalization" rarely describe with any degree of precision what the original tribal system was which is now being altered (spoilt) by the migrant labor system. Moreover, although it is certainly a fact that some tribal societies are very badly affected, economically and/or otherwise, by the departure of their male labor force (e.g. the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia⁸) I hope to show that in the case of the Tonga this is not so, mainly because their agricultural system is such that the absence of male labor does not interfere with its ability to support those who are left behind. In other words, the problems associated with labor migration should be considered in relation to the economic and social systems of the tribal societies concerned.

II. Factors Discouraging Migration of Families

I shall now discuss some of the factors which encourage Tonga men who seek employment abroad, to go without their families and to maintain contact with their village.

6. These are the criteria which Wilson uses to distinguish between "Labor migration" and "temporary urbanization". G. Wilson, An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia, Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1942, Livingstone, p. 46.
7. For a sample of opinions on the effects, good, bad or neutral, of labor migration on family life, tribal authority and tribal values in general, see R. D. Bell, Chairman, Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial Position and Further Development of Nyasaland, Bell Report, H. M. S. O., London, 1938, p. 97; T. Lacey, Chairman, Report of the Commission to Enquire into Emigrant Labour, Government Printer, Zomba, 1935, p. 35; Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners, 1946, Government Printer, Zomba, 1946, p. 38; *ibid.*, 1954, p. 23; F. Debenham, Nyasaland, H. M. S. O., London, 1955, p. 157.
8. Personal communication from Mrs. E. Collins (then Miss E. Richardson).

Tonga men who go abroad for the first time or go to a place where they have not lived before, frequently say that they do not want to take their families because the journey is difficult and they want to explore the place first. Large numbers of Tonga (perhaps half or more) go to work in South Africa where they are legally prohibited immigrants unless they sign a contract for work in the mines. But in contrast to the neighboring Tumbuka who sign on for the mines in large numbers, no Tonga ever considers this possibility. They consider that the wages are too low and that the contracts would restrict their freedom to sell their labor for the best price they can get. Moreover contract laborers have to be returned to the area from which they have been recruited after a maximum period of eighteen months; the Tonga prefer, however, to stay abroad for much longer periods because they reckon that that enhances their chances to find better jobs and to save more money. Since Tonga never sign on as contract laborers for the mines (although many work on the mines as locally recruited workers on a monthly basis) they often enter the Union of South Africa by various illegal means. They obviously do not want to be burdened with a family; an illegal immigrant when caught may find himself working as a prisoner on a farm instead of in a relatively well-paid and certainly much preferred job in a town, as was his intention. After they have explored the new conditions, some Tonga may then fetch or write for their wives who usually also enter the Union illegally.

Another factor which tends to discourage a Tonga from settling in the towns with his family is the fact that the minimum wage is adjusted to the requirements of quasi-bachelors without family commitments, and that in general the wage structure is based upon the assumption that families are left behind in the rural areas where they support themselves.⁹ But even when wages are adequate for the maintenance of a family in the towns, the acute shortage of housing for Africans is still a deterrent to urban family life. The industrial economy is still largely based upon the assumption that African employees come to the towns singly and thus require only single accommodation. The consequent overcrowding is often so great the Tonga do not like to take their families and least of all their small children with them. There is, however, some family accommodation in the urban areas provided by the municipalities and some of the larger employers such as the mining companies on the Rhodesian Copperbelt, but this is still far from sufficient.¹⁰

Housing provided by employers, such as these mines, has the great disadvantage that it offers little security--"no job, no house" is the Tonga comment on this kind of housing. Housing provided by municipalities in "locations" or elsewhere is for various reasons also virtually "tied housing." In addition there

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9. Bachelor-based wages are an obstacle to urban family life, particularly at the lower levels of income. Cf. C. H. Thompson and H. W. Woodruff, *Economic Development in Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Dennis Dobson, London, 1954, p. 75. For African wages and family standard of living see Dalglish, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 35; Hellman, *op. cit.* p. 270, B. P. Thomson, *Two Studies in African Nutrition*, Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Paper, No. 24, Lusaka, 1954, pp. 25 *et passim*.
10. Cf. Dalglish, *op. cit.* p. 36; Hellman, *op. cit.* pp. 246, 268 *et passim*.

is the inadequacy of social services (educational, medical, recreational, etc.) for Africans in the urban areas. Even if these services are no more inadequate than in the tribal area, the Tonga at home have at least the compensation that they live among their own kin on whose support they can rely.

III. Reciprocal Relations between Town and Village

The families who stay in the village have no difficulty in maintaining themselves, even if only on a subsistence level. In spite of the absence of such a large proportion of male labor the Tonga area still produces a small surplus of cassava, groundnuts, maize, rice, beans and so forth; at any rate there is no shortage of food. Some of this surplus is produced by single women (e. g. widows and grass-widows) who do not receive any or enough remittances from their kinsfolk abroad or who for other reasons are short of the cash needed for a new cloth, salt, fish, soap, and other necessities and/or luxuries. This means that those who stay behind can feed themselves and that the money which is sent in from abroad is net income and not needed to make up for the absence of male labor (as for instance among the Bemba).

The income, both cash and in kind, of the Tonga in the tribal area still consists largely of goods which are produced locally by the consumer himself or acquired through barter. But barter is increasingly being replaced by exchange for money and at the same time, as a result of a determined effort on the part of the Tonga to raise their standard of living, their minimum requirements tend to include more and more manufactured goods and other items which can only be purchased with money. There are few opportunities for earning cash locally. In any case, local or even Nyasaland employment offers fewer openings for the kind of better paid "white collar" jobs which the Tonga seek and which they appear to obtain with remarkable success abroad. Moreover the Tonga are aware of the attractions of the different kind of life that the larger urban areas in the Rhodesias and South Africa offer. For instance, the range of goods available in Tongaland or even in Nyasaland as a whole compares unfavorably with the much greater choice in the larger industrial centers abroad.

The Tonga who goes abroad without his family leaves them behind in the care of his own kinsmen or of his in-laws. Wherever the wife lives during her husband's absence, her relatives will see to it that she receives the treatment due to her as a wife. For instance, her husband must send her money with which to buy salt, cloth and the other necessities which a husband is expected to provide. Conversely, the husband's kin take care that his marital rights are not abused, and many are the cases in which an absent husband's kinsmen sue his wife for adultery or divorce. This generally involves correspondence between the husband in the town and his relatives at home, in which the husband instructs them what line to take. Similarly, a wife in the village often receives information in a letter from her kinsmen in the same town or from returning labor migrants about her husband's adultery or marriage.

Wives who have accompanied their husbands to the urban areas often come back to Tongaland alone to be confined, or to bring home their children because "the town is a bad place for small children." Children may also be sent home with some other returning migrant. It also frequently happens that

a man contracts a quasi-marriage in the urban area with some local non-Tonga woman without making whatever the customary payment of the woman's tribe may be. He has then no legal claim on the children. In that case he may send at least one child away to his village so as to put it out of reach of his "wife" who might otherwise take it to her own tribal area. The men's relatives in the village welcome these children, the old people particularly, because they want their grandchildren's companionship to make up for the absence of their own children. Women especially want to keep the family together to save it from getting lost in those distant parts where women seldom go. On the other hand, children of about thirteen years and older are sometimes sent to a relative in the towns for more education (Standard IV and higher) for which there are not many opportunities in the District. The relative pays for the child's education in the urban area, but if the child can get a place in a local school in the rural area the relative may send the money for the fees instead. An interesting example is the following extract from a report of a mission station which mentions: "... the receipt... of a sum of money from a number of Atonga working in Elisabethville, Congo Belge, calling themselves 'The Tonga Special Committee' who seem to interest themselves in the welfare of their fellows. These lads gave me the names of a number of young brothers and other friends, the expense of whose education they wished to meet. They have written me more than once asking if their gift is yet exhausted as they are ready to send a further sum. They have now devised a card system of their own, by which every child presenting one of those cards signed by their secretary will have the expenses of his schooling paid."¹¹

Money is also sent from abroad for a great variety of other purposes. Relatives at home may appeal to kinsmen working abroad for clothes or for financial help (and often receive it) to pay a fine, damages or bridewealth, to buy clothes or to pay for the fare to go abroad. Others may help a kinsman in the country by sending him money for a gun with which he can shoot meat for his own pot and for sale to others. Another way in which a relative abroad can help a kinsman at home is to send him or her a sum of money which his kinsman can use for lending to intending migrants. Loans which are taken abroad have to be repaid with 100% interest irrespective of the period; loans which stay in Tongaland are interest-free. But often money is sent home merely for safe-keeping.

The total amount of cash which is sent to the District from abroad is quite considerable and is, incidentally, larger in proportion to the population than for the other Districts of the Northern Province and perhaps of the whole of Nyasaland.¹² At the end of 1953 it was officially estimated by the District Administration that the remittances sent in from abroad that year through various official channels amounted to £56,525; this excludes cash and the cash value of goods brought back by returning Tonga. This was more than the cash income of the District from all other sources, e.g. wages, Government building program, export of produce etc. As I estimate the *de facto* population of the District at about 50,000 and the number of absent males at over 10,000, the

11. Quoted in the *Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners, 1931*, Government Printer, Zomba, p. 37.

12. See the *Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners, 1946*, Government Printer, Zomba, pp. 38, 45.

remittances thus amounted to about £1 per head of population (including women and children) or about £5 per labor migrant per annum.

Finally, labor migrants help their kinsmen at home with other services. I mentioned already the opportunities for education which they sometimes offer. Prospective labor migrants generally depend for their contacts, introduction to employment etc. on Tonga, whether they are kinsmen or not, who are settled in the towns already. The latter will help the prospective migrants with papers (genuine or forged) to facilitate their entry into the Union of South Africa.

I have not tried to give an exhaustive description of the manifold reciprocal services which are expressions of the continual contact between Tongaland and the labor migrants. I merely wanted to indicate the range of these reciprocal contacts and to show that they are the result of normal kinship relationships (such as exist between persons who are still in personal touch in Tongaland), and partly the result of the special circumstances of the considerable separation, in terms of geographical distance and social and economic environment, between the two places where Tonga earn a living. In spite of this separation there is still a great deal of interdependence between what one might call the rural and the urban Tonga. Rural Tonga society is geared to a permanent situation in which only a minority of its menfolk in the prime of life is available in Tongaland. The Tonga do not consider this situation as exceptional: migration to the urban centers has become part of the Tonga culture. The Tonga accept it as part of life that every normal man should spend at least some years away from Tongaland. They see Tongaland as a training ground for the young and a place of retirement for the old. Young men consider their stay in the village, before they can go off to the towns, as a period of marking time. They sometimes have to wait for the return of a kinsman to take their place: "I am waiting for my brother to come back first. How can I leave my *muzi* (hamlet) behind without a man to look after the women?" (The Tonga try to organize their export of labor in such a way that at least one man per hamlet is left behind.)

The income which supports the rearing and the training of the young until they are ready to make their contribution to the industrial economy of the towns is for the greater part generated in Tongaland and derived from the traditional subsistence economy of the Tonga. The rural economy thus relieves the industrial economy of the towns from the responsibility and the expense of rearing its own future labor force. Urban social services are inadequate and could not at present take over the tasks which are now performed in the rural area. Although many Tonga manage to send money home and although this cash is important as an addition to the income generated in Tongaland, it is insignificant in relation to the services performed in the rural area.

Women on the whole do not expect to go abroad and few have ever gone. The result is that the knowledge, experiences and, one might almost say, the culture of the two sexes differs considerably. While many men are literate in or can at any rate speak at least one if not several other languages (often including one or two European languages) besides Tonga, women on the whole do not have these accomplishments. Men have seen and know about the ways of Europeans and other peoples from first hand experience, but the knowledge of the women in this respect is mostly secondhand or restricted to what they have seen in the District. On the other hand, since the women have been able to follow the

developments at home during the absence of their sons, brothers or husbands, it is the women who are more fully *au fait* in that respect. Village and town have come to represent, for the men at least, different phases of life. The same people move from one environment to another and have interests in both.

IV. The Migrants' Social and Economic Status in the Village

I have given a short description of the links between town and village, and some of the interests they serve. We saw that the Tonga migrants leave certain interests behind which they expect their kinsmen at home to protect. It is not only a certain number of specific interests which a labor migrant expects his kinsfolk to protect, but also his total legal personality--his membership of, and his place in, Tonga society. As I mentioned before, the Tonga leave their villages for the towns with the intention of returning and they want, therefore, a niche to which to return. They know that a time will come when they will no longer be productive in the urban economy, through illness, invalidity or old age, and when "those who cease to be employed...relinquish their rights to be housed [in the urban area]".¹³ The same factors which make it difficult for a Tonga to take his family to the towns, also make it difficult for him to stay in the towns when he is no longer employed: housing which is directly or indirectly tied to employment; shortage of housing in general and of married quarters in particular; inadequate social services. The latter includes absence or inadequacy of pension rights. If a Tonga cannot find social security in his place of work, he will expect it in his village. That is why urban workers try to keep a stake in the village or, as it is often phrased: "one foot in the...native areas and the other in the European area."¹⁴ They expect their rural kinsmen to continue to consider them as members of the village and of the kin group who are only temporarily absent. And both groups of Tonga see their respective services on a reciprocal basis. The labor migrant sees his contributions of cash and goods to the rural economy as a kind of insurance premium: "How can we expect our *abali* (kin, friends) to help us later when we are old, if we do not help them now?". I was once told about an old man who had spent most of his life in Johannesburg without maintaining any contact with his kinsfolk. When he returned to his village he was left to look after himself even when he became old and crippled although now and again a granddaughter would take pity on him and fetch him some water. The moral of the story was: "Well, what could he expect? While he was in Johannesburg he had such a good time with his money that he forgot about his people at home. All right, if he thinks that he can live for himself alone and then suddenly come back here when he is too old to work and expect the people in the village to look after him, he is wrong." I never saw the man myself, nor indeed did I ever see anybody else in similar circumstances: old, crippled and unattended; but as a story it sums up the rights and obligations of labor migrants.

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13. G. W. Noble, "African Housing in the Urban Areas of Southern Rhodesia", Journal of African Administration, Vol. III, No. 3, p. 128.
 14. A. Pendered and W. von Memerty, "Native Land Husbandry Act of Southern Rhodesia", Journal of African Administration, Vol. VII, No. 3, p. 102.

To keep the place of labor migrants means amongst other things, that their kinsmen in the rural area must make sure that there will always be enough land for them. This is one reason why those who have, in one capacity or another, control over land, are chary of indiscriminate settlement even though there is enough land. People will say that, although there may not be many people in the village now, they will have to reckon with the possibility of many people who are now abroad but may want to settle in the village later.

A person's relationship to land, his claim for a garden, is only one aspect of his membership of Tonga society. Status the social and political structure within the village and outside it is closely connected with access to land, and a person's rights to land cannot be isolated from his relationships involving other rights and obligations in the community. It is therefore his status as a Tonga in its entirety which a labor migrant wants to be preserved during his absence. Although the Tonga have been drawn into the orbit of a cash economy, those who live in Tongaland still need land as the principal source of their living. It provides them with food, fire and building materials for their houses. As regards most basic requirements of life such as food and housing, though not clothing, the economy of Tongaland is still essentially the traditional subsistence economy. I do not know of any Tonga in Tongaland who lives entirely on a cash income.

Like all men, the Tonga do not live by bread alone. The crippled old man who is said to have been practically abandoned, might well have had a garden; but even if he had been strong enough to cultivate it he would still have needed a female relative to draw water for him. People depend on one another's help in daily life and in emergencies. Therefore people want more than just land; they want a position in the society which gives them security in all the ways in which Tonga society can offer it.

The situation in Tongaland is therefore that there is still a relative scarcity of cash; that land and in practice labor, too, have no cash value; that the household continues to rely for its subsistence income on its own garden and labor. Moreover, the Tonga are still dependent on their own forms of social services which are built into their traditional kinship system, for, except for some rudimentary modern medical facilities, these services have not yet been taken over by agents outside of the traditional system. These factors, combined with a certain social inertia, may explain why Tonga society is still governed by its traditional norms. It is within this framework of basically traditional values that a Tonga occupies a position into which he is born and by virtue of which he is a member of Tonga society. And it is within this framework, too, that Tonga holds gardens, marry, have children, occupy political office, seek for protection of their rights--in brief, expect security in life. This means that a member of this society who wants to maintain his status cannot do so only in relation to one aspect of life--he is inevitably drawn into the total life of the community.

V. The Role of Migrants in Tribal Politics

Tonga, whether at home or abroad, who are interested in the preservation of rights in land, are inevitably involved in tribal politics. This explains why labor migrants continue to compete for political office at home as well as

they can in spite of their absence, and notwithstanding the fact that the monetary rewards of the office, if any, are likely to be very small in comparison with their earnings abroad. I saw a striking example of this when two elderly and well-to-do men entered the political struggle for a comparatively unimportant headmanship. Both had reached positions of distinction as Northern Rhodesian Government servants; they had both spent at least thirty years in Northern Rhodesia. Both also played roles in national politics (one was a member of the Nyasaland legislature) and in Commonwealth politics (both went to London more than once on political missions). During their absence in Northern Rhodesia they both wrote various memoranda, tribal histories and other documents for the benefit of the Administration both in their home District and in the Nyasaland Protectorate capital. In these documents and letters they were concerned to point out and prove the political seniority of the headman they backed and whom they wanted the Administration officially to recognize instead of the neighboring headman who at that time was enjoying Administrative support. These two men had clearly not lost interest in Tonga tribal politics despite having entered politics on a much higher level. This was also clear later, after they had retired to their village, when they became involved in the minor political intrigues surrounding the selection or support of headmen.

It is a common practice for labor migrants to write to the District Commissioner or the Protectorate Secretariat in Zomba asking for clarification of or protesting against political events in Tongaland.

I have seen many similar cases: sophisticated men with (as far as I could judge) quite good positions and cash incomes abroad who come back for a few months' holiday in the village and get involved in competition for headmanships or other minor political honours or make every effort in trying to rectify what they consider is a usurpation of office.

VI. Migrants' Support of Traditional Values

We have seen that the rights associated with a person's social and political status (including claims to office) require continuous vigilance against encroachment. A labor migrant expects his kinsmen at home to protect his status, though those kinsmen may be in a weak position through the very absence of male relatives. In the flexible political system of the Tonga, struggles for political power are won and lost, and titles appear and disappear. The Tonga political system shows relatively little continuity of titles of office and produces great numbers of rival claimants for political titles. And when a labor migrant's claim has gone by default (which can easily happen since many Tonga stay abroad for long periods) he loses no time in putting in his claim on his return. Hence the reference in an Annual Report to "educated Africans who have spent most of their lives in employment abroad and who have returned to this country on retirement. It is no uncommon practice for these people to unearth dormant disputes, and urge claims for their own recognition... or ...[for] members of their family... These tendencies are most marked in the politically minded and self-assertive aTonga."¹⁵

15. Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners, 1949, Government Printer, Zomba, p. 40.

Whatever other effects labor migration may have upon Tongaland, it is clear that most Tonga do not cut their ties with the rural area. When they return from an urban life abroad they settle again in the pattern of Tonga life which is still dominated by traditional values. There have been many gloomy prognostications (some of them dating back about a generation) regarding "de-tribalization" and "lack of parental control" resulting in "complete disregard of tribal inhibitions" which "tends to destroy tribal customs and authority,"¹⁶ and so forth. But the present-day visitor to the area cannot but observe that there are no obvious signs of tribal disorganization and that the Tonga still hold together as a tribal unit, distinct from other such units surrounding them. There are indeed various factors and pressures which work towards the continuance, if not reinforcement, of tribal integration rather than towards tribal disorganization. Firstly there is the basic assumption, explicit or implicit, of the industrial economy that the average African "is not in any real sense a wage-earner,"¹⁷ but is a labor migrant who has his tribal village to fall back upon. Secondly, the Tonga abroad have therefore a vital interest in maintaining their position in the community and the economy of Tongaland. I mentioned several factors prevailing in Tongaland which encourage the Tonga, including the migrants, to conceive of their social and economic security in the rural area in terms of traditional Tonga values.

A third important factor is the Administration of the territory which is based upon "tribal integrity."¹⁸ Consequently the Administration of the District makes extensive use of Tonga tribal agencies. This means in practice that some village headsmen (and this by no means includes all who claim to have a title and to be headmen) receive recognition from the Administration and are appointed Administrative Headsmen or Native Authorities, the latter with their own court warrants. Such Administrative appointments are on the whole made upon the assumption that the appointees hold office in the Tonga political structure. Thus Administrative recognition not only puts a premium on political leadership in the Tonga political structure, but the competition for this recognition, i.e. for Administrative appointments, is also largely in terms of traditional values. The tribal political structure thus receives powerful support from the Administration. The idea of tribal integrity is also implicit in the tax census in that a Tonga who is de facto resident abroad, is de jure still a resident of his village.

I suggest that all three categories of persons--industrial employers, Administration, and the Tonga themselves--have an interest in maintaining the cohesion of the Tonga as a tribal community; and that there is a connection between this interest and the fact that the social and economic systems (including

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16. This was reported in 1933 and 1935 by district commissioners in the Tonga area. See Lacey, op. cit., p. 111. For the opposite view, that "on his return the native is not... disaffected but is perfectly content to resume his comparatively primitive mode of life," see Report on Native Affairs, 1931, Government Printer, Zomba, p. 8; and Lacey, op. cit., p. 34.
 17. Nyasaland, Colonial Reports, H. M. S. O., London, 1954, p. 22.
 18. See for instance Lacey, op. cit., pp. 36, 40, 63.

the land-holding system) are still dominated by traditional norms. But while I emphasize that returning labor migrants seem to fit themselves into the social, economic and political life of the Tonga community again, I do not want to suggest that there are no "new men" who are dissatisfied with the Tonga way of life. However, in the conditions which prevail in Tongaland and outside it, these "new men" have little chance to give practical expression to their dissatisfaction, for instance by adopting a different way of life. There are other factors, too, which prevent an acute opposition between conservative and progressive elements. For example, literacy and education in general, experience of urban and European ways of life and other such factors are not confined to a certain section of the Tonga male population. Practically all men have been away to the towns at one stage in their lives. Education is comparatively widespread in Tongaland and the enjoyment or lack of it, both in the past and at present, is not confined to any particular social or political category of people. There is no sharp division between conservative and illiterate headmen and progressive, educated labor migrants.

Relatively few Tonga have acquired, through trade, position in the Administration, legislature or church, the power and influence to enable them to strike off on their own, outside the framework of Tonga norms and values. On the contrary, such men generally exert their influence in the manipulation of tribal forces and personalities.

In this paper I have tried to explain an apparent contradiction. On the one hand we have the continued predominance of traditional values; on the other hand the exodus of large numbers of men who return to the village with a great deal of sophistication and education in the ways of the Europeans, who have become in many ways a reference group for the Tonga. And I have tried to show that in general these returning labor migrants are actively stimulating the traditional values of their rural society, and the reasons why they do so.

I would like to add one "practical" conclusion. If my analysis is correct, that would mean that as long as Tonga (or for that matter, members of other tribal societies) in the urban areas are not given an opportunity to make their living entirely in the towns, in other words to "urbanize" themselves, so long will they have to rely on making their living partly in the rural area. And this pull of the rural area (and the economic and social system found there) will continue to exert its influence on the stabilization of the urban population, the labor turnover, the efficiency of labor, etc. The apparent failure of the majority of Africans to settle down as a fully urbanized labor force is too often ascribed to inherent personal "failings" too rarely the cause is sought for in the ambivalent lives which so many urban Africans are forced to live.

CHANGING RELIGIOUS PRACTICES OF AN UNTOUCHABLE CASTE*

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One of the most radical aspects of the Indian Constitution adopted in 1950 was its abolition of untouchability. To realize this objective, and to encourage the advancement of the depressed classes, not only were seats reserved for their representatives in Parliament and in the legislative assemblies of the states, but special scholarships were made available to them in public schools, and a proportion of jobs were reserved for them in many government departments and institutions.¹

Like most progressive reform movements, Indian democracy has been built upon earlier efforts, a spirited nationalism. In Northwestern India (the Punjab and western Uttar Pradesh) early nationalism was partly embodied in the Hindu reform movement, the Arya Samaj.

The new Constitutional opportunities for untouchables, and the earlier reforms of the Arya Samaj have had a marked effect upon the religious practices of the Chuhra (Cūhras,) a group of untouchable sweeper-scarvengers whom I had the opportunity to study quite intimately for two years in a village of northwestern

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1. For a coverage of new opportunities for untouchables, see Harijans Today, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, September 1955. "Harijan", meaning "children of God", was the term Gandhi applied to the untouchables of India. It should be mentioned that before Independence there had been earlier legislation for untouchable advancement such as the Government of India Act of 1935. Efforts in this direction on the part of Congress Ministries in power in the provinces for a brief period, from 1937 to 1939, were interrupted by the Second World War (pp. 7-8). See also Mohinder Singh, The Depressed Classes, Bombay, Hind Kitabs, Ltd., 1947, pp. 149-152.

Increase in educational opportunities has been an important aspect of India's Five Year Plan, now being effected; over three million Harijan children are to be awarded scholarships to help them attend schools and colleges. (Planning Commission, Government of India, The New India, New York, Macmillan Company, 1958, p. 381.)

Uttar Pradesh.² These stimulators of change, the Arya Samaj reforms and new Constitutional opportunities, are altering the world view of the Chuhra, even though their economic situation does not appear to be improving. Economically, their lot, in fact, appears to have deteriorated during the decade since Independence. Socially and ideologically, however, in terms of the values of a new India, they are making advances.

The religious changes which have taken place are integrated with the Chuhra efforts to advance in the caste hierarchy and to better their economic and social conditions. Under the influence of Arya Samaj reforms, the social unit of advancement was the caste brotherhood (*birādarī*) as a whole; with secular educational opportunities, the unit of advancement seems to have become the individual more than the group. The religious beliefs and practices associated with the varying modes of advancement have also tended to change the unit of worship from the group and household to role units based upon age, sex and education.

In this paper, I shall describe the three dominant modes of religious worship represented in Chuhra life today. They exist side by side, but represent developments which have taken place at different periods in the group history. The three modes are: (1) the shamanistic and polytheistic "original" religious practices, (2) the Valmiki (*Vālmiki*) cult influenced by the Arya Samaj, and (3) the Valmiki cult as it integrates ideas of new Nationalism emanating from the Indian public schools.

I. Shamanism and Polytheism

Important to the sweepers in their relationship to the other, higher castes of the village were their shamanistic powers. As the reward for devotion to certain deities committed to their almost exclusive keeping, the Chuhra have been endowed with a faculty for spirit possession, enabling them to

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2. The Chuhra are also called Bhangīs. They are especially numerous in the Punjab.

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I owe special thanks to Miss Usha Bhagat who acted as my assistant and interpreter during my field work. Thanks are also due to Dr. Morris E. Opler, director of the Cornell India Program, and to Miss Mildred Stroop and Dr. John Gumperz for their helpful comments on this paper.

facilitate the cure of many ailments and to offer certain other magical services.³

With some exceptions, most shamans in both Northern and Southern India have been reported to the members of the lower castes. This may reflect the tribal origins of the lower castes, or, as David Mandelbaum has suggested, an incompatibility of the emotionalism of spirit possession with Brahman ideals of restraint.⁴ Whatever the origin of their special capacities, their supernatural powers had won for the Chuhra a measure of respect and fear from others which they would not have enjoyed on the basis of their more secular achievements alone.⁵

For the individual Chuhra male, there lay in the shaman role the possibilities of prestige, fame and even immortality. Through devoted service to a godling, rendered by means of endless animal sacrifices and offerings of meat,

3. We did not find any other castes of the village worshipping the particular five brother deities of the Chuhras. Two of the Chuhras told us that some grainparchers (*Bharbujās*) did so, however, and one of these informants, a schoolboy from outside of Khalapur, reported that washermen (*Dhobīs*) and untouchable agricultural workers (*Camārs*) in his village worshiped the five brothers. Other instances of which we heard were of single individuals of other castes apprenticing themselves to Chuhras shamans to learn to serve one of these godlings. Also, the five brothers may be related to the Five Pīrs worshiped widely over North India or to the five Pāṇḍavas of the *Mahabhārātā*. Generally, the Chuhras maintained that the five brothers were most particularly in their control.
4. "The World and World View of the Kota", in McKim Marriott, ed., *Village India*, the American Anthropological Association, Vol. 57, No. 3, Part 2, Memoir No. 83, p. 247: "To hold tight rein, check rein, over one's sensual impulses, is to be a proper Brahman and a fit, pure social being. To give way to impulse is to desocialize one's self. That may be why shamanistic possession and the liking for liquor, so common to lower castes in South India, ... are discountenanced among Brahmans."
5. For information on shamanism in Northern India, see William Crooke, *Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, London, Oxford University Press, 1926. On page 132, he says: "... the exorcist is usually not a Brahman but a member of one of the lower castes who, as original owners of the soil, are supposed to understand spirits and their ways." For other references to the compensatory nature of supernatural powers for lower-castes, see A. Baines, "On Certain Features of Social Differentiation in India," *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1894, Art. XIX, pp. 664-5, and M. N. Srinivas, *Religion and Society Among the Coorgs*, London, Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 42.

liquor and sweets, control of a supernatural spirit could be gained for purposes of curing, sorcery and magic in this life, and for the promised reward of immortal service to the godling for a period after death.

Each family in the sweeper group worships at least one of the five special caste godlings, as well as some of a number of widely-worshiped disease goddesses, village tutelary deities and malevolent ghosts. The offerings are intended to satisfy the appetites of the deity, and thus to avert the vindictive visitation of illness and disease upon members of the worshipping household. Traditionally, each family further hoped that through extraordinary service and devotion, at least one male member of the household might become a powerful shaman.

The burnt offerings (*hūm*) to these supernaturals are performed by the male head of the family, with other family members in attendance. Actual curing sessions require the presence of at least ten men, and are presided over by the elders of the brotherhood, who share in the responsibility for calling the spirit into possession of the shaman. It is unusual for more than two or three of the oldest and boldest women to witness these events, and tolerance of their presence may be a recent concession to them.

The sweeper shamanistic cult, however, has been rudely shaken by the influence of the Hindu reform movement, the Arya Samaj, active in this area during the early part of this century.

II. The Arya Samaj-Valmiki Movement

The Arya Samaj was founded in 1875 by a learned holy man, Swami Dayanand, in response, it seems, to the challenges of Christianity and Western science. Advocating a return to the pure belief of the most ancient Hindu religious scriptures, the *Vēdas*, the movement was anti-Brahman, anti-idolatry, anti-Christian, anti-Muslim, and anti-caste. A true nativistic revival movement,⁶ it was nationalistic and militant. The militancy took the form of a *shuddhi* or purification movement, an intense proselytizing directed toward two groups: Indian Muslims and untouchables.⁷

Christianity and Islam had both appealed to the untouchables of Northern India, since orthodox Hindu belief had always considered them to be without the pale. Their low social position and confinement to various dirty and defiling occupations, was held to be the result of *karma*, destiny resulting from sins committed in previous lives, hence a deserved situation. The nationalistic aims of the Arya Samaj included the cessation of the conversion to Christianity and Islam of the one-fifth of the population who were untouchables.

6. Ralph Linton, "Nativistic Movements," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 230-240.

7. Rai, Lajpat, *The Arya Samaj*, Lahore, Uttar Chand Kapur and Sons, 1932.

The Arya Samaj influenced both high castes and low castes in village Khalapur, the place of our study. As a result of the anti-caste doctrine taught by Arya Samaj lecturers, the higher castes gave up some of their more extreme practices of untouchability. As a result of its anti-idolatry, their patronage of low-caste shamans and magical curers dwindled.

Among the Chuhras, the shuddhi movement took the form of Hinduization through the Valmiki cult. Lecturers claimed that the Chuhras were descended from Valmiki, a robber-turned-holy-man, who wrote the beloved Indian epic, the *Rāmāyana*. Valmiki himself appears in the *Rāmāyana* as the forest hermit who protected Sita, wife to Rām, the culture hero from whom the high caste Rājput warriors trace their lineage.⁸

Before the advent of Arya Samaj ideas, the Chuhras had worshipped a Muslim saint as a caste deity, and in ritual, the gestures and forms of worship were largely Muslim.⁹ Now they were given to understand that they were not only Hindus, but were rightfully of higher status than the presently dominant Rājputs and Brahmans. The Arya Samaji, educated Chuhra preachers exaggerated their ancestry until Valmiki, the old religious hermit, was held to be the One Supreme God. True Valmiki devotees claim that even *Brahma* and *Visnu*, the highest Hindu gods, bow before Valmiki.

Among the Chuhras of Khalapur today the chief Valmiki devotee is their headman, who learned a great deal about the Arya Samaj and Valmiki during his sojourns in the city. At one period, he even resided at the Valmiki temple in Lahore, a city in the Punjab. Now, though he has lived steadily in the village for several years, he actively maintains contacts with the educated Chuhra leaders in nearby cities.

He recalls that as soon as the Chuhras learned of their "true" heritage some thirty years ago, they gave up the non-Hindu customs of eating beef and burying, rather than cremating, their dead, and they replaced their Muslim shrines with one to Valmiki. The headman has introduced and maintained the

8. There probably already was a tradition that Valmiki was connected with the Chuhras. Ibbetson, writing in 1883 about Chuhras, said: "... I have received traditions from distant parts of the Province which leave little doubt that Bāla Shāh, one of the Chuhra Gurus, is another name for Bāl Mīk, a hunter of the Karnal district, who was converted by a holy Rishi, and eventually wrote the *Rāmāyana*." Sir Denzil Ibbetson, *Punjab Castes*, being a reprint of the chapter on "The Races, Castes and Tribes of the People" in the Report on the Census of the Punjab published in 1883 by the late Sir Denzil Ibbetson, K. C. S. I., Lahore, Govt. Printing, Punjab, 1916, p. 294.

The Arya Samaj most probably adopted this tradition and wrote it primarily for the Sweepers. In general, I follow the description of the stages of change given by the Khalapur Sweepers themselves.

9. Contemporary references to this sect, the Lāl Begīs, are to be found in R. Greeven, *The Knights of the Broom*, Benares, Medical Hall Press, 1894, and in Rev. J. Youngson, "The Chuhras", *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. 35 and Vol. 36.

Hindu worship of Valmiki as God, through the Vedic hūm, burnt offerings of ghī, incense and fruit, as opposed to the blood sacrifices and liquor offered to the deities of the shamanistic cult. He has advocated salvation through the higher Hindu devotion to one Supreme God as against the lower polytheistic propitiation of the disease goddesses and godlings.

With regard to caste advancement, the headman tried in 1942 to organize the Chuhra of twelve villages into a religious association for support of a regional Valmiki temple. The aims of the association were to be religious salvation, on the sacred level, and union and strength to strike against high-caste employers, on the secular level. This attempt was not successful, because of a majority distrust that the headman's motive was avarice, rather than caste advancement.

The effects of the introduction of the Valmiki cult among the Chuhra have been these:

- 1) The group changed its name. They encourage others to call them Valmikis.
- 2) They accepted Valmiki as an ancestor, teacher and deity.
- 3) They became Hindu in terms of identification and in forms of Valmiki worship. They were Hinduized in certain customs.
- 4) Most important of all, they gained a new self-respect.

As an aspect of the new Hinduization, many of the more thoughtful men took cognizance of Hindu religious concepts such as karma. They did not agree, however, that their caste position reflected karma, a deserved destiny. They concluded that their duty (dharma) was not to rest content with being sweepers. One could have a happy fate no matter what one's caste, they felt, and one's character was not faithfully portrayed in a traditional dirty occupation.

Within the group itself, Valmiki beliefs have been accepted differentially. The women, who were largely excluded from the explanatory lectures given in the men's quarters, have not entirely understood the superiority of the worship of One God and the meaning of the new beliefs. They accept Valmiki as an ancestor and treat him as an additional member of their disease pantheon. Some of the men, especially those who have worked in the city, are skeptical both of the Valmiki beliefs and of the caste godlings and disease deities. As with many of the high-caste men, the effect of the Arya Samaj has been to leave these untouchable sweepers skeptical. Such men are drawn back into the shamanistic curing sessions and worship of the caste deities at times of sickness, and in compliance with women's requests that they perform the family rituals.

The most ardent Valmiki devotees are the ten or a dozen schoolboys, students at primary and secondary schools of the village. These boys take for granted their right to worship Valmiki as a form of the One Supreme God of Hindus, but they have reinterpreted the dharma of life quite radically as compared to the first Arya Samaj preachers and as compared to the old headman.

The earlier or first stage of the Valmiki movement can be understood as a Hinduization process, or, to use M. N. Srinivas' term, "Sanskritization."¹⁰ The group has been brought into the Hindu community, at least psychologically. They have given up certain "low" customs and have begun, to some extent, to accept monotheism. At this stage, the orientation is still in terms of the village social structure, however. The leaders of the group are looking up the caste ladder to the higher rungs of the Rājputs and Brahmins. The movement as a union of Chuhra is a union of sweeper servants, still accepting their caste duties.

III. The Valmiki Cult Integrating Nationalism

The oldest schoolboys, young men seventeen to twenty-one years of age, are introducing new values into the Valmiki cult. Their orientation has been strongly influenced by the new nationalism, taught in the schools, and by their contact with untouchable leaders of the city. These older boys attend the new high school, established in Khalapur in 1949. They have met with the educated and well-placed untouchable leaders in the cities of the area. It is to them that they look for encouragement and advice. The boys themselves are Hinduized beyond other Chuhra in their vegetarianism and teetotalism, and they are spotlessly clean and neat in their appearance.

During the summer and fall of 1955, the schoolboys excited the community of Khalapur with an uplift movement. Legitimizing their program by securing the Arya Samaji headman as leader, they staged a series of hums, or fire sacrifices, for Valmiki, followed by preaching to the assembled community, which included all the women and children.

These sessions began with lectures about the ancestor Valmiki, given by the headman. Here is a section from one of his lectures:

You, even being the descendants of such a great rishi neither worship him nor praise him. Had you done so, you would have become his true servants, and it would have brought glory to his name. . . O my mothers and sisters, I request you with folded hands to worship that rishi daily, so that you may be saved. Many great rishis and other people have attained salvation after being inspired by him.

The headman's emphasis was upon the caste's high ancestry, and the hope for salvation. The schoolboys' lectures, however, were discourses upon the importance of cleanliness, saving and education. Cleanliness was advocated for its healthfulness and respectability. Savings, made possible by reduced expenditures at marriages, should be spent for children's education. The purpose of the education should be that of service to the nation.

In their ideology, the schoolboys accept the possibility of salvation through devotion to Valmiki, but they have changed the emphasis in preaching from devotion to service. The duty of the Chuhra is not only not to accept their

10. M. N. Srinivas, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization," The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 15, pp. 481-96.

traditional occupation, but to educate their children for service to the country. New nationalism has become for these boys the new kind of karma mārg, the path to salvation through works, as opposed to bhakti mārg, or the path to salvation through devotion to God, manifested in the earlier stage of the Valmiki cult, and to a degree, in the shamanistic cult, as well.

IV. Summary

In summary, we may distinguish four aspects of the changes in the religious practices of these untouchable sweepers: the character of the leadership and the stimulators of change, the changes in the quality of religious worship, the change in the aspirations for social advancement involved in the religion, and the segmentalization of religious activity according to age, sex and education roles. These are summarized briefly below.

1. The character of leadership and the stimulators of change.
 - a. Arya Samaj reforms were largely a response to Christian, and, to some extent, Muslim threat.
 - b. The source of inspiration for religious change is the cities, both in terms of educated preachers coming to the village, and in the contacts Chuhra maintain through their working in cities, and through kinship and friendship ties with city sweepers.¹¹
 - c. The schoolboys have broken with their village elders to some extent--certainly to the extent of taking leadership into their own hands. Their real elders and mentors are untouchable leaders who have become successful in the city.¹²

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11. In his paper, "Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization," Village India, op. cit., Marriott mentions a similar pattern of stimulation for the adoption of great-traditional forms in the Uttar Pradesh village he studied. He says: "But those few persons and groups of Kishan Garhi who have demonstrably in recent times taken on more Sanskritic, great-traditional forms of religion seem in every instance to have obtained them, not from the local higher castes, but from itinerant teachers of exotic cults, from urban-centered associations of recent growth, from new state schools, or from the market place." (p. 211)
 12. A similar process reported for a village in Mysore in South India is described briefly by M. N. Srinivas as follows: "... the Untouchables of Rampura Village in Mysore State are getting increasingly Sanskritized and this seems to be due to their present leadership and to the fact that the younger men are more in contact with the outside world than their parents. Also, if the reports which one hears from some local men are to be believed, Rampura Untouchables are being egged on by Untouchable leaders from outside to change their way of life." (From "A Note on Sanskritization..." , op. cit.)

2. Changes in the quality of religious worship.

In the shift from shamanism to the Valmiki cult, we can see a shift from propitiation to adoration. In the second stage of Valmiki worship, being introduced by the schoolboys, the shift is from adoration to service.

3. Change in the aspiration for social advancement.

- a. The social mobility now being advocated has shifted from an orientation to the village to national orientation. The schoolboys are not thinking of educating boys and girls to be sweepers, but to become members of a new middle class.¹³
- b. The social mobility advocated in religious terms is no longer predominantly the mobility of the caste group as a whole, but tends to be on an individual basis--not so much by design, but because the new hope appeals chiefly to the educated young man for whom opportunity exists.

4. Segmentalization by role.

It is the young men who are the Valmiki devotees. Women cling to their polytheism, their vows and sacrifices, since they find them of utility in their responsibility for the children. Some men still believe in the old religious forms, while some are doubtful and tend to perform the worship in connection with the caste deities perfunctorily. They are interested in the higher monotheism, but few participate; they are skeptical of this cult as of the old. Thus, religious practices are segmentalized by age, sex and educational roles.

We do not know to what extent this same process is being repeated in other villages, but it suggests that Indian secondary schools are beginning to perform a function of Indianization in much the same way that American public schools acted as a melting pot in the process of Americanization. Perhaps the day when it could be said that an Indian's only patriotism was to his caste is passing away even in the villages. As yet, among these village untouchables, nationalism is strongly integrated with their religious interests, but the process of development can be seen to be a gradual movement from religion to ideology, as Hindu dharma is reinterpreted as patriotic duty.

13. "The depressed classes of Uttar Pradesh have, during recent years, become conscious of the advantages of educating their children. This is due partly to the lure of government jobs and partly to their desire to improve their social position. . . In fact the association between education and government jobs is firmly established in the minds of most of them as in the case of high caste Hindus. As a result of education and acquisition of government jobs, a middle class is coming into existence amongst them. . ." (Mohinder Singh, The Depressed Classes, Bombay, Hind Kitabs Ltd., 1947, p. 174.)

A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN*

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I. Introduction

Up to this time there have been rather few closely focused, independent studies of community development. There are many accounts which describe in glowing terms how a program was introduced and the measure of cooperation which it encountered. In these, resistance receives slight attention or is explained away.¹ The literature on rural reconstruction, mass education, and community development does much to support the notion that the kindly-intentioned, idealistic people engaged in those ventures care little about having their work evaluated realistically by independent observers.² Experience, perhaps, has taught them that anthropologists in particular will be likely to give highly conservative advice on questions of culture change, advice which,

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1. By way of example see E. R. Chadwick, "Communal Development in Udi Division", Overseas Education, Vol. 19, pp. 625-644.
2. Cf. the review by Charles J. Erasmus of Report on Community Development Programs in India, Iran, Egypt, and Gold Coast, a publication of the International Cooperation Administration, in American Anthropologist, Vol. 59, pp. 1140-1144. For one notable exception to this generalization, see American Friends Service Committee, A Village Development Project in Jordan 1953-1956, Philadelphia, 1958.

if heeded, would seriously slow down a number of ambitious programs.³ To be sure, some objective appraisals of community development have appeared. The Evaluation Organization of the Planning Commission of India, for example, has published five reports on the working of agricultural extension and community projects in that country. While often quite general, the volumes offer enlightening accounts of how one of the most publicized modern experiments in directed culture change is going. The present essay examines the working of community development in one West Pakistan village.⁴

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3. R. A. Manners, "Functionalism, Realpolitik and Anthropology in Underdeveloped Areas", *America Indígena*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 7-31. Perhaps rural sociologists are less hard-headed than anthropologists and therefore find a readier place in U. S. technical assistance programs. On the other hand, anthropologists impressed with the hypothesis offered by Margaret Mead in *New Lives for Old*, New York, 1956, might urge much greater speed and higher rates of innovation than most community developers themselves deem desirable. Germaine Tillion, without any reference to Mead's work, speaks in these terms in *Algeria*, New York, 1958.
 4. Is it necessary to add that the village can scarcely be taken as typical of anything in South Asia? According to hear-say, community development was considerably more successful in other near-by villages and less successful in still others. Any generalizations which transcend the village are based on other sources of information or else constitute suggestions for further research. For general statements of community development in Pakistan see H. S. Adams, G. M. Foster, and P. S. Taylor, *Report on Community Development Programs in India, Pakistan and the Philippines*, Washington, 1955; James W. Green, "Rural Community Development in Pakistan: The Village and the Program," *Community Development Review*, Sept. 1957, pp. 45-69; and *Report on Concepts and Principles of Community Development and Recommendations on Further Practical Measures to be Taken by the Secretary-General*, United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/CN. 5/325, 12 March 1957, pp. 113-127.

II. Pakistan's Village Agricultural and Industrial Development (AID) Programme

Village-uplift movements have recurred several times in recent South Asian history.⁵ Like India's Community Development Projects, Pakistan's Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Programme finds little encouragement in those. Rather, both these programs have borrowed extensively from the United States' official and private experience with agricultural extension and rural rehabilitation. Albert Mayer, architect of India's Community Projects, documents this connection quite explicitly.⁶ For example, he refers to the stimulation which he derived from the Near East Foundation's post-war program in Greece⁷ and from the efforts of D. Spencer Hatch in Travancore and elsewhere.⁸ Continuous diffusion between the United States and Pakistan has been maintained by the many nationals exchanged between these countries under Point Four and I. C. A. auspices.⁹

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5. For a brief review see Grace E. Langley, "Community Development Programme: Republic of India", Community Development Review, Sept. 1957, pp. 6-23; G. B. Jathar and S. G. Beri, Indian Economics: A Comprehensive and Critical Survey. Ninth edition, Bombay, 1949, Vol. I, pp. 327, 331, 332-335; and P. Mason, "The New Look in the Indian Village," The Listener, Vol. 58, pp. 234-235.
 6. A. Mayer and Associates, Pilot Project, India, Berkeley, 1958, p. 31.
 7. Cf., Harold B. Allen, Come Over to Macedonia, New Brunswick, N. J., 1943; also his Rural Reconstruction in Action: Experience in the Near and Middle East, Ithaca, 1953.
 8. Duane Spencer Hatch, Up From Poverty in Rural India, Bombay, 1932.
 9. For some of the things learned and how learning is assimilated see the very interesting document, Community Development Training at the University of Kentucky: The 1957 Program of Study and Observations for Pakistan Village AID Workers, Kentucky Community Series, No. 19, Lexington, 1958.

What basic values guide the Pakistan Village AID Programme? By what ultimate conceptions of its goals does the organization defend and evaluate its performance? In describing the charter of Village AID we do not assume that the constituent values are consciously held by all members of the organization. While a high level of morale and sincerity characterized many of the institute teachers and administrators with whom I came into contact, some people seemed to give mainly lip-service to the ideals of the Programme. Even where a man feels commitment to the ideals, he may not always be skillful enough to bring out the norms of the charter as he plays his role.

Apart from such specific target goals as strengthening the friendships of villagers, increasing the size and scope of rural groups, increasing earnings, multiplying community services, and promoting general social progress, the central value is to establish in rural people greater confidence in their capacity to help themselves. Hence the term "catalyst" is often applied to the entire Programme or to its representatives, for example, the village worker. The catalytic process consists in releasing popular energy, enthusiasm, and willingness to work. Of course, some undertakings are beyond the means of villagers. For these, the local development officer contacts technical specialists or helps people secure an appropriation from a development fund which exists for the purpose of partially subsidizing new schools, village drains, and other large ventures in developments.

Self-help is one ideal and self-planning is another, closely related one. The task of any officer is not to spot community needs but to help the village council or others to realize their real, felt needs. The Programme assumes that change cannot be successfully inculcated if it is commanded by someone outside of the community. Villagers will not be motivated to drain village lanes simply because the village worker, himself a stranger in the group, complains about their unpleasantness. People must be led to see that a different style of life is possible and then they must choose freely to follow the new ways.

Third, the charter justifies the Village AID Programme by stressing its uniqueness. True, there is an older agricultural extension service in the country. Other departments, too, have attempted to reach the people. But those attempts have never been really successful. The nation-building departments, for example agriculture, lacked funds and manpower to do intensive educational work. The country's technical departments, according to the charter, were handicapped by exemplifying the philosophy that government would do things for the people's welfare. Such an attitude failed to arouse any popular motivation to change. At each point of weakness a corresponding point of strength characterizes the Village AID Programme and favors it for achieving a far larger measure of successful change than any other government department has achieved. The same reasoning separates the Programme from earlier, indigenous village-uplift schemes. Those ventures failed because they did not closely involve the people in their plans and relied on "teaching the natives."

A fourth note is more implicit in the charter. It concerns the conception of the villager for whom the Programme is designed. Village AID, it would seem, is designed for the peasant cultivator who is ignorant, poor, beset by illness, and lives in unhygienic and uncomfortable surroundings. He and his family are forgotten people in a world where standards of living are expanding. The peasant is also underemployed and underskilled. Therefore, if he can be taught to enhance his skills and better utilize his time, he can also increase his income. The charter does not acknowledge wealthy landlords in some villages nor does it dwell on the tenant farmer, landless laborer, and artisans like the blacksmith, carpenter, potter, or weaver.

Such a view of the ideal villager nicely complements the conception which the urbanized, elite planners, some of whom have spent several months in the United States receiving advanced training, hold of their own mission. Despite the modesty implied by the term "catalyst," it is likely that many community development administrators privately think of themselves as governing the direction of change if not its pace. That direction, of course, is away from the present-day apathy and miserable squalor of the village community and toward "moral rehabilitation" in a physical setting of well ventilated houses, village playgrounds, recreational halls, and other amenities.¹⁰ It is worth noting, however, that despite the picture of village poverty and squalor which is held, the peasant's basic contentment is admitted to such an extent that it is expected to slow down the acceptance of changes that would be in his best interests.

One dilemma arising out of the charter remains unsolved. How much persuasion and outside initiative are compatible with the conviction that felt needs constitute the only effective impetus for change? Someone has suggested that increasing rural income must be accompanied by training villagers for wise spending. Could this view be implemented without transgressing on felt needs? Various rationalizations seeking a way out of this dilemma have been proposed. For instance, a distinction is made between real needs and felt needs, the latter being part of the former. Social education converts real needs into felt needs and may also call attention to unreal felt needs. Speaking from a somewhat different point of view, the great stress on self help appears to contradict one of the salient orientations of the South Asian peasant: his reliance on persons more powerful than he is. "Too many village people look upon the village improvement programmes as being of Government origin and direction."¹¹ Community developers recognize this attitude but prefer to fight it.

10. Village Aid in West Pakistan, Lahore, 1957.

11. Douglas Ensminger, "Training of Gram Sevaks and Gramsevikas," Kurukshetra, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 17-25; p. 20. Although Ensminger's remark pertains to India, it definitely applies to Pakistan.

Administrative organization of Village AID need be sketched only briefly. Each of the two provinces of Pakistan is divided into a number of development areas. In West Pakistan an area comprises from 70 to 150 villages, for every 3 to 5 of which there is a trained male village worker (far more rarely as yet a woman worker). Every 20 or so villages also have an adult literacy worker who organizes instruction in village schools. In a development area the development officer is expected to be the leader of technical and social change. He is regarded as a link between the village workers and villagers on the one hand and district representatives of the "nation-building departments" concerned with agriculture, animal husbandry, health, education, and cooperatives on the other. The resources of these specialists are to be channeled into the rural area to promote development. From this point of view, a development officer and his 30 or so workers constitute extensions of the country's technical departments. Two supervisors assist the development officer in coordinating village workers.

Specialized knowledge is applied by the village worker directly when he demonstrates skills in agriculture and sanitation or expounds principles of the cooperative movement. Somewhat more indirectly he facilitates rural development by helping villagers to organize a council on whose cooperation he is supposed to rely in planning for rural development. For financial assistance the village council applies to the development area committee. That body includes the chairmen of all village councils in the area together with the heads of the technical departments in the district (unit of provincial administration). The deputy commissioner, highest provincial government officer in a district, acts as chairman of the committee while the development officer serves as secretary. The worker is also expected to organize village boys into 4-H-like clubs through which developmental knowledge and the desire for a "better life" can be taught. The woman worker is taught to organize the village girls and women. A worker is limited in both ability and promotional opportunities by the fact that at best he is educated only through high school before spending about a year in a village AID institute. As with all appointments in the Village AID Programme, his job is temporary. Unlike his development officer, a permanent civil servant, he cannot expect to transfer to another government department should the Programme be discontinued.

III. Chak 32 J. B.

Over half the 92 zamindars (landholders) in Chak 32 J. B., Lyallpur District, West Pakistan, own less than 9 acres of land. Four families own more than 100 acres, 2 between 50 and 99, 13 between 25 and 49, and 18 from 13 to 24. Very few owners are absentee. Over 200 heads of families own no land. The average holding was higher before partition when the population stood closer to 900 persons than to its present total of about 2000. The exodus of several large Sikh landlords following partition and the sharing of this land among many more muhajirs (refugees) who came from India resulted in the present distribution. These events also led to a new division

of villagers between "locals" and so-called "refugees." The latter, muhajirs probably comprise close to 60 percent of the total population. "Locals" are again divided among descendants of 15 original colonists (who possess most of the village land) and tenants, laborers, and artisans, who have lived here since before Partition. The descendants of the 15 original colonists are the socially dominant nucleus of the community, although their ranks are not solidly united.

The modern villages of Lyallpur District date from the opening of the Lower Chenab River irrigation scheme in 1892.¹² Three main branches of the Chenab canal, Jhang, Rakh, and Gudera, have given their initials to the colony chaks, or villages. Chak 32 J. B. is named after the Jhang branch, whose irrigated lands were opened in 1896. The resettlement program which followed was intended to create villages of a type superior in "comforts and civilization" to anything then existing in the Punjab. The area possessed naturally rich soil. Villages were planned to be spacious, as they still are except where muhajirs have crowded together on the property evacuated by former Sikh owners. The settlers were chosen largely from agriculturalists of repute living in overcrowded districts. Not all grants went to small-holding peasants. Land in some chaks was reserved for military and other government officers deserving of reward for faithful service to the Indian Raj. Such men each received several squares of land (a square contains about 25 acres) despite the fact that they might also have been landowners in other places. Chak 32 J. B. was settled by military men from other districts in Punjab Province, North-West Frontier Province, and Kashmir. Most of the settlers were Punjabi, that is, members of a single speech community. Punjabi cultivators are described as "on the whole enterprising, easy to organize, and quick to accept new ideas."¹³ Certainly the descendants of the original settlers give an impression of relative prosperity. Few, however, rely solely on their land for support. Brothers hold official positions throughout West Pakistan and sons are being educated to follow similar careers. Failure of daughters to inherit from colonist fathers helped to restrict subdivision. The village is overwhelmingly Muslim, largely Sunni. A few Christian families of sweepers were converted by English missionaries some years ago.

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12. Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, Fourth edition, London, 1947, Ch. 7; Deva Singh, Colonization in the Rechna Doab, Punjab Government Record Office Publications, Monograph No. 7, Lahore, n. d.
 13. Tarlok Singh, Poverty and Social Change, London, 1945, p. 125.

The prosperity of the total community depends on agricultural activities: cultivation of cotton, maize, sugarcane, millet, gram, and wheat. Tenants receive fifty percent of the gross yield but are expected to provide fertilizer and to pay half of the land revenue. Opportunities for tenancy are limited and several men expressed the desire for more such land to till. Laborers on farms work for a fixed wage, Rs. 20 monthly plus meals and some clothing. Agricultural equipment is provided or serviced by village artisans, particularly the blacksmith and carpenter. Other service workers (the barbers, water carriers, and sweepers) serve both agriculturalists and other nonagricultural persons. Because payment to artisans and service workers is primarily in grain, nonagricultural workers are closely integrated with the agricultural system of the village. Two diesel powered mills grind wheat and maize into flour for the households and several more ox-driven mills perform the same function or press oil seeds. Over a dozen shopkeepers ply trade in the village, selling to farmers who have sold their wheat, cotton, and sugar in Lyallpur City fourteen miles away. The shops also buy small quantities of commodities from agriculturalists. A larger shopkeeper or a prosperous landlord may make small loans but the village contains no credit society and no other form of cooperative organization. I am convinced that the cooperative network in the chak is one in which each actor participates primarily in the expectation of receiving a reward which will help to maintain his own kinship group. Occasionally men whose fields receive irrigation water from the same water-course cooperate in cleaning the common channel. The village mosque was constructed from funds partly raised in the village. There is even an instance of a tonga driver repairing an especially bad stretch of public road leading out of the village. But, generally, people do not work for the sake of the village but for themselves and the benefit of their families.

Dairy cattle are owned by all except the poorest farm laborers, surplus milk being exported from the village as far as Lyallpur City. The manure of these and other animals possesses considerable value as fuel and fertilizer and a large portion goes to the houseowner as the equivalent of rent. A number of larger landlords have erected deras (stables) for plow cattle on their fields. Chickens are kept but are not numerous.

The family usually lives in a house of unbaked brick. Only about 10 out of a total of some 270 dwellings are provided with a latrine. No single zat¹⁴ dominates in the village. Among muhajirs, Arains and Jats from the

14. In North India zat or jat is translated as "caste" or "sub-caste." Such a translation does not apply well to the cultural realities of Muslim Pakistan where anything like the Hindu caste system is unknown.

same district (for example, Jullundur or Ludhiana) often live contiguously. The unity of such collectivities is recognized when people refer to them rather disparagingly as "parties." For collection of land revenue the village is divided into five pattis, each under a lambardar (who may not even reside in the chak). But this grouping is without further significance. The primary and mosque schools are groupings of children, their "master," the religious teacher (maulvi) and, for girls, his wife. More important than any of these groups is the hatta group.

At the time of colonization each landholder in addition to his squares of farmland received a definite space, hatta, in the settlement area. Here he built his house and also the residences of his tenants, farm laborers, and such village artisans as he wished to accommodate. Today the owner's house is walled off from the rest of the hatta by a wall high enough to permit his women to maintain purdah. The other houses, however, typically face a central open area where animals are kept and manure collected for use on the hatta owner's fields. Animal droppings in the hatta¹⁵ normally belong to the owner who also has a claim on the services of his residents for small tasks. Many of a man's farm laborers and tenants reside in his hatta. Such residence is perceived by some people, particularly landless laborers, to be fraught with insecurity. A resident must leave a hatta if the owner so orders. Perhaps no other hatta will accept him, in which case he has no choice but to leave the village. Today the 15 original hattas have been subdivided or added to until 28 are recognizable. The hattas of former Sikh landlords, now occupied by muhajirs, have become honeycombed with diminutive courtyards, houses, and stables. These are connected by an intricate series of twisting lanes. A crowded muhajir hatta (it is still referred to by the name of its original Sikh owner) resembles a small compact village, one that grew without plan by multiplication of dwellings. People who reside together in a hatta form a group. In the case of a "local" hatta, the owner is a kind of formal leader, but less apparent, informal leaders may also exist. Evidence indicates that leadership also appears in the muhajir hattas.

As elsewhere in Pakistan, the inhabitants of the chak perceive their community to be comprised of people who are by no means equal. Even within the ranks of big landowners, some families are relatively "meaner" than others. Sweepers and laborers are never thought of as deserving the respect received by a large landholder. Within the village as a whole, the most influential men are the relatively prosperous descendants of the original settlers. They tend to be mature men and heads of families to whom a title, like Chaudhry, Raja, or Mian, is applied by way of respect.

15. "In" appears more appropriate than "on" and also refers to the fact that the hatta tends to be walled off portion of ground.

The solidarity of these men as a group is limited by antagonisms that divide some of them or some of their families. Such antagonisms are reinforced when representatives of one family fail to attend the marriage or death ceremonies of the other. Nobody steps forward to promote reconciliation though some effort is made not to bring antagonists into face-to-face meetings.

The village contains no clinic or physician trained in western medicine. One landlord practices traditional Muslim Unani medicine and government-supported medical and veterinary clinics are located about a mile away.

A few additional generalizations may help to sum up the character of the people who live in this community. One dominant element in the character structure (not only here but also elsewhere in West Pakistan) is the implicit belief that good of all kinds is limited. There is only so much respect, influence, power, and love in the world. If another has some, then somebody is certainly deprived of that measure. An ambitious man or woman spends considerable effort in maximizing and safeguarding his own advantages while jealously contemplating those of another. These sentiments are also reflected in the keen competitiveness shown by individuals of both sexes. Related to the principle of limited good is a complementary trait of personality that expresses itself in catering to influential people. To put powerful persons under obligation by a gift or a service is done with the hope of accumulating influence that someday may be useful. Of course, no assurance exists that the other person will recognize his obligation. Security, however, lies in trying to obligate people who occupy important social positions. Third, we again point to the villager's quite explicit belief that the government through its officers is in a position to help or injure him. Although people conceive of government as almost unlimitedly powerful, they do not feel confident that its actions will always be beneficial. Finally, Pakistanis here and elsewhere see the future as capable of improvement and progress. People are quite ready to visualize and plan for such a future, apparently seeing the plan as the first step in the creation of the end which is to be achieved. In some situations more effort and enthusiasm may be invested in planning than in carrying out the plan.

How has this village responded to the catalysis of the Village AID movement? The reader will have noted points potentially favorable to Village AID work (for example, the positive orientation toward improvement, the core of influential leaders, and hatta-groups) and also points likely to generate difficulties (the attitude toward powerful "others" or the lack of solidarity in the core of influential men). Perhaps the reader even spotted likely felt needs, such as the desire for secure tenure in the hatta and the desire of tenants for more work.

IV. The Village AID Programme in the Village

The development area which includes Chak 32 J. B. was opened on March 23, 1956. A village level worker probably reached the village about the same time but little is known of what he did. The young man became involved in personal difficulties and in April, 1957, was replaced by the present worker, a young muhajir in his early twenties. He and his wife lived for a time in the house of an absentee local landlord, paying only nominal rent. The landlord is related to several other prominent families in the village. In addition to this chak the village worker has charge of another village of 3000 (primarily occupied by muhajirs) and shares a third village of 1000 population with another young man.

Records indicate the village worker made the required survey and became aware of a number of difficulties facing people: the lack of local credit facilities; a deficiency of irrigation water; much trouble getting goods to market due to poor approach roads; local lanes nearly impassable; no modern instruments of cultivation; people not cooperatively inclined; lack of a girl's school; "failure" of some very poor people to "educate" their children; "uneducated" women; "no recreation in the village," and no place where manure could be stored outside of the habitation (hatta) sites or village lanes. A person familiar with the standard goals of village improvement will appreciate the somewhat stereotyped nature of this list. "Failure" of poor people to send children to school and the presence of "uneducated" women would seem to be "difficulties" of a different order from inadequate approach roads.

The first village worker knew that he could only work through some kind of village organization. He apparently did not find indigenous groups significant for this purpose (if, indeed, he realized their significance¹⁶). Anyhow, the worker, assisted by the development officer (the latter was born and reared in Chak 32 J. B. and regards it as his home), in September, 1956, was instrumental in getting the community to organize a village council. It consisted of five office bearers and some ten additional members. According to the minutes these men all swore to pursue faithfully the welfare of the village. At the second meeting of the body (October 1) they "decided to make the bazar [lanes] level and to make pukka (cement) drains near the bazar so that all the water from the hattas can go out." A meeting

16. Ensminger, op. cit., suggests that village-level workers in India are not trained to perceive village values or to discover villager leaders (p. 19).

scheduled for October 16 could not be held because members were prevented by "business" from attending but the next morning they met again and resolved to collect 8 annas per acre from every landholder for expenses incurred in leveling the lanes. They also resolved to write to the Canal Colony Department for additional land located outside the settlement area on which to relocate the village pond. Apparently nothing came of this petition for it is never again referred to. A meeting on October 26 reported Rs. 526-14-0 to have been collected but still more funds were needed to complete pukka drains and to plant trees on the side of the levelled lanes. According to the minutes no further meeting was held until December 26, 1957, when the development officer arranged to introduce the anthropologist to the council. Another meeting was called (again at the request of the development officer) on January 21, 1958. Here the development officer advised formation of a new council to replace the current inactive one. On January 31 a reorganization meeting occurred at which sharp recriminations flew back and forth between the factions but little reorganization was accomplished.

The village council had apparently been nominated by villagers gathered at the crossroads of the settlement. It is said that only shopkeepers and big zamindars suggested names for the council; artisans or laborers would not venture to participate publicly to this extent. There was no formal polling for officers. It is evident from the membership that the council had been overwhelmingly recruited from prominent local zamindars with the exception of two shopkeepers (who also own land). Despite small contributions given by landless weavers, watercarriers, and artisans, more than Rs. 527 could not be raised from the village. With this money the council paid laborers from a neighboring village to move earth from two or three fields onto two village lanes plus a stretch of road leading north of the village. It may not be significant that the stretch of improved road leads toward, and stops just short of, the adjoining deras of the council chairman and his brother. At the time of field work half of the streets had not yet been leveled nor had pukka drains been constructed. Some council members claim that the money had been raised with the expectation that the development area committee would provide an equal amount. No request for funds seems ever to have reached this body and the development officer points out that it is contrary to policy to provide funds for "earth moving."

It would seem that the village council had little to do with other accomplishments traceable to the Village AID Programme. A club for primary and middle school children lapsed after it was begun by the worker but was reinstituted in January, 1958. Its main project is to raise silkworms, an aim that originated with the development officer. A barber's son is president of the youth group but all other officers are sons of zamindars or of a veterinary doctor. In contrast to the predominantly "local" composition of the village council, four out of six officers of the boy's club are muhajirs. Adult literacy is the main object of an evening class made up of eight or ten laborers, tenants, and small landowners. Five or six additional adult pupils are reported to have dropped out. The group is taught by a schoolmaster who receives Rs. 20 additional remuneration every month for his work. The village workers planted a number of

demonstration plots in wheat, sugarcane, and tumeric. The current worker has not always prepared these plots with the idea of controlling all but one crucial factor, nor are the plots labelled (ideally they should be, but a label would have small meaning in a primarily nonliterate village). Before starting these plots the worker approached certain big zamindars who offered fields. Village workers have encouraged more planting of vegetables and succeeded in expanding the size of some men's kitchen gardens. In one case a worker is credited with introducing potatoes in a man's field. But the tubers were small and the owner, a man little interested in managing his tenant cultivators, abandoned the crop. The village contains a seed depot of the provincial Agricultural Department and the village worker apparently has had success in propagandizing an improved wheat seed. Some informants claim that the seed they received was old and in a large percentage of cases, therefore, failed to germinate.

Some 15 or 16 farmers in the fall of 1957 applied to the worker for medication of wheat seed. He provided others with insecticides to protect growing crops. For one landholder the worker demonstrated how shelters could be built to protect mango plants from cold. When a householder complained about a neighbor's manure pile, the village worker undertook to have the manure moved to the owner's fields. The owner promised that in the future he would not store manure in the chak for more than four days. Much manure continues to be heaped up in the lanes bordering the village, only two large landholders storing their supply in compost pits (built before Village AID) located at their deras. Other men, notably muhajirs, claim that their land is too far from the village to permit daily cartage of manure and that in the crowded hattas where they live no room exists for storage. As a demonstration the current worker built two cisterns in village lanes for collecting drain water from the hattas. In one, however, the excavators struck underground water and the job had to be abandoned. Water accumulating in the other pit seeped into a spring which supplied water to a landlord's hand pump so it too had to be filled in. In company with the visiting veterinary the same worker helped to inoculate several hundred cattle and chickens. The team made special visits to the deras of prominent landowners to complete its task. In one hatta of muhajirs, money was raised to build drains and the village worker gave advice for constructing the brick-lined ditches that now lead waste water out of the inner lanes and into the street. Here, however, the dirty water forms a nearly impassable mire.

The development officer's initiative resulted in a village meeting at which an assistant registrar of the Cooperative Department addressed about 10 landlords (three owning 18 acres or less) on the advantages of cooperative marketing and farming. Village workers everywhere have been urged to take advantage of all opportunities to encourage cooperative organization. Chak 32 J. B. once did possess a cooperative credit society but it failed when an officer embezzled its funds. Perhaps because of this experience I heard no talk of establishing another credit society here.

This partial resume of village work in the chak has shown the diversity of tasks executed by the village worker. However, his day-to-day work is concerned primarily with agriculture. Demonstrations of improved seed, new

methods of cultivation, and the application of fertilizer have as their objects increasing farmers' output and income. Very little or nothing has been done with the more difficult problem of developing village crafts or helping artisans, service specialists, and professionals to raise their earnings.

A small randomly selected number of men and their wives representing different economic categories in the village was interviewed in an effort to discover attitudes toward the Village AID worker. The results will be summarized:

1. Many respondents possessed a very favorable image of the worker, regarding him as someone whose job it was to help villagers in the areas of agriculture, sanitation, and health. He had been sent to serve the village, treat sick plants, arrange for drainage ditches to be dug, and spray houses against flies.

2. Several villagers thought the worker should be endowed with coercive power so that he would be better able to get things done.

3. A number of respondents saw the young man spending too much time and effort in behalf of rich people and neglecting the poor. A very few expressions of mild hostility were directed against him by people claiming to have vainly sought his help or who saw his actions as benefiting mainly the large zamindars.

4. A few men professed either not to know who the worker was or what he was doing. They were farm laborers and claimed never to have had contact with him.

5. Most of the female respondents interviewed by the anthropologist's wife did not know the worker personally. They lacked a clear notion of his purpose in the *chak*. Perhaps enough has already been said to indicate that this village is not marked by widespread seclusion of women (*purdah*), although, of course, the sexes do not interact as freely as in an American city.

One more generalization emerged from the survey: the Programme to date has not built up much faith in the possibilities of self-help.

V. Conclusions

New social groups, the village council and boy's club; pursuit of adult literacy; renewed interest in raising vegetables; protection of seeds and plants from insect and other danger; leveling of half the village lanes and a stretch of road; inoculation of a large proportion of cattle and fowl, and drains in one hatta represent some achievements of the Village AID Programme in two years. Apathy and antagonism in the village council; reluctance to spend for development; failure to realize the keystone of the Programme, the idea of self-help, and a certain lack of knowledge about the village worker or his goals are other conditions found after 23 months of community development. It is safe to conclude that the course of change has been unequal. Some people more than others have been aroused by the goals of Village AID. Certain areas of culture have been affected above others.

Let us consider, first, the degree to which different sections of the population are involved unequally in community development. Farmers clearly have benefited more from the skills of the worker than have service specialists or artisans. On the other hand, not all farmers participate equally in the program. Just as a wealthy, developed nation can, with relatively little trouble, increase still further its level of development, so men in the village with large landholdings and sufficient capital are best able to take advantage of the village worker's extension services. They have money to buy seeds or young trees, land to lend for demonstration purposes, and servants or laborers to help prepare the plots. They can afford to take risks with improved varieties of seed. Because such men are also socially prominent and influential they attract the village worker's attention and he naturally seeks to involve them actively in development. The rest of the population, for example tenants and small *muhajir* farmers, who need help equally if not more, remain relatively neglected. Unintentionally they are given a basis for resenting the advantages received by the few. It is quite likely that those villagers who are literate and most aware of the wider society are also those most sympathetic with the goals of community development.¹⁷ Of course, in Pakistan sophisticated men also tend to be the most prosperous. Unlike the rural United States, where community development has had a strong impact on the woman's world, women and girls in the *chak* are little affected by Village AID. The same situation undoubtedly exists in the rest of the country. It is difficult to recruit and train a sufficient number of qualified women workers for the country's many villages. Suitable living accommodations for women are also difficult to secure in rural areas.

That some areas of culture should have been affected by change more than others reflects, first, the worker's uneven training in skills pertaining to agriculture, sanitation, and crafts. He has far more to offer in the first two fields than in the third. The Village AID Programme, perhaps reflecting its roots in American extension, is predisposed in favor of agricultural extension. Increasing food production also meets a need which is stressed by planners on the Central Government level. Naturally, more can be done for farmers than for craftsmen because more is known about the difficulties of agriculturalists and how to meet them. Elaborate agricultural research organizations in Pakistan are constantly providing new and more profitable information and resources for farmers but no comparable attention is given to pottery, blacksmithing, or carpentering.

Socially and psychologically the village has not been effectively organized in support of a voluntary program of community development. It has already been suggested that inertia is to some extent anchored in the tendency to rely on outside power and influence. Without careful nurturance the ideal of self-help probably can make little headway against this orientation. The human relations skills of the village worker are quite insufficient to cope with such resistance.

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17. Feelings of inferiority and suspicion toward the larger society on the part of the Dutch farmer have been found to be negatively associated with readiness to adopt new methods of farming. Cf. A. W. Van den Ban, "Some Characteristics of Progressive Farmers in the Netherlands," *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 22, pp. 205-212.

It is not surprising that the worker also does not command enough skill to control the antagonisms which prevent village leaders from working as a body. Another reason for the chak's essentially apathetic response to community development may be the attitude that good is limited and that another person's gain is equivalent to a loss, real or potential, incurred by one's own circle. Such a conception does not appear to be well suited to community-wide cooperation.

It may be thought that placing one worker in charge of only three or so villages will enable him to bring personal influence to bear in order to promote change. Such a conception overlooks the fact that individual workers vary much in leadership ability. Furthermore, five thousand or more adults living in two or three villages are far too many for any man to know and influence through personal appeal. The worker's prestige and influence may also be reduced by how big landlords and even development officers treat him, and this circumscribe his influence.

So far Pakistan has attempted little evaluation of Village AID apart from the item-counting kind. When released to the public such evaluations usually cite "good progress" and "great success."¹⁸ I have also met urban-based, Village AID top administrators who assured me that community development was radically, but successfully, transforming the rural countryside.¹⁹ Perhaps these evaluations, being based on information about many development areas, are true (in which case the reports of the Programme Evaluation Organization in India are not simply more realistic but prove the Indian program less successful than Pakistan's). Low echelon administrators and a few United States advisors have sometimes been more candid in confessing frustration and admitting slow progress. There simply are no adequate sources of information available for gauging the success of this ambitious venture in directed culture change. Evaluation depends on appraising consequences in the light of the ideals of the Programme and its target goals. This paper has attempted to apply that prescription in one very small corner of Pakistan.

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18. Take for example, this news story from *Dawn*, Oct. 25, 1957: "The V-AID Programme in Tando Allahyar-Tandojam Development Area is reported to have proved a great success and the Village AID worker, who implements the programme, has to a great extent been able to pierce the shell of apathy which surrounds the mind of the villager and inspired in him the confidence to help himself in the solution of his problems." A list of specific accomplishments follows, including the use of chemical fertilizer, new methods of sowing cotton, stocking ponds with fish, a new health center, 75 new schools, and a number of youth clubs.
19. Lt. Gen. Burki, Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Government of Pakistan (the Village AID Programme is housed in his department), is cited to the effect that "He cannot say as yet whether the Village AID work in Pakistan is progressing satisfactorily or not" but that the Government attaches great importance to the successful working of the Programme (*Dawn*, Jan. 21, 1959).

FORM AND FUNCTION IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION*

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The old saw that form should follow function would provide a severe test for measuring past organizational arrangements for bilateral (United States) and multilateral technical assistance administration, if it is assumed that the only function of technical assistance is to aid developing countries. The test would, however, be an unfair one. Bilateral assistance also had to serve short-range political and economic interests of the United States; both bilateral and multilateral assistance had to be adapted to the institutional interests of the various federal agencies and international organizations concerned. The instability (mainly financial) of both types of programs has proved a serious handicap from the standpoint of personnel as well as organization. Moreover, this is a new task for governments and international organizations, and a good deal of trial and error was to be expected even under the most favorable circumstances. It is a hopeful sign that lessons from experience are being recorded and heeded and, as the magnitude of technical assistance increases, dysfunctional elements in organization are being removed. There is then the hope that we will evolve appropriate forms to carry out the enormous and complex task of rendering technical assistance effectively. Mr. Glick's book allows this optimistic outlook while at the same time conveying the impression that we are still in the early stages of evolving appropriate organizational forms and relationships.

Mr. Glick has drawn highly useful lessons of general application from the experience of the United States, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States in providing technical assistance to countries in Latin America. His study was one of a number organized in 1953 by the National Planning Association on the subject of "Technical Cooperation in Latin America."¹

Mr. Glick therefore had not only his own rich experience as general counsel of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and of the Technical Cooperation Administration to draw upon, but also the collaboration of colleagues engaged in related studies and the advice of a well-informed advisory committee. He carried

* Philip M. Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. xix+390, \$5.50.

** The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the United Nations.

1. Other published studies that came from the NPA project are: Arthur T. Mosher, Technical Cooperation in Latin American Agriculture; James G. Maddox, Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin America; National Planning Association Planning Committee on Technical Cooperation, Technical Cooperation in Latin America.

out field studies in six countries to gather material especially for this book and, before the manuscript was completed, participated in the Brookings Institution's study in 1957 for a United States Senate Committee on Administrative Aspects of Foreign Assistance Programs.²

I

The book takes a broad view of technical assistance, including the relationship of technical assistance to other forms of foreign aid and to the needs generally of countries for external assistance. It is divided into three parts: the first, the most comprehensive, is focused on the bilateral program. It summarizes the history of foreign aid administration; describes the public administration setting for technical assistance in Latin America; analyzes the various means which have been developed for rendering assistance (i.e., the economic survey, technical mission, joint operation through a *servicio*, university contract, other private contracts, and training abroad); assesses the organization for program planning of technical assistance; and examines the arrangements under which technicians are employed and trained for work in a foreign country. The first part concludes with a discussion of alternative forms of organization at home and abroad for rendering bilateral assistance--not only technical but also military and economic.

The second part analyzes arrangements for carrying out the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. It follows much the same pattern of analysis as the first part. It analyzes the case for administration of the Expanded Program by a single international agency; the case for allowing the specialized agencies the same measure of independence in administering their part of the Expanded Program as they have under their "regular" program (i.e., technical assistance financed from the regular budgets voted by their respective governing bodies); and also the case for the present arrangements for coordination through the Technical Assistance Board³ and its resident representatives in the aided countries. Mr. Glick recognizes, in balance, the advantages of the present system of coordinated administration but suggests several ways of improving it. An analysis of the limited role of the Organization of American States in administering training centers concludes the second part.

The third part, entitled "Plural Efforts towards a Common Goal," examines the roles and relationships of bilateral and multilateral technical assistance and the strengths and weaknesses of each. The book ends on a cautiously optimistic note that a well-administered program of technical assistance is possible and that it can contribute significantly to the world's progress and welfare.

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2. A study prepared at the request of the Special Committee of the United States Senate to Study the Foreign Aid Program, Government Printing Office, 1957.
 3. The Technical Assistance Board is an interagency body composed of representatives of the secretariats of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies plus an Executive Chairman appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

II

It is here impossible to summarize or analyze the many useful conclusions and suggestions presented. These have enduring value and merit close study by students and practitioners of technical assistance administration.⁴

Instead, I will first present what appears to be Mr. Glick's conception of what is desirable and possible to work toward in the administration of technical assistance and then examine certain elements in it. He envisages the following for the bilateral program of the United States: little change in the Washington organization for technical assistance administration (i.e., continuation of the present status of the International Cooperation Administration within the State Department), but a clearer disassociation of technical assistance from military aid; a policy commitment to render assistance on what amounts to a permanent basis; further decentralization of authority to directors of United States Operations Missions (USOM) within the aided countries, but better backstopping of their activities to ensure that mistakes in one country are not unwittingly repeated elsewhere; a core career service for foreign aid technicians, supplemented by short term assignments for specialists; politically appointed but nevertheless qualified USOM country directors; an integrated staff of United States technicians in each aided country under the overall supervision of the country directors, but with the chiefs of missions in major functional fields otherwise free to direct their programs in cooperation with the respective ministers of the host government; United States ambassadors who are sympathetic, informed, helpful, but unobtrusive; use of all instruments of technical cooperation for the purposes they best serve, with greater use of comprehensive regional projects and joint operations of the servicio type (with due regard for the dangers inherent in servicios); and close relationships with multilateral and other technical assistance programs.

Mr. Glick's image of the United Nations technical assistance program involves far greater increases in funds and more important changes in the existing arrangements than does his image of the bilateral program. The multilateral program would also be recognized as permanent. All technical assistance projects of the United Nations and the specialized agencies would be financed from Expanded Program funds; that is, the practice of financing technical assistance from the regular budgets of the respective agencies would be discontinued. The Technical Assistance Board (TAB) would disappear, and the Administrative Committee on Coordination (composed of the executive heads of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies) would take over its function of coordinating technical assistance activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. The secretariat of the Technical Assistance Board would be converted into an office of program coordination of technical assistance under the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is the presiding officer of the Administrative Committee on Coordination. The TAB Resident Representative would become the special representative of the Secretary-General of the United

4. For excellent supplemental reading see the May 1959 issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, "Partnership for Progress: International Technical Cooperation," edited by Richard W. Gable.

Nations, and there would be one in each aided country. The principal technicians of all technical missions of the United Nations in a country would be organized into a program planning committee under the chairmanship of the resident representative.

The United Nations would assist the countries in developing their own coordinating committees, and there would be joint sessions of bilateral, multi-lateral, and country programming committees. The United Nations would participate in joint operations, including the joint administration and financing, along the lines of the *servicio*, with nationals of the host countries serving as directors or at least co-directors. The United Nations would also have more funds available for material, equipment, etc., to support other activities of its technicians. A career service would be established for a "core" of technicians to serve developing countries and arrangements made for their training. They would be supplemented by "short-termers." The United Nations program in the aided countries would become more comprehensive on a regional or country basis and not represent just the sum of unconnected "projects" requested by the government. Criteria and techniques for evaluation would be developed and applied.

Mr. Glick's conception of the technical assistance program of the Organization of American States (OAS) would involve some expansion in the present program and changes more in role than in organization. The OAS would "specialize on problems about which the region is particularly concerned and on those where sensitivity to external technical assistance is strongest." He suggests, for example, assistance in leadership training and other work among the Indian population; agrarian reform policies and procedures; a regional training center in public administration to supplement the schools in Rio de Janeiro and Costa Rica; national programs to foster peaceful uses of atomic energy; stimulation of bilateral cooperation among Latin American countries; and provision of fellowships to Latin American universities.

The author envisages a symphony of technical assistance effort emanating from diverse sources, private philanthropic as well as bilateral and multi-lateral; each aiding agency informed of what the other is doing and plans to do; and each prepared to recognize the peculiar advantages of others in rendering certain types of assistance. The work of each aiding agency would have its own internal coherency and supplement or at least not conflict with the work of other aiding agencies, and fit into a comprehensive program of economic and social development which the country itself has formulated. Greater use would be made of modern techniques of mass communication to support technical assistance activities and ways would be found to render aid to local government units.

III

In this very general picture, there are only a few functionally significant elements which make me uneasy, but I find that the sum of these elements raises a fundamental question about the soundness of the image itself.

First, I feel uneasy about the suggestion that *servicio* type joint operations be more widely applied, and particularly about the suggestion (repeated in

Mr. Glick's article in the May 1959 issue of the *Annals*) that the United Nations engage in such joint operations.⁵ Although this suggestion is supported by an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the bilateral *servicio* and by a statement that hundreds of *servicio* projects have been transferred to the ministries in which they are located, Mr. Glick did not discuss the common *servicio* practice of paying higher salaries to local personnel than is paid in the rest of the Ministry. This enables the *servicio* to attract more qualified employees, which could account in part for its often impressive results. Moreover, the practice presumably makes it difficult to effectuate a smooth transfer of *servicio* projects, including personnel, to the respective ministry. A *servicio* director is credited with likening "the *servicios* to a flatcar from which projects are unloaded and new ones taken aboard as it moves along a governmental frontier." The concept is appealing, but further study is needed of the condition of the projects after they are "unloaded." This might well form part of a special study, which is urgently needed, of the *servicio* as an instrument for rendering technical assistance.

Even if it is assumed that the *servicio* is an effective instrument of bilateral technical assistance, I would still question, from the standpoints of both the United Nations and the aided countries, the adaptability of the *servicio* device to the United Nations program. The United Nations could not help finance very many *servicio* type operations without an enormous increase of funds. More serious, the administrative apparatus of the aided countries could become hopelessly complicated if they had *servicios* in several ministries under joint operations with different member organizations of the United Nations family, and also perhaps one or more under joint bilateral operations. If we have learned anything in public administration, it is that administrative principles and practices must be adapted to the traditions and circumstances within each country and the practices applied as uniformly as possible throughout the government of a country. Moreover, decentralization of decision-making is essential. Joint operations with different governments and different international organizations could impede the growth of a sound system of public administration within a country and aggravate the difficulty of making officials accountable to the citizenry for their actions.

Another point in Mr. Glick's book to which I wish to call attention is the lack of clear distinction between the proper roles of aiding agencies on the one hand, and of the government being aided on the other, in the task of programing and coordinating technical assistance. He views this as a collaborative effort

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5. Mr. Glick states that the *servicio* is not the only type of joint operation. But elsewhere he asserts that the United Nations has not engaged in joint operations and excludes the joint efforts of the United Nations in establishing Institutes of Public Administration and other training and research institutions from his concept of "joint operations." He also excludes the Andean Indian Program. His concept thus seems to narrow down to the *servicio* type of joint operation of a function like agricultural extension that can be administered and financed separately from the rest of the Ministry in which it is located. The concept involves institutional participation by the aiding agency with the host government in all operating decisions.

of USOM and United Nations country committees and interministerial committee of the host government. He recognizes the need for the aided governments to have planning bodies, but he does not think that the planning bodies should have authority to approve joint projects of the ministries and external aiding agencies. His model seems to call for initiative by the aiding agencies in planning technical assistance, apparently regardless of differences in the capability of the host governments to determine what external help is needed and how it should be phased. He is critical of the United Nations practice of responding to miscellaneous requests and praises what he sees as a shift toward "the preparation and execution of balanced country programs."⁶ Although the aiding agencies may have to assume an active role in planning and coordinating technical assistance requirements in many countries, surely in countries like India that have effective central planning and administrative machinery, the role of the aiding agencies can and should be confined to weighing the requests of the governments for assistance and relying heavily on the government's own administrative machinery to plan and coordinate the aid to be rendered. More systematic analysis is needed of the respective roles of bilateral and multi-lateral aiding agencies and of the host governments in the programming and coordination of technical assistance. There can be no doubt, however, that where the aided governments do not have the planning and administrative machinery to ensure that available technical assistance makes its fullest possible contribution to national development goals, priority should be given (as it is in the United Nations program) to building and strengthening such machinery.

This brings me to my final point, a fundamental one: there should be a place in our model of ideal technical assistance arrangements for the systematic employment by the governments of developing countries of technical and executive personnel from other countries in operating posts to strengthen their planning, technical, and administrative staffs where needed. Newly independent governments have learned to appreciate the value of retaining many of the able colonial civil servants who served their people faithfully. Puerto Rico has successfully employed "statesiders" under contract in executive and technical posts. In October 1958, the United Nations General Assembly approved, on an experimental basis, a program for the Provision of Operational and Executive Personnel (OPEX). Under this program governments will pay OPEX appointees at the established local rates for the positions they occupy, and the United Nations will supplement them as necessary to attract qualified persons to the posts. The United Nations provides only recruitment and financial assistance under this program. It neither instructs nor guides the OPEX appointees. The latter are obligated to train nationals to take over their jobs as rapidly as possible. Neither the government nor the United Nations assumes any responsibility to find other employment for OPEX appointees upon termination of their contracts. The proposal which led to OPEX, called the International Administrative Service, had envisioned pension and other elements of a "career service." It remains to be seen how far the OPEX scheme as now conceived will become an important means whereby governments obtain external technical assistance.

6. The notion of "balance" is elusive. It is meaningful in technical assistance only in relation to the whole scheme of development. "Imbalance" can serve a useful purpose if it leads to integration at a higher level of development.

There will in any case be room for development of other arrangements, private as well as public, for helping the governments of developing countries employ trustworthy non-nationals who possess skills that are needed for national development.

Assuming that these arrangements become adequate to the need and the planning and administrative structures of aid receiving countries are thereby strengthened, most developing countries will be able to formulate their own development plans, identify their needs for external assistance, and assure aiding agencies that the assistance they make available will be spent for purposes agreed upon. Mr. Glick asserts in partial justification of the servicio that "the characteristics of public administration in the underdeveloped countries makes it unreasonable to expect the United States to contribute substantial sums unless a United States representative can thereafter exercise some suitable control." However, employment of non-nationals in technical and executive posts would enable governments of developing countries to provide reasonable assurances to aiding agencies without the fragmentation of administration involved in servicio type joint operations. Moreover, it would permit changes in the respective roles of aiding agencies and aid recipients in programing and coordination of technical assistance that will render its form more suitable to its function.

As can be seen from this review, Mr. Glick's book is provocative as well as highly instructive. It will prove rewarding to all who are concerned with the administration of technical assistance.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

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I

Widespread agreement on the existence of an intimate relationship between social mobility and economic development is often accompanied by equally widespread controversy over the specific form and degree such intimacy takes. Thus, the relationship between social mobility and economic development remains problematical in a number of important respects, e.g. the functional and sequential interaction between these two processes of change and the manner in which the desire for mobility in this world is introduced into cultures that emphasize acceptance of one's fate rather than striving to achieve.

This important new book by Lipset and Bendix* comments on these controversial issues with varying degrees of directness and specificity. However, since a discussion of the Lipset and Bendix study limited to the controversial mobility-development issues would destroy the book's admittedly fragile continuity, it seems wise to begin with a brief overall description of its contents.

Lipset and Bendix have assembled and compared existing data on social mobility from a surprisingly large number of original sources, including many of their own earlier publications.¹ The book adequately demonstrates the importance and economy of secondary analyses.

Following a brief introduction, the remaining nine chapters are equally divided into three parts. Part I begins with an exciting analysis of comparative mobility rates and patterns based on data from the United States and the industrial societies of Western Europe. The comparisons employ the fullest set of international data on mobility I have encountered and should facilitate many future studies of social mobility.² The most striking result emerging from

* *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959, xxi, 309 pp, \$5.00.

1. Since many of the original papers on which some of the book's chapters are based were co-authored with various other scholars, the authorship status of some chapters is complex. Thus, Chapter II is co-authored by Lipset and Zetterberg, and Chapter IV by Bendix and Howton. A full listing of original papers and their authors is provided on pp. xi and xii of the preface.
2. Lipset and Bendix mention a forthcoming study which Prof. S. M. Miller is preparing for The International Sociological Association that will apparently report fuller sets of international data on social mobility.

these comparisons is that the rates of social mobility are equally high and the patterns remarkably similar for all these industrial societies, when mobility is measured by movement from manual to non-manual occupations (p. 37). This result defines the problem upon which the remainder of Part I and in some respects the rest of the book focuses. For assuming (as Lipset and Bendix do, p. 112) that the belief in equality of opportunity is much more widespread in the United States than in Western Europe, it would appear that actual mobility rates and patterns are not nearly so important for equalitarian beliefs as previously thought.

The remainder of Part I concentrates on the mobility-equalitarian belief relationship in the United States. Chapter III examines certain features of the overall occupational and educational structure, while Chapter IV reports an excellent comparative analysis of the available studies of recruitment into the business elite.

In general Lipset and Bendix conclude that variations in the degree to which equalitarian beliefs are widespread are a function of the values and attitudes attached to mobility rather than the actual rates of mobility. Further, that such anomalous values and attitudes persist in the face of sizable alterations in the facts of the case, (pp. 111-113).

It must be noted that Lipset and Bendix can provide only a partial answer to the problem they raise. For the critical test of their position is the disparity between equalitarian beliefs and mobility rates in Europe, i.e., the situation where the disparity is presumably greatest. Their analysis of the United States is in the nature of things less persuasive since it is precisely this country that makes up the "positive cell", i.e., the place where both mobility and equalitarian beliefs are relatively high.

This situation is partly compensated for by their analysis of recruitment into the American business elite. Their findings are: (a) "recruitment into the American business elite has remained remarkably steady" (p. 127) and (b) "that the American business elite is disproportionately derived from Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, native-born, well-to-do families" (p. 183). Thus, at least in regard to the availability of elite positions, the facts do not condone wide-spread equalitarian beliefs in American society.

Part II consists of a distilled analysis of the Oakland Labor Mobility Study. Presumably the purpose of this distillation is to highlight the more important findings. It appears to me that Lipset and Bendix were most concerned with demonstrating the extent to which this local labor market is both open and closed. For depending upon where one looks and the observational techniques employed, the emergent picture is either one of widespread and enduring opportunity, or one of sharply restricted horizons. For example, while there is a great deal of job mobility in the "normal" course of a career, very little of such intra-generational mobility leads to permanent movement across the manual-nonmanual line, (p. 180).³ In regard to inter-generational mobility (father-son), the crucial factor appears to be son's education. Without

3. In an appendix the authors compare intra-generational mobility studies from Great Britain, Japan and the United States.

education, very few sons are able to achieve significantly more than their father's occupation (p. 197). Surely the repetition of these findings should go a long ways towards dispelling the simple-minded, all or nothing clichés about the extent of mobility.

Part III shifts the focus back to more general and pervasive features of social mobility, and again employs data from many different sources. Chapter VIII examines the importance of local community size and structure for social mobility. The analysis successfully attempts to go beyond the redundant documentation of the urban center as the prime locus of mobility and makes a special effort to identify the specific mechanisms through which community factors influence life chances.

Chapter IX deals with the persistently "sticky" problem of the role of intelligence and motivation in mobility. Though hardly the authors' fault, I found this the least satisfying of the data chapters in the book. This is especially the case in regard to the role of intelligence in social mobility. Even if one maintains a properly suspicious attitude towards the values and vested interests commonly held by social scientists, it remains true as Lipset and Bendix point out, that there is no satisfactory demonstration of the role of the innate, except in the extreme case.

A somewhat more hopeful situation obtains in regard to the role of differential motivation. From the information assembled here, it appears that upwardly mobile people share certain personality traits that are related to conditions during early socialization, not the least of which is small family size.

The tenth and final chapter attempts to specify some critical problems for future study. As one would expect, the discussion is somewhat diffuse. Towards the end of the chapter, there is a suggestive critical discussion of the value of extensive up-mobility for personal and social stability.

Before I discuss the social mobility-economic development relationship, I want to make my overall evaluation of this book explicit. This is an excellent study and now becomes indispensable for any future study of social mobility.

II

The crucial point for interpretation according to Lipset and Bendix is the lack of correlation between rates and patterns of mobility on the one hand and cultural values on the other. The important thing to keep in mind about this observed lack of consonance between mobility and belief systems is that it cuts two ways. Thus, just as it appears that widespread experience with mobility does not necessarily bring about equalitarian beliefs, it also seems to be the case that initial differences in belief systems do not seriously inhibit large scale mobility brought about by technologically induced changes in occupational distributions. It would seem that a specific set of beliefs is both much less of a prerequisite for and much less of a consequence of widespread social mobility, contrary to much of the current literature.

Some of the major implications of this finding for economic development are:

1. The experience of up-mobility by virtue of economic development will not necessarily convince people that the "new" economic system is fair and/or equitable and thus will not necessarily enlist their support for the responsible political agencies.
2. Large scale recruitment of an industrial labor force can occur without major value shifts, for labor force recruitment apparently does not require a basic commitment to industrial values.
3. The post-recruitment impedimenta to labor force commitment may be a more difficult problem than some believe. Though significant shifts in occupational distributions may take place without causing the destruction of "traditional" beliefs, these "traditional" beliefs may remain to plague and impede future development efforts.

Since this is an important issue, a more detailed examination of the data and their interpretation seems in order. The issue is that a high and constant rate of mobility is accompanied by a variable belief in the presence of equality. This lack of correlation may be the result of at least three different situations.

1. The experienced occupational mobility may be of basically different types.
2. The experienced occupational mobility may lead to quite different amounts of other forms of "social" mobility.
3. There may be a lack of knowledge of how extensively shared the experienced mobility actually is.

Lipset and Bendix lean to the second explanation and see it as bringing about the third. Thus they feel that the upwardly mobile person in Europe encounters certain barriers that make his initial achievement seem a mockery, whereas in the United States, mobility is proudly displayed as a "badge of equality" (p. 62). Thus occupational mobility in European societies accentuates the pain of status frustration. Such pain, in turn, leads to continued if not increased dissatisfaction with the stratification status quo, in part by blinding the mobile person to how extensively shared mobility actually is.

Presumably this argument would be even more the case for many developing areas, where mobility is even less likely to involve entry into desirable social circles; where the arriviste stands out in bold relief and thus becomes a most visible target for increased social discrimination. In the extreme case, the mobile segment of the population might become the source of economically disruptive political radicalism or reaction (p. 262).

These interpretations are of course variations of the Durkheimian mobility-anomie hypothesis. Rather than imputing the source of anomie to the lack of opportunity for mobility in societies that encourage uniformly high aspirations and thus bring about what Merton has labeled "innovating behavior," Lipset and Bendix find that normatively legitimate opportunity is quite available

but that occupational-economic achievement, even through normatively sanctioned means, opens up whole new sets of aspirations that are likely to be frustrated in European societies. As they point out (pp. 284-287) these findings and their interpretations shift the value argument in regard to the desirability of extensive mobility. Rather than being a problem of exceedingly limited opportunity, it may be a problem of too much opportunity in that the socio-psychic costs associated with status frustration within societies that stress invidious distinctions may be increased rather than diminished by widespread, normatively sanctioned, social mobility.

III

There are a number of points on which alternative interpretations of these findings are possible. At least two counter arguments deserve some comment. First, Lipset and Bendix seem to feel that status inconsistency and its accompanying frustrations result from mobility rather than its lack (pp. 64-66). The problem is perhaps better viewed as mobility consistency vs. mobility inconsistency. Indeed, it may well be that the association of status consistency with immobility is quite unreal.

The fortunes of men are constantly changing and at least in this sense the experience of mobility is universal. Moreover, these fortunes change relatively as well as absolutely. Thus inconsistency might better be measured relative to "normal" mobility rates.⁴ For as long as he ages, and as long as increasing age is normatively associated with increasing socio-economic status, the non-mobile person cannot enjoy status consistency. If, in addition, the non-mobile person lives in a society with high rates of mobility, his status inconsistency is increased both absolutely and relatively.

This point may be illustrated in regard to the discussion of the psychic costs of mobility that result from the destruction of primary group ties (p. 65). The implicit picture is one in which the primary group is maintained minus its mobile member. However the data assembled by Lipset and Bendix indicate that the proportion leaving the primary group may approach or even exceed the size of the remaining proportion. Thus these intimate friendship ties may be equally destroyed for all concerned. Now the mobile person may indeed suffer social and psychic pain as a result of the destruction of primary group ties, but his assumption that immobility would have spared him such pain may be quite unrealistic. The point at issue is not that there are costs associated with the failure to achieve, for Lipset and Bendix are, of course, quite aware of this. Rather the point I am perhaps unduly belaboring is that the occupationally immobile person also suffers from and pays the price of status inconsistency.

This point also applies to mobility within developing areas. Too often social and political instability in developing areas is attributed to initial mobility and the subsequent frustration of newly stimulated aspirations (pp. 261-2).

4. For a method of measuring "relative" mobility, see Tumin and Feldman, "The Theory and Measurement of Occupational Mobility," American Sociological Review; June, 1957, pp. 281-8.

Again, the analysis seems to juxtapose two basically different kinds of costs, i. e., the cost of stable grinding poverty versus the cost of partial mobility. Again, stability is implicitly associated with occupational immobility, whereas political and social chaos is associated with the mobile.

I believe that this position results in part from the assumption that pre-industrial societies typically permit little or no social mobility and thus one source of instability is absent, the instability associated with status inconsistency. However, the assumption that the sectors of a developing society untouched by nascent industrialism are stable is questionable. It may be that the mobility present in such areas is all status degradation and not dramatic enough to catch the observer's eye, but it may well be experienced as downward mobility of considerable magnitude by those involved. As the term implies, grinding poverty is an active process of mobility. Thus it might be more accurate to juxtapose the costs of downward mobility with those of partial up-mobility rather than a comparison between costs of mobility versus the cost of stability. Of course, these remarks do not question the important finding that up-mobility is not necessarily a panacea for political and social disturbances in newly industrializing societies.

IV

An additional point at which the Lipset and Bendix findings and interpretations are open to some question concerns the extent to which the pattern of mobility in the United States is similar to that observed in Western Europe. Some of the data presented in Chapter III suggest that the constant pattern of mobility becomes quite variable in certain respects. Most noteworthy is the greatly increased accessibility of formal education in the United States (p. 94). The fact that educational opportunities are much more widespread in the United States than in Western European societies suggests at least two alternative hypotheses.

1. That occupational mobility in the United States is based upon significant educational achievement and thus the distance moved occupationally is commensurately greater; or, because of increased educational achievement in the United States, manual to nonmanual occupational mobility involves traversing a greater social distance than a comparable move in Western Europe.

2. It may be that manual to nonmanual occupational mobility is moderate in degree and equal in proportion in both the United States and Western Europe. However such occupational mobility in the United States is more likely to be matched by equally moderate amounts of educational mobility.

The data presented by Lipset and Bendix do not permit any clear basis for choice between these two hypotheses, though the second hypothesis receives an edge, in that apparently the function of educational mobility is to bring about mobility consistency rather than markedly different degrees of occupational mobility.⁵ In any case, the greater consonance between mobility and equalitarian

5. The data presented by Lipset and Bendix indicate that the middle ranges of education are quite accessible in the United States to lower class sons but that the opposite is the case for college. Thus, the lower class son is not likely to achieve sufficient education for elitist occupations, p. 94-5.

beliefs in the United States seems to be associated with the widespread accessibility of education. This tentative finding may contain an important lesson for the strategy of economic development.

The fact that widespread moderate amounts of occupational mobility may leave belief systems unaltered in certain crucial respects and, further, may add to the absolute level of social unrest, presumably means that the lower classes in industrializing societies cannot be counted upon to support or energetically contribute to the completion of the industrialization program even when provided with factory jobs. At best one might predict the lower classes will drag their feet and at worst that they will serve as a constant source of social and political upheaval, eventually placing all development efforts in great jeopardy. This line of argument causes some to place renewed faith in the crucial role of the manager-entrepreneur as the person most identified with continued economic development. Thus the working class becomes defined as economically reactionary, the managerial class as economically progressive.

The programmatic implications are that most of the available resources should be devoted to the development of an entrepreneurial elite, in part to compensate for the failure in enlisting lower class support. Negatively, this means the rationalization of anti-union activity, since independent unions are perceived as the vehicles for the expression of working class economic reaction. Positively, it means the disproportionate allocation of funds available for education, to the development of higher educational training. Thus, the educational task is defined as one of developing an elite to lead economic development rather than creating a broad strata of moderately educated people. This means building an educational structure from the top down rather than *vice versa*.

Now, assuming that resources available for education are limited, this is a very real allocation problem. Should the society invest in one university for the few able to enter or should the investment go to a number of elementary schools, even though the graduates of such schools will have no place further to go? The assumed crucial role of education in consolidating limited amounts of occupational mobility argues that it may be more beneficial to invest in making moderate amounts of education available to broad segments of the population rather than *vice versa*.⁶ The point is that industrialization must entail moderate amounts of occupational mobility for broad masses of people. It appears that minimal education for this newly industrialized labor force might lead to the kinds of altered beliefs and attitudes that might enlist their support for economic development. As Lipset and Bendix demonstrate, such attitudinal changes may not be induced solely by occupational mobility.

V

The social mobility studied by Lipset and Bendix is, in most instances, occupational mobility measured by a crossing-over of the head/hands dividing line. This procedure is, of course, fraught with dangers, most of which are recognized by Lipset and Bendix. Moreover they present a most convincing

6. For an extension of this argument to Puerto Rico, and supportive evidence, see Tumin and Feldman, "Status, Perspective and Achievement," *American Sociological Review*, August 1956, pp. 464-72.

argument for (a) the necessity of using such a procedure in order to obtain some comparability for widely different forms of data and (b) the primacy of a head/hands division if one is forced to employ a two-fold classification of occupations. Thus there is no need to repeat tediously herein the traditional criticisms of this procedure.

Actually some of the traditional criticisms of a two-fold occupational classification are partially incorrect. For example, it is commonly said that this way of measuring mobility leads to a severe deflation of resulting estimations, the rule being that the amount of observed mobility varies directly with the number of categories employed. However the use of a single line to measure mobility will also inflate estimations, since mobility between at least two immediately adjacent status positions is quite sensitively recorded. Thus this technique both inflates and deflates: inflating mobility at the place in the hierarchy where the line occurs, and deflating mobility at all other places in the hierarchy.

It follows that the crucial point for argument is the presence or absence of a sharp barrier at the point where the line is located. If the analyst can argue (as Lipset and Bendix successfully do) that the line is located at the point where the social distance between immediately adjacent groups is greatest, this would negate the inflation criticism; and if (as in this instance) the observed mobility is quite high then the deflation criticism becomes somewhat academic. The challenging question raised by this study is why mobility rates are so high. That mobility rates may be still higher is not destructive of the interpretation.

There is, however, at least one problem that Lipset and Bendix do not adequately handle: the shifting location of the head/hands line, both cross-sectionally between situses and longitudinally within a situs. To the extent that the head/hands line shifts in either of these two ways, its utility for measuring the elevation or degradation properties of mobility is questionable, particularly for mobility between situses.

Figure 1 illustrates the nature of these difficulties. It is a primitive attempt to diagram the anomalous character of status mobility when it takes place by virtue of labor force shifts between situses. The solid line running from the left to the right and labeled H/H represents the head/hands division. The cross-hatching within each of the industry blocks refers to the degree of status and sub-situs differentiation characteristic of each of the major situses (see note *, Fig. 1).

Many analysts, including Lipset and Bendix, discount the status elevation or degradation due to mobility from Primary to Secondary industry on the grounds that the situses themselves start and end at different points on the status hierarchy. The most common example is the $P_1 \rightarrow S_1$ move that, in a classificatory sense, is registered as up-mobility by virtue of the higher "status" of the lowest job in secondary industry when compared with the lowest job in primary industry. Thus the agricultural day laborer displaced by the mechanization of agriculture is counted as an upwardly mobile person as long as he finds urban employment. In many newly developing areas this anomalous type of status elevation is heightened by virtue of the scarcity of factory employment and thus the entry of many displaced agricultural laborers directly into service occupations.




Figure 1. The Interaction Between Status and Situs Mobility*

* This diagram is a modification of one used to illustrate the folk-urban continuum in Freedman et al, *Principles of Sociology*, (rev. ed.), Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1956, p. 279. The vertical status axis is defined in the usual fashion, i.e., the invidious evaluation of occupational prestige. The horizontal situs axis is defined in two different, though non-conflicting, ways. Major situs refers to the three-fold industrial classification à la Colin Clark. Sub-situs, of course, refers to the internal differentiation within each major situs. Thus, Clark's three-fold classification is viewed as having salience on the horizontal dimension comparable to the manual-nonmanual division on the vertical status dimension. For the most recent discussion clarifying the meaning of the situs concept and reporting additional references to alternative usages, see R. T. Morris and R. J. Murphy, "The Situs Dimension in Occupational Research," *American Sociological Review*, April 1959, pp. 231-9. The definition for situs provided by Murphy and Morris differs in a number of respects from mine.

A specific case in point is the manner in which Lipset and Bendix discount data from Great Britain, and particularly Denmark and Italy, that show the amount of down-mobility to be at least twice as large as the amount of up-mobility.⁷ They argue that the different class structures (and thus the different location of the head/hands line) in these two major situses is responsible for a spurious increase in the rate of down-mobility (p. 23). The specific kind of mobility to which they refer is illustrated in Figure 1 by the line from $P_3 \rightarrow S_3$. In this instance the downward crossing of the head/hands line is a result of the fact that sons of small farm owners will, in all likelihood, be limited to manual jobs when they migrate to the city.

My argument is that the mobility that accompanies labor force shifts from secondary to tertiary industries encounters many of the same analytical problems.⁸ The person in secondary industry who is upwardly mobile across the manual-nonmanual line can follow a number of quite different mobility paths, some of which may be status degradation rather than elevation. Figure 1 illustrates two alternatives: $S_3 \rightarrow S_5$, and $S_3 \rightarrow T_2$, the last representing status degradation even though it is a manual to nonmanual move.

Lipset and Bendix themselves present evidence that supports the assigning of considerable magnitude to the $S_3 \rightarrow T_2$ move. The typical case of this type of mobility would be the semi-skilled worker who starts his own small business. According to the Lipset and Bendix study this type of mobility is a significant proportion of all intra-generational manual to nonmanual moves (p. 102-103).

In general, the increased differentiation of tertiary industry makes the use of any single point less meaningful. For, as I suggested above, the crucial methodological point is the extent to which the head/hands line represents a sharp barrier. I now suggest that this is the case for mobility within secondary industry and not the case for mobility from secondary to tertiary industry.⁹

7. The minimal treatment by Lipset and Bendix of the often sizeable amounts of downward mobility is the one place where I feel they do less than full justice to their data.

8. Figure 1 is a general version of a series of such diagrams. Since the present version is of course hypothetical and not drawn to any empirical scale, I am guilty of rigging its construction in order to illustrate my point.

9. Lipset and Bendix make what I judge to be a related point in a discussion of horizontal mobility on p. 272. However, they are apparently concerned with the subjective consequences of moves that do not involve any changes in objective status.

I must also add that, obviously, not all moves from secondary to tertiary industry are downward. The majority of such moves may be status-elevating. Lipset and Bendix present data showing that the average income for tertiary industry is considerably higher than the average for secondary industry (p. 85). Nevertheless, I do not think that it follows that all such moves are status elevating, or that a significant proportion cannot be status degrading.

To the extent that currently observed occupational mobility in advanced industrial societies is a consequence of labor force shifts from secondary to tertiary industries, the available techniques for measuring mobility may yield quite spurious results. Indeed the difficulties are not only technical. It may be that a wholesale re-conceptualization of what stratification means is in order. The Lipset and Bendix study, by amassing data that permit some examination of the utility of current concepts and techniques, provides a singularly important opportunity for needed revision of current theory and technology.

THE INCOME OF NATIONS*

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A whimsical cartoon of a few years back shows an Indian smoke signalman gazing from a distance at the mushroom cloud of an atomic explosion rising above the desert flats. It is captioned, "I wish I had said that." While the analogy may appear exaggerated, the sentiment expressed might well be applied to Professor Studenski's scholarly treatise on the history and present state of development in the aggregate measurement of "economic activity."

The product of nearly half a working lifetime, this 554 page, double column volume (set in rather small type) has brought together in well organized form information and interpretation formerly available only in disparate and often inaccessible sources. While, as the author informs us, the twenty-five years in process included many interruptions and delays, the finished product bears testimony to long periods of patient research and careful sifting.

The project, of which this volume is the end product, had support at different times from several sources, including the Federal Government, New York University, the Rockefeller Foundation and the National Bureau of Economic Research. This reviewer cannot forego the wish that some additional subsidy might have been found for part of the publication costs, thereby permitting the book to be sold for something less than twenty-five dollars. As a library reference volume, the book will no doubt have intensive use by future generations of graduate students, and may find its way to some professors' desks. At the present price its distribution is unlikely to be as wide as it deserves.

While the book is notable for its delineation of other people's work, particularly in the historical section, it also bears the imprint of Professor Studenski's breadth of interest and mature judgment. Interlaced with the methods and actual income estimates of the early English, French, German, Russian and American estimators are brief biographical and ideological references which hold the interest and provide insight into forces influencing the development of science. The style throughout is simple and straightforward, objective and scholarly, yet seldom dull or pedantic. To the reader who works his way straight through the entire book, the author's technique of presenting an overall view of materials to be covered, followed by a more detailed treatment, the repetition may become monotonous. The historical development of concepts and procedures, covered country by country, is partially repeated when estimates for the individual countries are presented in the third and fourth parts of the book. For the beginner, such repetition can be an aid to learning. As a reference work, the repetition and cross references can have their advantages.

* Paul Studenski, The Income of Nations, New York, New York University Press, 1958, pp. 554, \$25.00.

In its general format, the book comprises an introduction, four separate parts, and a statistical appendix. Comprehensive bibliographical and other notes are appended at the end of the book, ahead of the abbreviated twin indexes of authors and of countries and regions. An analytical table of contents provides a helpful guide for ready reference.

The introduction consists of a brief statement of the importance of national income estimates, and the logic of the book's over-all organization. Each of the four major parts will now be treated separately and in order.

Part One. History

Professor Studenski begins his historical section by tracing briefly, in sequence, the main current of ideas in the development of a concept (or concepts) of national income for the major countries for which estimates were made. This is followed by a more detailed treatment, country by country, chronologically from the time of the first estimates.

Sir William Petty (1623-1687) in England and Pierre le Pesant de Boisguillebert (1646-1714) in France are credited with the first formulation of the concept and the first attempt at giving it empirical content, with principal credit going to Petty.

Contrary to widely held views that the material production concept of national income antedates a more comprehensive one, Professor Studenski points out that both of the above writers "conceived of production and national income as embracing both goods and services." The contrary impression stems from the fact that the "later restricted material production concept of Adam Smith," crowded the more comprehensive concept off the scene, thereby doing a disservice to the discipline of economics. The unwarranted success of the "material" concept influenced classical economic thought for many years, and remains today to plague the student of comparative income statistics because of its retention by those nations dominated by the Marxian ideology.

Although Petty's concept of national income lacked adequate treatment of "the sources of increase of the national wealth" this fault was corrected by his immediate successor, Gregory King. The latter, "more a statistician than an economist, was the first truly scientific estimator of national income." His Natural and Political Observations and Conclusions upon the State and Conditions of England, dated 1696, contained the terms, "annual income of the nation," "annual expense of the nation," and the "yearly increase in the nation's wealth."

King prepared separate estimates of per capita income, expenditure and savings for each social and economic class in England, totaling these to obtain a single national income aggregate. "In this way he obtained an estimate of the distribution of national income as well as estimates for each of the items surveyed. His computations were, in effect, a national balance sheet foreshadowing the social accounts of today."

The pioneering work of Petty and King was followed by a succession of sporadic estimates of national income in England and elsewhere. The initial efforts in France represented attempts to do for that country what had been done in England.

Professor Studenski's observations on the circumstances which led to the development of the national income concept should be of particular interest to the student of the history of science. These were, he points out, as much a product of the times as of the man (or men). The scientific outlook was permeating the intellectual atmosphere of England and of western Europe. Perceived problems were approached more and more in the light of inquiry rather than according to the tenets of received dogma. England was in the throes of a continuing struggle with France and Holland. The mounting costs of this struggle, met by means of a highly inequitable tax system, had produced increasing concern over England's capacity to meet and outdistance her rivals without destroying the productive base on which the country's strength rested. A measure of that strength was needed, both as a means for estimating the nation's potential and for discovering where the most fruitful sources of revenue for the government might be found. Petty had been a tax administrator. He was also a physician and sought to apply the scientific method to the body politic. He was intent on proving that England had not been ruined by the civil war, and that adequate revenues could be raised for both war and peacetime needs.

Although King's work remained unpublished for more than a century, it was publicized by Charles Davenant (1656-1714) "influential writer and political figure" who exerted pressures for the improvement of official records and statistics. Such improvement was slow in coming, and for the most part had to await the emergence of a whole new set of problems attending the industrial revolution.

Following a 70 year period of relative neglect, Arthur Young (1741-1820) signaled a renewed interest in national income measures and improved statistics. As might be expected, his interest in agriculture inclined him toward a product approach to income, and his own estimates in 1770 were built up from production data collected in the course of his travels.

Income estimates developed later in France than in England, and those who developed them had even poorer materials with which to work. More than this, affairs of France were in the hands of a tyrannical authority, precariously balanced on a pyramid of privilege, which had little taste for the illumination of the existing state of affairs. Boisguillebert, who attempted to do for France what Petty and King had done for England, was motivated by a deep conviction of the need for tax reform, and for a general liberalization of governmental policy toward economic life. Described as "a good theorist but one of the world's poorest statisticians," Boisguillebert tried to prove too much (specifically the extent of the decline in France's income) with the result that his estimates were quite unreliable. Although many of his proposals were to be adopted a half century later, the publication of his and Vauban's works resulted in their banishment from court, and in the case of the former, from Paris.

Not until the rise of Physiocracy, as exemplified by Quesnay, Lavoisier, Du Pont and others, was there further interest in France in estimates of national income. Among these, François Quesnay (1694-1774) "is generally acknowledged to have invented the money-product flow of modern economic analysis." The concern with agriculture which characterized the work of this school, however, fastened upon French tradition, a dogma which was to limit the scope of its income estimates far into the nineteenth century.

Interestingly enough, the only other example of income estimates to make an appearance in the eighteenth century was in Russia. "Connected by a multitude of threads with the national income estimates in Britain and France, but firmly rooted in Russian soil were the national income estimates made in Russia toward the end of the eighteenth century." These, Studenski believes, were intimately connected with the rapid development and change then occurring, particularly during the reign of Catherine.

In the early part of her reign, particularly, her interest in liberal ideas allowed a degree of free inquiry not hitherto known in Russia. Her court became a center for expatriates and for the curious.

Out of this came what Studenski calls the "three lost Russian estimates" of national income. Although incidental to other statistical and descriptive data concerning the then little known country, these estimates by B. F. J. Hermann (1755-1815), an Austrian, A. N. Radeshev (1749-1802) and one anonymous became the principal basis for comparisons with the outside. But there, once again, the lot of the income estimators proved to be not without perils. Radeshev, for example, was exiled to Siberia by Catherine who, near the end of her reign, old and afraid, no longer wanted the illumination of ideas and fact.

In all, Studenski has accounted for 13 estimates of national income in England from Petty to the end of the eighteenth century, and 12 in the nineteenth century up to 1885. During about the same period, 25 estimates appeared in France.

First attempts to estimate national income in other parts of the world appeared somewhat later than in England and France. The first estimate of income and wealth in the United States was made in 1843 by George Tucker, professor of moral philosophy at the University of Virginia. Using the six decennial censuses from 1790 to 1840, he sought to derive measures of the growth of income and wealth in the new Republic. He further extended his estimate on the basis of the 1850 census. Although the quality of American statistics continued to improve, no further income estimate was attempted until 1893, when Charles B. Spahr, a liberal editor, published his estimate of income and wealth, as a means of demonstrating certain convictions regarding the inequality of its distribution.

By the closing decade of the nineteenth century, estimates in other countries were appearing. Austria's first estimate was for 1859. Germany, where economists of the historical-descriptive school (and theirs was the predominant view) were highly skeptical of all generalization, was a latecomer. Near the end of the century, members of this school were still characterizing national income estimates as worthless.

To Australia goes credit for preparation in 1886-87 of the first official estimate issued under government auspices. International comparisons of national income also began to appear during the last quarter of the century.

A characteristic feature of all early estimates was that they were sporadic, prepared by solitary workers intermittently, usually to buttress some thesis they had come to hold. They relied chiefly on census data, which through the years were being improved, and were not therefore readily

comparable one with the other. The concept of income itself had to develop through use and testing, while statistical techniques (crude improvisations, at first) had to be developed and generalized.

Interestingly enough, the contribution of economists, particularly the professionals, was small. One notable exception was Say, who, while he was little interested in actual estimates, contributed to clarification of the concept. Originally "inclined toward accepting the Smithian material production concept," he eventually discarded it for the more comprehensive one. He also pointed out the limitations of the Physiocratic concept. But, as Studenski indicates, "He believed that economics and statistics were wholly unrelated disciplines and he criticized those writers who intermixed them." His own estimate of French income was largely undocumented. Physicians and engineers come off rather better as early contributors to what has become an area of primary concern to modern economists.

Part Two. Theory and Methodology

The second part of the treatise links easily and smoothly with the concluding chapter of the first where Studenski introduces the men and the forces contributing to a universalization of the income concept. Some of the men introduced there, and who influenced estimating techniques, are: Bowley and Stamp in England; Colson in France; King in the United States; May and Helfferich in Germany; von Fellner in Austria; Bongor in Holland. The forces credited with contributing to universalization include: advance of economic theory; wars, revolutions and economic crises; fiscal reforms; technological changes; international and class conflicts; improved statistics; introduction of the income tax; government fiscal and economic planning; and finally, the influence of international organization.

Oddly enough, with the increasing assumption by governments of the task of preparing income estimates on a sustained basis, there has come greater objectivity--less injection of political or economic ideology. (Studenski observes that "W. I. King's estimate for the United States in 1915 was one of the last national income estimates in any country to combine the estimating task with economic politics." Presumably this observation exempts Soviet statistics published for world consumption.)

With the new climate has come the new generation of scholars to replace the old: Clark and Stone in England; de Bernonville in France; Kuznets and Gilbert in the United States; Coats in Canada; and numerous others in countries large and small.

Only limited attention will be paid here to Studenski's lucid presentation of the basic concepts used in income estimates, their uses and limitations, since these have become generally familiar. Suffice it to say that he has performed a useful service in the systematic development of the essential social nature of national income, in showing how it is linked with the "economic organism of society."

His discussion of the synthesized, three phase treatment of national income--production, distribution, disposition--leaves small room for improvement.

Almost any intelligent reader could follow his exposition. A simple overview is used to introduce the topic under discussion, followed by a more detailed treatment of each dimension. Woven into the fabric of his main narrative are references to men and their contributions in resolving conceptual or methodological difficulties. His treatment of the government sector, in national income accounts, is particularly well presented. The discussion of netness and grossness will provide an assist to many a struggling student. His chapter on inter-temporal and international comparisons illuminates as well as can be done an involved and underdeveloped area. Following his delineation of the basic concepts and relationships is a useful summary of estimating methods.

Part Three. Estimates for Selected Countries

Here Studenski reviews the income estimates of 12 countries selected for purposes of illuminating the types of problems encountered under highly variable conditions of institutions, development, and theoretical sophistication. Stated variables include: "the nature of the economy and its problems of the moment; the degree of appreciation of the importance of national income estimates by official and unofficial bodies in the country; the state of development of its statistics; and the imagination and competence of the individuals charged with preparation of national income estimates."

Most extended treatment is reserved for the Soviet Union because of its different concept of production, and the importance of the country. Defined as "that part of material product, evaluated in monetary terms which is created each year by the labor of society...available for consumption and accumulation," their measure excludes incomes from governmental and personal services. Material production consists of six branches: (1) agriculture, (2) industry, (3) construction, (4) freight transportation, (5) retail trade and (6) miscellaneous. After tracing procedures and quoting published estimates, Studenski points out the essential uselessness of the figures. This is not to deny the competence of many of the Soviet statisticians, or to doubt that data useful for domestic purposes do not exist. However, these figures the world does not see.

Canadian estimates are included because they are among the most advanced in the world, and are prepared by all three estimating methods. Netherlands estimates appear here both because prior to the war they were one of the best examples of the income distributed approach, and have since been extended by the other approaches. Swedish estimates are included because in their pre-war form they constituted a unique example of net output estimates. Germany is included because of features which stem from the historical development of the estimates, and because since the war the figures are for a divided country. French estimates are almost wholly new, and represent a complete break with the past. Irish estimates, also, are new, but they have been developed *de novo* according to U. S., British, and Canadian standards. The other five countries included are underdeveloped areas. Yugoslavia and Turkey illustrate the application of sophisticated methods to inadequate data. (Yugoslavia also uses the material concept of production.) Political importance of the country and use of advanced techniques applied to faulty data are given as reasons for the extended treatment of Indian data. Brazil is included as one of the few examples of an underdeveloped country using the income distributed technique.

Discussion of the estimates of these countries takes the reader over a wide range of problems, helping to reinforce points covered under the earlier discussion of concepts and methods.

Part Four. Development in Sixty-Six Other Countries

In this part, the much larger group of countries are treated in more abbreviated form. For the United States, the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth nations, all with extended experience in the field, only recent developments are covered. For underdeveloped areas in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and European countries which are comparative newcomers, the material consists chiefly of progress reports. In each case bibliographies for the individual countries are included.

Statistical Appendix

The statistical appendix consists of a summary table of the principal national income aggregates for 87 countries in 1955 or the nearest year. Also included are population figures and the dollar exchange rates for the national currencies.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF PRODUCTION AMONG NONINDUSTRIAL PEOPLES*

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A basis for predicting the receptivity or resistance of non-industrial societies to economic change would be most useful. In Organization of Work, Stanley Udy, Jr. compares data from 150 non-industrial, largely primitive, societies in an effort to provide tested propositions towards such a scheme. The attempt is a brave one, although the results are somewhat disappointing.

The study uses the materials of the Human Relations Area Files on primitive societies as the source of data. Udy has explored the "statistical co-variation of substructures of technological process, production organization, social setting and reward systems" (p. 125). Findings are presented and analyzed in the form of tables of association of the above variables, Chi-square measures, and tests of statistical significance.

Following Parsons and Levy¹, the author uses a model of industrial production described through pattern variables of functional specificity, universalistic recruitment, hierarchies of authority and achievement orientations in rewards. The interdependencies emphasized in system analysis and

* Stanley Udy, Jr., Organization of Work: A Comparative Analysis of Production among Nonindustrial Peoples, New Haven, Human Relations Area Files Press, 1959, pp. 182, \$3.95.

1. Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1951; Marion Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952, pp. 255-262, 421-444; *ibid.*, "Some Sources of the Vulnerability of the Structures of Relatively Nonindustrialized Societies to Those of Highly Industrialized Societies," in Bert Hoselitz, ed., The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1952.

functional requisites theory leads to expectations that these patterns will occur together, since each performs functions upon which the others depend for maintenance. Industrial organization is then dependent upon the existence of these patterns as an interrelated complex. As Udy uses this model, systems containing all or some of such patterns are closer to industrialization than systems with none of them.

A first approximation to the problem in primitive societies is given by the functional relation of work structures to technological processes. Differing kinds of technology may be more efficiently utilized by different work structures. (Unfortunately, insufficient data was available on structures of animal husbandry or primitive manufacturing.) The significant differences which emerged were those between tillage and construction work, on the one hand, and hunting, fishing and collection systems on the other. The "simpler" structures of hunting, etc. have specific goals, universal recruitment systems, and authority hierarchies proportionately more often than do the tillage, etc. systems. Udy finds this consistent with the system needs of the technological processes. Tillage does not require undivided attention at all times from the tiller nor is perfect performance essential for the individual or the communal tillers. Hunting differs in this respect. It often involves combined effort and the need for specific attention to the immediate task. Skill is essential and the consequences of poor performance are economically disastrous.

While differences exist between the production systems associated with different technological processes, there are many exceptions. There are many diffuse hunting structures, for example. These are not explainable by a theory of functional requisites of technology, and suggest, according to Udy, the pressure of institutional features, shaping production organizations in ways inconsistent with demands of technology. In analyzing the exceptions, Udy reaches an important finding. Most of the exceptions, in which diffuse, ascriptive and particularistic recruitment occur in dysfunctional manner, are instances associated with custodial recruitment (membership in the work organization is compulsory and control is based on ascribed power.) Such cases tend to occur only where a centralized government is present. Further, "bureaucratic" organization (defined as organization with three or more authority levels) is associated with custodial, rather than voluntary or the few cases of contractual organization. In other words, non-industrial societies possessing settled agriculture and a central government are further removed from the conditions associated with industrialism than are more "primitive" societies. Thus Udy concludes "... in order for contractual organization of the type common in industry to develop at all, conditions must be present which in themselves tend to produce custodial forms instead, without contractual organization having much of a chance" (p. 70). For industrialization to "take hold" in previously non-industrial societies, it must overcome the barriers of a social system whose norms are more opposed to it than are those of "simpler" societies.

In his analysis of rewards, Udy again uses a theoretical orientation based on functional requisites. Rewards institutionalize work by providing adequate motivations to performance and appropriate cognitive elements to

insure role differentiation. Such rewards are thus functionally necessary when the social system has not elaborated other ways of structuring motivation and cognition. Udy assumes that balanced compensation (workers and managers receive rewards for performance) is essential to industrialism and is maximized with voluntary or contractual recruitment systems. In custodial recruitment, however, the reward system is unbalanced and managers reap rewards without returns to workers. Thus achievement orientations depend upon institutional systems which minimize the role of political or class power in the distribution system. This is precisely the opposite of the conditions associated with settled agriculture and custodial organization. Allocation of products is also dependent upon the system of proprietorship, which is largely a result of technology, permitting the accumulation of produce to the manager or to the corporate body of workers.

In summation, Udy reaches the conclusion that the organizational form associated with industrialization, "bureaucracy," is less the essential element in duplication of industrialism elsewhere than are the institutional forms by which industrial patterns of specificity, achievement, and universalism are supported or rejected. "Bureaucratic" organization, among non-industrial, primitive peoples, is associated with institutional forms, such as custodial organization, which are otherwise antithetical to the pattern variables associated with the western model.

This reviewer finds a number of difficulties with the study, largely stemming from the mechanistic fashion in which the author has utilized the concepts and the theoretical framework.

1. Concepts are applied to case materials with little analysis of the methods by which the author determines their applicability to a case.

One example, and a significant one, is the use of the concepts "functional specificity" and "functional diffuseness". These, Udy states, refer to mutual role-expectations. "Division of labor content is deemed specific if organizational objectives are explicitly limited to material productive ends, and diffuse to the extent that other ends are additionally involved or where objectives are obscure" (p. 42). But when are ends specific or objections obscure? Judgments do not emerge by themselves from the data. Such concepts are not easily applied even in modern industry. An influential stream of modern corporation analysis testifies to a growing pluralism of ends in the operation of contemporary industry.² What are material productive ends, clearly pursued? When the farmer attempts to increase his total yield, is he

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2. Robert A. Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation, Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1945; A. A. Berle and Gardner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1932.

pursuing specific ends? When he joins with other farmers to restrict production in the pursuit of profit, is he now diffuse in his pursuit of material productive ends, but specific in his pursuit of profits? Unfortunately Udy assumes that these pattern variables, now having been rubbed by years of repetition, have become shiny with clarity.

2. The author assumes that the characteristics associated with industrial development in the western model are necessary to industrial development elsewhere.

Only insofar as Udy believes he has identified the essential patterns associated with industrialism can he identify specific structures as closer or further from industrial prerequisites. Thus he can state, with no attempt to document so significant an assumption, that "industrialism, so far as is known, depends on contractual production organization" (p. 137). This is a cardinal assumption in the judgment that custodial recruitment and industrialism are antithetical.

The problem of primary requisites for industrial development is hardly a question on which wide consensus exists in the social sciences. Analyses of non-western industrial development in the case of Japan have reported high levels of industrialization within systems which must be characterized as functionally diffuse, particularistic, and lacking intensive contractualism.³

A general difficulty in the use of these "ideal type" constructs lies in the failure to supply appropriate measures, so that we could know whether cases such as Japan contain more specificity, for example, than the tillage instances in Udy's materials. The concepts in pattern variable analyses, being analytical rather than empirical, have meaning as contrasts. A given case is more than A, but less than B and is hence capable of being described by both terms of the paired variables.

3. Covariation and functional necessity are confused.

Thus Udy tells us universalistic recruitment is functional in a hunting system because the skillful performance of each person is necessary to successful hunting results for the entire group. Since this consideration is not present in tillage, the functional necessity for universalistic recruitment is absent. Here, then, is the confusion implicit in the idea of "rational" administrative organization, which Udy uses as his model of industrial organization. If "rational" refers to a process of adjusting means to ends, both systems are "rational" for the problems set by their technologies. Similarly, in analyses of industrial rationalization, nepotism is viewed as irrational, yet to the manager intent on improving familial relations, nepotism may be more

3. Solomon B. Levine, Industrial Relations in Post-War Japan, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1958, Chs. 1, 2; James C. Abegglen, The Japanese Factory, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1958, Chs. 1-4.

reasonable than recruitment by skills.⁴ The problem is less one of processes of logical relation of means to ends than it is of the isolation of one set of institutional norms from another. As Tawney clearly saw, the freeing of economic values from control by Church and State was a significant part of the drama of economic growth in the West. What is functional depends on the value system from which efficiency and utility can be appraised. This is important because it means that the impedimenta to industrialization are not necessarily in the failure of the non-industrial peoples to think logically, but in the values and interests about which they may think.

4. Udy's use of social setting is too narrow to encompass variables which might relate to the importance of economic and technological values.

We learn nothing about the importance of work or of material products in the cultures of the primitives studied. Despite the large amount of past theories about work-oriented values in the western industrial development, we don't even learn the extent to which these societies perceive a realm of work as separate from a realm of play. Udy equates social setting for purposes of this study with proprietorship, recruitment systems and government. Value systems, stratification and other possible elements are ignored.

Similar narrowness exists in his view of bureaucracy, defining it by reference to levels of authority. Thus he ignores the valuational and qualitative elements usually appearing in classic views, such as discipline, close supervision, and above all, a system of authority resting on formal rules.

5. Udy confuses the problem of description of static systems with the problem of change.

The capacity of a society for change is not completely given by its present degree of similarity to a future possible state. This is Udy's major assumption, enabling him to assess the capacities of the two social systems under scrutiny. Udy assumes that because a present system handles work in patterns closer to industrial norms than does another system, the former will behave more industrially than the latter, if the external impulse is presented. Even assuming the similarity of the conditions under which the external change might be presented, the motivations to industrialize and the abilities to utilize capital must also be considered, as well as work habits. For this we need to

4. For a discussion of non-economic values in recruitment see my "Equalitarianism and Bureaucratic Recruitment", Administrative Science Quarterly, 2, March, 1958, 521-541.

analyze the differentiated structure, its power potentials, skills, and values.⁵

6. The findings are reported in a rhetoric inappropriate to his data.

Assumptions of the random distribution of error are necessary for the use of statistical tests of significance. These are not applicable to data of such uneven quality as multiple anthropological reports, at least not without much defense of the method by the writer. Here we have 150 societies described by more than 150 anthropologists writing in different times, within different traditions. The possible biases of language, poor sampling and the use of sub-units of a society are clear.⁶ A major difficulty, not treated in this study, is the tendency of such data, especially the earlier studies, to report ideal patterns of behavior and to ignore actual behavior or the conflicts and discrepancies to which even folk societies are heir. It is interesting that Udy does not report instances in which he is unable to code a datum, although with the clearest of codes there are usually some perverse cases. The difficulty in the standardization of this data is pointed out by the author's frequent use of much less than 150 cases, often only 50%, because data was lacking on specific items.


We cannot develop methods for cross-cultural comparison on a grand scale unless we recognize the very real problems in concept formation, theory and method to be overcome. Udy has taken a useful step in attempting a most difficult task at this point in the history of social science. We only wish that he had recognized just how difficult that task really is and had tried to cope with the problems it presents.

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5. A general scheme of approach, with a less narrowed series of variables, is presented in Manning Nash, "Some Social and Cultural Aspects of Economic Development", this journal, VII, No. 2, pp. 137-150; for an analysis of structural elements in explaining acceptance and rejection in specific cases, see Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan" in S. Kuznets, ed., Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1955.
 6. These limits on the reliability and validity of HRAF data are discussed in John W. M. Whiting, "The Cross-Cultural Method"; in Gardner Lindzey, Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. I, Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954, pp. 523-531; and in Oscar Lewis, "Comparison in Cultural Anthropology" in Yearbook of Anthropology, 1955, New York, Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc., 1955, esp. pp. 267-269.

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